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Abstract 
 
Immanuel Kant’s publicity maxim states that other-regarding actions are wrong if 
their maxim is not compatible with their being made public. This has the effect of 
forbidding dissent or rebellion against tyranny, since rebels cannot make their intentions 
and plans public. However, new internet technologies offer public speech from behind 
the “shield” of anonymity, allowing dissent to be public but preventing reprisals from 
tyrants. This thesis examines not only this possibility, but the value of internet-based 
discursive spaces for politics, their viability as a mode for political communication, and 
their implications for Classical and Enlightenment approaches to politics and intellectual 
virtue. Anonymous internet communications favour logos-based reasoning and discourse, 
which, in the liberal-democratic tradition, is preferable to phronesis and its attendant 
elitism and chauvinism. These technologies can open new vistas for liberal-democratic 
politics. 
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Introduction 
 
To produce simple tests for the rightness of action, Immanuel Kant proposed 
universal maxims against which they could be measured, rather like a litmus test for 
rationality. His search for an objective and non-empirical concept of the good and of 
justice made the existence and discovery of such maxims imperative. He proposed such a 
maxim in On the Disagreement between Morals and Politics in Relation to Perpetual 
Peace: “All actions affecting the rights of other human beings are wrong if their maxim is 
not compatible with their being made public.”  This is not only an ethical principle, but a 
juridical one; not only a part of a theory of virtue, but an actual principle which should be 
practically applied. If a plan depends on secrecy for success, whether because revealing it 
would endanger it, or because it would be likely to arouse vehement or even violent 
opposition, Kant reasoned that that must be because the plan is unjust, and as such poses 
a threat to all. Consistent with other philosophical applications of the Enlightenment 
project, this is an attempt at a first principle, an absolute law of the ethical universe, just 
as those of gravity are absolute laws of the physical universe. If we can make predictions 
and models of the physical universe based on the rules of gravity, so too can we judge 
actions based on these ethical rules. 
If a people were ruled by a tyrant, a cruel and vicious despot who committed 
many grievous trespasses against the rights of his subjects, and who, in the words of Kant 
himself, “would not be receiving unjust treatment if he were dethroned,” it would be 
wrong if some of his oppressed subjects conspired to overthrow him and put an end to his 
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reign of terror.
1
 If their gambit failed, they would deserve all of the torture and misery 
that the tyrant will no doubt heap upon them and would have no grounds to complain of 
unfair treatment, no matter how righteous their cause or how evil the tyranny. 
Kant’s grounds for this were the compatibility of maxims with publicity, public 
release and public knowledge. In his view, a constitution cannot contain an option for the 
people to rebel against an abusive ruler, for if that were the case, he would not be the 
ruler at all, and the state is not possible – it is internally contradictory for the highest 
authority to permit conditional usurpation of its authority, which could only mean that it 
was not the highest authority. Conspirators against tyrants cannot make their intentions 
public; their conspiracy is incompatible with public knowledge. Any tyrant worthy of the 
name would doubtless be so capricious and unjust that any person who publicly vowed to 
overthrow him would presumably be putting their head in a noose.
2
  
If it were not for the publicity principle, then it might be quite permissible to 
overthrow tyrants and remain in accordance with Kantian principles. All regimes are not 
equal, and as with Plato and Aristotle, Kant divides regimes into several categories. 
When one has law and freedom without force, that is anarchy; law and force without 
freedom are despotism; force without freedom and law is barbarism; force with freedom 
and law is a republic.
3
 Despotism is a defective form of a republic; barbarism is a 
defective form of anarchy. Further, people must strive to leave the state of nature 
(including barbaric or anarchic regimes), since to remain in the state of nature is wrong in 
the highest degree – as is upholding barbarism.4 As Arthur Ripstein points out, these 
                                                          
1
 Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, Appendix II: 1.  
2
 Kant, Perpetual Peace, Appendix II:1-2. 
3
 Immanuel Kant, “Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View,” 7:330-31. 
4
 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 6:307. 
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distinctions are important, for those examples of regimes which might embarrass the 
Kantian opposition to revolution fall into those categories of regimes which Kant 
condemns.
5
 Revolution risks throwing a society back into a barbaric or anarchic state, 
which is anathema for Kant, but if the regime was already barbaric or anarchic, then it 
perhaps it deserves to be overthrown since it would probably make things no worse if 
successful (one might cite the example of the Russian Revolution of 1917, which – 
notwithstanding the Kerensky interlude – replaced one despotic regime with another), if 
only that revolution could withstand the publicity test. 
I shall briefly visit an historical example of the problem of the publicity principle 
in rebelling against tyranny. Kant’s work is steeped in Roman Stoicism, and Kant was a 
keen student of Latin and of Roman authors.
6
 Through the histories of Plutarch and 
Appian, it might be presumed that he was familiar with Sulla, Dictator of Rome in the 
first century BCE. Both historians agree that Sulla was a vindictive, cruel and greedy man 
who rose to power through scheming and conniving, but his disposition did not improve 
after he had attained the highest office.
7
 Possessed of a violent and vengeful nature, he 
would order torture and execution in response to the slightest of wrongs. He became 
famous for creatively filling the public coffers (which, thanks to his corruption, became 
synonymous with his own) by dispossessing his enemies after their execution and 
robbing their heirs of their inheritances, and finding ever more trivial reasons to put 
                                                          
5
 Arthur Ripstein, “Kant and the Circumstances of Justice” in Kant’s Political Theory: Interpretations and 
Applications, Ed. Elizabeth Ellis (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2012), 68. 
6
 Martha C. Nussbaum, “Kant and Cosmopolitanism” in Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant’s Cosmopolitan 
Ideal, ed. James Bohman & Matthias Lutz-Bachmann (Cambridge, MA & London, UK: MIT Press, 1997), 28. 
7
 Bizarrely, Sulla voluntarily resigned the dictatorship and returned Rome to constitutional rule; perhaps 
even more bizarrely, the Roman people actually elected him to public office again. Perhaps he may not 
have been as tyrannical as Plutarch and Appian made him out to be – sadly, alternative accounts are hard 
to find. 
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wealthy Romans to death. Sulla was known for his practice of proscription, the 
publication of lists containing the names of those he had vowed to execute, frequently 
accompanied by bounties promised to anyone who would murder them. Sulla’s enemies 
lived in fear and in hiding while Sulla himself could – and did – publicly proclaim his 
intent to commit murder and injustice.
8
 Sulla, his actions, and his intentions were public. 
His enemies had to hide their actions, intentions, and even their persons. 
This fact, Kant argued, is the reason why it would be wrong in the highest degree 
to conspire and rebel against a tyrant: while the conspirators cannot possibly make their 
pronouncements public, the tyrant can. As the wielder of supreme, irresistible power, the 
tyrant should be aware that public knowledge of his aims alone cannot frustrate them. 
The tyrant conforms to Kant’s principle while the rebel does not.9 If this is not a defence 
of tyranny, then it is at least a principle by which tyranny can be perpetuated even if it is 
not lauded. One must hope that the tyrant has an attack of conscience, for efforts to 
reform his regime by force would be most immoral – as much, if not more so, than the 
tyrannical regime itself. The key issue is the essential nature of the state for law, right, 
and freedom. Although the state may not guarantee the presence of these things, as might 
be seen in “defective” states (a despotic state being a defective form of a republic, for 
instance), the absence of the state guarantees their absence.
10
 The republic combines 
force with freedom and law, and while all defective states forgo one or more of these 
attributes, a pre-political existence – the state of nature – forgoes them all, and to reiterate 
                                                          
8
 Plutarch, The Fall of the Roman Republic, trans. Rex Warner, Ed. Robin Seager (London, UK: Penguin 
Classics, 1972), 31-33; Appian, The Civil Wars, trans. John Carter (London, UK: Penguin Classics, 1996), 95-
98, 101. 
9
 Kant, Perpetual Peace, Appendix II:2. 
10
 Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, 7:330-31. 
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a point made above, to remain in the state of nature is wrong in the highest degree, to say 
nothing of actively trying to return to it.
11
  
However, I struggle to find any examples of revolutions which resulted in the 
dissolution of the state and a return to a pre-political existence. Some manage to remove a 
despotic or barbaric regime and replace it with a republic (the American revolution, 
arguably; but better yet, the series of largely bloodless revolutions which pushed aside the 
Communist states behind the Iron Curtain in 1989-1991 and replaced them with 
democratic regimes), others strive to replace despotism or barbarism with a republic but 
ultimately fail, succeeding in changing the governors but not the mode of government (as 
with the 1917 Russian revolution, or the French revolution, which quickly decayed into 
the Reign of Terror and paved the way for the replacement of a king with an emperor). 
The risk of revolution against tyranny might almost seem worth taking, in Kantian terms, 
for the worst-case scenario seems to yield no improvement in the character of a regime, 
while a well-planned and principled revolution may actually improve it. Unfortunately, 
such revolutions run afoul of the publicity principle above, regardless of their potential 
utility. To risk revolution on the grounds that to fail is no loss but to win may be of 
benefit is ultimately a consequentialist argument which Kant must reject in favour of 
axiomatic principle. 
The problem with this “defence” of tyranny (and although it is not intended as a 
defence, I use this word since the argument can definitely be recruited for this purpose) is 
that Kant himself is a liberal, committed to a free society, to democracy, and all the other 
principles which are antithetical to dictatorship. One might expect such an argument from 
Hobbes or Plato, who seemed to believe that human society needed strong leadership 
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 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 6:307. 
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above all else and that the iron fist was a necessary aspect of the state that ensured social 
cohesion and civil order. If rebellion against tyranny is forbidden by the publicity 
principle, then the transition from tyranny to liberalism in accordance with Kantian 
principles does not seem possible. Kant is no friend of tyrants, and even in his 
explanation of this principle, he remarked on how richly tyrants deserve to be overthrown 
and brought to justice by the people they oppress. There is an almost palpable lament in 
his tone; he regrets the fact that a tyrant can be justified and a rebellion delegitimized by 
his maxim, but there it is, he seems to say – would that a tyrant could be overthrown 
consistently with my principles! If we offered Kant a way out of this dilemma, would he 
not take it?  
The internet brings the remarkable combination of publicity and anonymity, with 
new technologies that can deliver a message to a global public without ever revealing the 
identity of the author. It provides the opportunity to conspire against the tyrant while 
remaining in full compliance with Kant’s maxim on publicity: the rebels can publicly 
shout their dissidence from the virtual rooftops and invite all and sundry to join them, and 
the tyrant, unable to break their encryption hashes, must resort to infiltration, violating 
Kant’s maxim in the process, and paving the way to a usurpation of his power fully 
consistent with that maxim.  
The proposition is that the internet may be able to combine public disclosure and 
wide broadcasting with the preservation of the anonymity of the author. It may be that 
this has been possible to some degree before; it may also be possible that the internet 
does not allow complete publicity and/or that it does not completely and unbreakably 
preserve anonymity. However, even if these caveats are true, the internet presents such a 
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huge leap in either category that we could liken it to the transition from the horse to the 
railroad, or from the written letter to the telegraph – while not entirely new, the changes 
offered are so vast that they are transformative not only upon the technology itself but 
upon society as a whole. This is the principal question I wish to examine: to what extent 
can the internet offer publicity with anonymity, and what does this mean for the Kantian 
publicity principle? 
Internet communication is not the same as personal communication, however, and 
the Aristotelian revivalists clearly feel that something important has been lost in 
humankind’s relationship to technology. I have therefore spent a substantial part of this 
research focusing on Greek perspectives on communication, technology, and the public, 
and particularly on those of Aristotle. I have done this for two reasons. Firstly, the Greek 
perspective presents an alternative way of looking at communication which is more 
emotional, more “human,” than the Enlightenment perspective of Kant and his 
intellectual fellow-travellers, but at the same time is more elitist, more secretive, and 
perhaps more open to disruption and deception, deliberately or not. I examine whether 
the internet is a better “fit” for Classical or Enlightenment visions of “ideal” 
communication, for if it is a poor mode for political discourse, then it can scarcely form a 
replacement for other modes even if it does have an advantage in anonymity. Secondly, 
critiques of the technological account are often, if not largely, drawn from the Greek 
account, and these criticisms must be investigated. In this work, I am comparing not just 
perspectives on communication, but perspectives on the definition and scope of the 
public, and on political discourse. Even if it is established that the internet’s offering of 
anonymity with publicity resolves an awkward paradox in Kantian thought, that is not 
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particularly helpful if Kantian and Enlightenment perspectives on political discourse are 
incorrect. For these reasons, I have spent considerable time on Classical perspectives in 
what is largely a research question focused on an Enlightenment maxim. 
The Enlightenment tradition views the loss or attenuation of pathos and ethos as 
positive and, in this tradition, the anonymity of the internet represents another measure 
against their creep into rhetoric and public discourse, and a way to better skim the cream 
of logos from arguments. Before examining the question of anonymity, we should first 
establish whether internet communication can possibly be either a substitute or a 
meaningful conduit for public discourse – for if it cannot, then the strength of its 
anonymizing technology is neither here nor there as far as such discourse is concerned. 
The rejection of pathos and ethos, and the attendant emphasis on logos, goes hand-in-
hand with the turn to techne – science – as the main or even the sole intellectual virtue, 
and this transition deserves to be examined. The first task in this work is to examine 
Classical thought on this matter before turning to the Kantian rejoinder, and to internet 
technology itself, as an answer to its conundrum. 
Part I: Classical Perspectives 
 
Without a doubt, the basis for Western political thought and philosophy is Greek, 
and this is no less true for our philosophies of politics and technology. Perhaps Alfred 
North Whitehead oversimplified when he remarked that “the safest generalization of the 
European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato,” but 
the point is well-made – any inquiry into Western political thought is at best incomplete 
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without first turning to Hellenic philosophy.
12
 If that were not sufficient reason, there has 
been something of a revival of Aristotelian principles in the twentieth century in response 
to the problems of technology. Even in some modern political thought that points out the 
problems of technology, much seems to be drawn from or owed to the ancients. For 
example, both Heidegger or Marx – at the risk of greatly oversimplifying their arguments 
– object to the technological worldview taking over all aspects of human life and society, 
arguing that technology plays a significant role in detracting from an authentic human 
experience, and that, while technology is not necessarily intrinsically bad, we need to 
exercise better judgement in our use of it if we are to preserve human dignity and the 
authenticity of human experience. This line of thinking (although it by no means 
encompasses their entire arguments) particularly seems to have been influenced by Greek 
thought, and therefore, a discussion of the interactions between technology and politics 
ought to start with Classical accounts of both.  
The Classical accounts I shall examine here are mostly drawn from Aristotle, who 
is more unequivocal than Plato in his meditations; Plato’s work is subject to almost 
endless reinterpretation as one is never quite sure, in the dialogue motif, if he is 
advocating for (or warning against) any particular concept. The City in Speech, like 
More’s Utopia or the opening chapters of Huxley’s Brave New World, may seem like a 
compelling argument for a certain political arrangement but also may be a caution against 
it. Plato’s definitions of techne and episteme are more overlapping and confusing than 
Aristotle’s, and his apparent advocacy of the ruler as technician, governing by mastery of 
kingly techne, may not be intended to be advocacy at all. These issues in Plato will be 
addressed below, but it is Aristotle, I argue, who offers the most comprehensive Classical 
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 Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology (New York: Free Press, 1979), 39. 
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Western critique of technology. As I have noted above, I shall start here in order to 
establish both the philosophical groundwork which Kant and the Enlightenment tradition 
later sought to overturn, and the bedrock of objections to the Enlightenment vision of 
political communication. 
The ancient Greeks have a different perspective on technology from either the 
optimism of the Enlightenment and the conviction of liberal thinkers that technology and 
technological thinking could change the world and human affairs for the better, or the 
anti-technological perspectives convinced that technology dehumanizes us, robs us of 
authenticity, or threatens our very existence as a species. However, the Greeks also did 
not understand technology to mean the same thing as it does in either of these views, and 
their definition of technology must be clarified first. 
The Greeks separated the concepts of techne and episteme. Techne is a craft, an 
applied form of knowledge aimed at working a human will upon an external subject – 
nature, or our fellow humans, for instance. Techne is practiced by the craftsman or the 
artisan in building houses, boats, or shoes. Episteme is what might be called “pure” 
knowledge, pursued without any obvious practical application in mind, or any practical 
application at all. Astronomy or physics would be examples, since while they might 
eventually produce a practical application, there is frequently no such obvious application 
at the time that they are studied (for example, the discovery of exoplanets, which 
“merely” enriches human knowledge since those planets are too far away for humanity to 
interact with in all but the most far-fetched fantasies of science fiction). When Aristotle 
offers his five virtues of thought – techne, episteme, phronesis, sophia, and nous – techne 
11 
 
is generally translated as art or craft, whereas episteme is translated as knowledge or, 
more specifically, scientific knowledge or just science.
13
  
To Aristotle, techne and episteme are clearly separate concepts. Episteme deals 
with first principles, which must be known but cannot be deducted from observation, and 
whose subjects are eternal.
14
 “We suppose ourselves to possess unqualified scientific 
knowledge of a thing,” he remarks, “when we think that we know the cause on which the 
fact depends, as the cause of that fact and of no other, and, further, that the fact could not 
be other than it is.”15 The scientific, then, is the search for first principles and root causes 
that depend upon no others. For example, the rocket scientist knows that to put a payload 
of mass x into an orbit of altitude y will require a Δv (i.e. a change in velocity, or 
acceleration) of z, and must design a rocket that is capable of Δv z in order to achieve the 
task of lofting payload x into orbit y. However, these rules – which might be looked up in 
a table without understanding of the underlying concepts – are not first principles, but 
depend upon something else. In this case, “something else” is the general theory of 
relativity, and if the theory were different, the rules governing z for mass x and altitude y 
would change too. The general theory of relativity is a first principle which does not 
depend upon anything else but is simply a rule of the universe, without further 
explanation or dependency. There is no other cause, and the general theory of relativity is 
universal and eternal; it will never change, and no matter where in the universe one is, it 
will always be the same. While the design of rockets is techne, a craft aimed at producing 
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 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 1139b15. 
14
 Ibid., 1139b15-35. 
15
 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 71b9-11, 94a20. 
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something in the world and which depends upon first principles but contains none, the 
abstract physics behind it is episteme.
16
  
Techne thus differs from episteme in its goals. Whereas the latter is the study of 
knowledge for its own sake, as knowledge of the forms tends to be pursued for its own 
sake, techne has a product and seeks some sort of increase in welfare. Plato offers the 
example of the physician, the physical trainer and the money-maker, whose arts aim at 
producing something that will increase welfare – the health or wealth of the client.17 For 
him, and for Aristotle, techne is a productive art which works upon the raw materials of 
nature or mankind, as opposed to episteme, which seeks knowledge for its own sake. 
In Aristotle’s account, while techne is the means by which we work with nature 
and bring the things required for the good life into being, phronesis is the virtue by which 
techne is guided to do so. Phronesis, the highest of Aristotle’s intellectual virtues, is 
defined as “a reasoned and true state of capacity to act with regard to human goods.”18 
This virtue is often translated as prudence or practical wisdom, but phronesis is the 
ability to make good judgements, to act in one’s own true best interests (i.e. to seek 
happiness in the truest sense – that which is sought for its own sake – rather than mere 
pleasures), and the interests of others.  
To clarify the difference between episteme and techne, especially with respect to 
the differing ways in which these kinds of knowledge are assessed by popular opinion, 
Aristotle offers the example of the philosopher Thales, who was criticized by others for 
spending too much time studying the heavens and not enough making money. Aristotle 
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 In all fairness, any rocket scientist worth their salt would also have a strong grasp of the episteme of 
orbital physics.  
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 Plato, Gorgias, 464c. 
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 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 1140b20. 
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contends that a philosopher has the option of turning his considerable skills to the making 
of profit, but generally chooses not to. Thales learned from his study of astronomy that 
there would be a bumper olive crop one year, but kept this knowledge to himself. He 
secured the hire of all the olive presses and made a fortune renting them out again when 
the olive harvest was taken in.
19
  
However, this is probably not a good example of techne or episteme wisely 
governed by phronesis, which is also probably why Aristotle chooses it to illustrate the 
example of philosophical knowledge being easily turned to other pursuits, rather than as 
an example of good phronesis. We could consider the examples of Jonas Salk, who 
developed the first effective polio vaccine, or Tim Berners-Lee, who developed the 
World Wide Web. Both men could, like Thales, probably have made a fortune from their 
inventions, but both chose to give the technology away, unpatented and royalty-free. This 
might be the outcome expected of the phronimos, who should not be preoccupied with 
wealth but instead be magnanimous and civic-minded, and it is the essence of phronesis 
in politics to act in the best interests of the citizenry as a whole. The reverse might be said 
of the scientists working on the Manhattan Project, who possessed the techne to construct 
nuclear weapons but lacked the ethical judgement to realize that the development of such 
weapons posed an enormous danger both to themselves and their fellow humans.
20
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 Aristotle, The Politics, 1259a3. 
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 While some contend that nuclear weapons may have guaranteed that a devastating world war could 
not reoccur due to the awful destructiveness of it, nuclear wars came within a hair’s breadth of breaking 
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Plato’s view differs in some respects, but nevertheless, episteme in the Platonic 
account is the ability to know reality – to know what is.21 This gels with the Aristotelian 
concept of episteme as the knowledge of first principles and the “rules” of the universe 
which do not depend upon deeper rules. Such knowledge is arguably knowledge of 
reality itself; rather than apprehending various effects and means, we apprehend the rules 
of the very universe – the rules of reality. Let us consider the Platonic forms. The forms 
are reality, as it is explained in the famous Allegory of the Cave, in which Plato likens 
humankind to a group of people sitting in a cave, chained so they may only see the cave 
wall on which shadows cast by firelight are thrown. Since this is the only “reality” that 
they know, they believe the shadows to be the total of existence and reality, not 
suspecting that there are real objects casting those shadows which they have yet to see 
and whose existence they have not guessed at.
22
 For an example of forms, we might think 
of geometry. A square is a shape with four equal sides and four right-angles. Anything 
lacking these attributes is not a square, but there is no greater degree of “square-ness” – 
the geometrical concept of the square is the perfect square, eternal and unchanging; 
squares vary in size but the larger square is not more of a square than the former. We also 
make the distinction between perfect, abstract squares, and actually existing squares; due 
to imperfections – however minute – in our ability to measure distance and angle, an 
actually existing square only approaches the form of a square to some degree. Perfect 
squares only exist in the abstract. Knowledge of the square is not (and, due to the 
imperfection of actually existing squares, cannot be) gained through observation, as 
                                                          
21
 Plato, The Republic, 477b. 
22
 Ibid., 514a-520a. 
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Aristotle would agree, but from abstract geometry and mathematics which allow us to 
know the “form” of the square.  
Techne is also technique aimed at a practical end for Plato, although he concedes 
that there may be some confusion between the two concepts. In the Charmides, for 
example, he observes that the techne of medicine is actually the episteme of health.
23
 
Techne could be simply understood as applied episteme, and this account of technology 
would not look out of place in the modern world. Anatomy or epidemiology might be 
examples of medical episteme, for example, which purely seek to learn how the body 
functions or how disease appears and spreads in a population. From these are derived the 
techne of surgery, which depends upon anatomical knowledge, or of public health 
screening, which depends upon knowledge of the spread of disease. There is a certain 
degree of dependency of techne upon episteme, and this can sometimes make the 
distinction between the two confusing. For instance, if the epidemiologist studies the 
spread of disease so as to produce better vaccinations, is this episteme, as she studies the 
disease for knowledge of it, or techne, as she has in mind the practical goal of vaccine? 
Plato’s evaluation of this tendency for conflation is perhaps a precursor of the blurring of 
techne and episteme after the scientific revolution, and, perhaps not coincidentally, Plato 
also makes a case for the technites as the optimal ruler, rather than the phronimos.
24
  
The Aristotelian relationship between phronesis and techne is not license to do 
whatever science and technology make possible, but is it not a rejection of science and 
technology either. Such a rejection would make the achievement of happiness and the 
good life difficult, if not impossible, for techne is what brings the material things required 
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for the good life into being. Techne makes the city possible – its buildings, streets, 
aqueducts, and so forth – and without the city, human flourishing is not possible. Techne 
also creates the opportunity for both wealth and leisure, allowing both magnanimity and a 
life of contemplation, both key to the highest levels of virtue. Unlike Rousseau, for 
instance, Aristotle holds that humans outside a civic, political environment with only 
their hands for tools can neither flourish nor be happy. The pre-political and pre-technical 
state is not an idyll from which community and technology can only detract, but a cage 
for human potential, to be escaped as soon as possible. 
Aristotle differs from the ascetics of both Western and Eastern traditions in his 
assertion that material things are necessary if not sufficient conditions for human 
happiness. This is plainly stated in the Ethics, when he bluntly posits that happiness 
“manifestly requires” external goods in addition to virtue, and that “it is impossible or not 
easy for someone without equipment to do what is noble.” 25 Interestingly, Aristotle 
remarks that happiness requires not just material goods, but also good birth, friendship, 
children, and even physical beauty (or, at least, the absence of ugliness), and therefore, 
that “those who are bereft of some of these… disfigure their blessedness.”26  
This is in marked contrast to Augustine’s admiration for the ascetic lifestyle of the 
hermit or the monk, to the conviction that earthly pleasures must be rejected for the 
ascetic virtue of the nurturing of the soul, and to his wholesale rejection of good birth, 
friendship, children, material goods and physical beauty as conditions for the only true 
happiness, to wit, closeness to the divine.
27
 The Augustinian position sets the tone for 
medieval Christian philosophy, and is possibly the first negative position on technology 
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in the Western tradition, as it holds that techne and the benefits it provides are only 
distractions from human flourishing. The technology that makes the City of Man more 
magnificent also makes the City of God harder to attain. 
The City of Man is all-important if one is to scale the slope of Aristotelian 
flourishing, however. The Aristotelian tradition favours technologies which make food 
plentiful and water clean, which save labour, and which make life easier in general. There 
is probably not much eudaimonia to be gained from doing the laundry or washing the 
dishes. Poor health from an inadequate variety or quantity of food is almost certainly a 
barrier to happiness, and the malformed or disfigured may come closer to the good life 
through cosmetics or prosthetics. Instead of Augustinian rejection, Aristotle argues for 
the management of technology through the intellectual virtue of phronesis. Labour-
saving devices may free time that can be spent in contemplation, but to spend one’s time 
in indolence watching reality television is a waste; plentiful food should not be an excuse 
for gluttony and immoderation, and plastic surgery in search of elusive social standards 
of beauty are not likely to lead to any kind of inner harmony of the soul. Techne must be 
ruled by phronesis; “to each man there comes just so much happiness as he has of virtue 
and of practical wisdom, and performs actions dependent thereon.”28 
This concept of technology ruled by virtue has enjoyed something of a 
comparatively recent revival, courtesy of thinkers such as Arendt, Gadamer and 
MacIntyre.
29
 The revivalists restate Aristotle’s objection to the decline of the Greek states 
whose politicians had given up governance and constitutions aimed at the good life in 
favour of a more “vulgar way of thinking” which pursues virtues offering greater utility 
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and profit for themselves and for the state, at the expense of virtues which pursue the 
genuine well-being and flourishing of the citizenry. If that were not enough, these 
lawgivers have also managed to acquire a reputation for statesmanship, and their 
constitutions a reputation for being the best-crafted.
30
 Comparisons to modern states 
which have all but handed over power to business interests, gutting philosophical and 
artistic programs and education in favour of science and technology as they go, and 
whose foreign policies focus on power rather than ethics, are probably unnecessary.  
This decline is held to be a consequence of abandoning the wise governance of 
technology with phronesis in favour of wholly technical aims. Aristotle specifically notes 
profit as one such aim, and this will seem familiar to anyone in the modern age who has 
wondered about the wisdom of the modern economic obsession with ever-greater 
productivity, efficiency, and profitability, while the standard of living stagnates and 
working hours increase, while material resources are exhausted and the climate warms 
ominously, and, most problematically in the Aristotelian paradigm, why happiness can 
seem so elusive to so many even in the midst of unprecedented material plenty and 
technological marvels which even the highly technical Victorians, much less the ancients, 
would have scarcely dreamed possible. 
If the Classical ideas of hierarchy in the soul and of the virtues are accepted as 
correct, then the problem is that the virtues of techne and episteme have been elevated 
above phronesis, when they should remain subservient to and governed by it. In the 
Classical account, both the practical application of technology and the pursuit of “pure” 
science have a role to play in human flourishing, and a valuable one – not for nothing are 
they both labelled “virtues.” For the Aristotelian revivalists, this is where the rift between 
                                                          
30
 Aristotle,  The Politics, 1133b5. 
19 
 
techne and “modern” technology occurs, once phronesis is laid aside in the 
Enlightenment and the scientific revolution. The Aristotelian concepts of the virtues are 
demolished. In discourse, logos gains complete domination over ethos and pathos, which 
are subsequently held to be fallacious and wrongheaded. Arguments made from emotions 
or passions are now held to be invalid against arguments made from logic and based on 
substantive, quantifiable evidence. Techne and scientific episteme are elevated, while 
phronesis and nous are marginalized or rejected.  
Nous is a concept like “common sense” or “intuition,” both of which are poorly 
regarded in the post-Enlightenment era as tools for apprehending the world, for 
governing oneself, or for governing others. Modern science has proven that sense 
perception and intuition are generally fallible means of comprehending the physical 
universe, at least, having given rise to concepts like geocentrism, animism, or 
abiogenesis.
31
 Discrediting nous in the physical sciences has arguably tarnished its 
reputation in other disciplines, such as sociology or politics, where quantitative, scientific 
methods seem to have become the most respected tools for understanding and studying 
their problems. 
The Enlightenment and the scientific revolution did not change anything 
fundamental about technology itself, the definition of which remains as it always has 
been: the tools and techniques to change our environment, to solve problems, or to 
achieve goals. “Modern” technology is not a different beast to ancient techne, but our 
approach towards it, and towards the other facets of human ingenuity, intellect, and 
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experience, have changed quite dramatically. Hedeigger, Arendt, and Marx do not 
contend that technology is inherently bad, but merely that we have given it an 
inappropriate place and priority, and forgotten our other virtues (although it is only in this 
great over-simplification that these three thinkers could be said to be in complete 
agreement on this matter). “Modern” technology begins with the enlightenment and the 
scientific revolution, and it is for this reason that the Aristotelian revivalists, for instance, 
do not advocate an abandonment and rejection of the technological as per Theodore 
Kaczynski, for example, but instead argue that we ought to restore phronesis. 
The break between techne and modern technology, or whatever alternative terms 
one might wish to use, comes about with the scientific revolution and a sea change in the 
way we approach technological problems. Pre-modern technology was largely – perhaps 
even exclusively – based on observation or trial-and-error. We observed what worked 
and what did not, drew our conclusions therein, and created our technological solutions 
accordingly. We had ideas for improvements or noticed that some accidents of execution 
worked better, and incorporated them into our technology. Modern technology employs a 
methodological approach found in modern science: the problem is first identified, and 
then hypotheses are developed, based upon our understanding of science, that attempt to 
solve the problem. We then move on to experimentation and prototyping, with 
refinements based on careful and exhaustive observation. The superiority of modern 
technology, in the wealth of its solutions and the speed with which it develops them, is 
obvious. One need only compare the progress of technology in the last three hundred 
years to that of the entirety human history before it in order to reach this conclusion. 
21 
 
Perhaps, however, there is more to technology than a simple acceleration of the 
pace of change, and another way to judge its success at solving human problems than just 
the speed with which it produces new artifacts and techniques. Francis Fukuyama, in Our 
Posthuman Future, offers a fairly representative example of this Aristotelian critique of 
post-enlightenment technology. Like Heidegger, Fukuyama feels that technology 
threatens human happiness and human existence, and like Aristotle, he contends that 
technology has the potential to be mastered by mankind and to serve as an aid to human 
flourishing. Religion has become the primary bastion of resistance to technology, but he 
considers this neither useful nor wise; rather, it is better that we return to Aristotelian 
ideals of justice and the good, anchored not in religion but in ethics and philosophy, to 
guide our use of technology.
 32
  
In the same volume and as part of the same project, Fukuyama also rejects the 
Kantian project of positivistic, universal rights and a priori ethical principle. The scorn 
poured on Aristotle’s naturalistic fallacies by Hume and his successors is ill-deserved, he 
argues; there are no universal positivistic rights, so rights ought to be derived from 
nature. Even the positivistic rights theorists, such as Kant, end up “sneaking” arguments 
derived from human nature into their theories – in Kant’s case, assumptions that humans 
are naturally rational, that they benefit from and use their rationality, and are capable of 
developing their rationality over time.
33
 
At this point, we should pause to consider the nature of the natural, as it were. The 
“natural” can mean two things: the innate, or the teleological. For example, when 
Aristotle talks about politics as natural to humanity, he means that it in the second sense: 
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we are not innately political, but we are predestined to form political societies. If humans 
were political in the first sense, it would not be necessary to document or describe the rise 
of the polis, for it would be naturally occurring in all human societies. However, for 
example, when Hobbes opines that humans are naturally self-interested and inclined to 
deception and violence when they further their own interests, he means it in the first 
sense: all humans have this predisposition, but it is not the destiny of humanity to live in 
the violent anarchy of nature, and not only is there something that can be done to resolve 
this, but there is something that ought to and must be done. If we take a teleological 
understanding of nature, then nature ought to show us the good or at least point us 
towards it. Nature as innateness, however, tells us nothing of what ought to be, only of 
what is (Hobbes found nothing good or admirable in his account of humanity’s innate and 
natural characteristics). 
Fukuyama’s idea is quintessentially Aristotelian in its account of nature, for it 
holds that a conception of the good can be obtained by observation and derivative 
theories. Nature here is meant in the second, teleological sense: from nature, we can 
deduce the good. It is fundamentally opposed to the Kantian paradigm, which will be 
examined in detail later, but which essentially rejects observation and empirical 
observation as means to truth in favour of a priori principles which can stand on logically 
firm ground alone, without the need for observation to prove their veracity. Where Kant 
considers nature, or makes assessments – however veiled – about the natural 
characteristics of humanity, it is in the first sense. Kant’s maxims must be freestanding 
and cannot derive from observation. Nature may support his arguments, but can never 
provide their foundation.  
23 
 
Aristotle’s devotion to observation has led to ferocious criticism; a great many of 
his scientific theories have since been wholly discredited, to the point of being considered 
childish and risible in the modern era, while his political works have been recruited in 
support of slavery or the continued subjugation of women. Although no critical study of 
modern, Western society could conclude that the problems of racial and gender inequality 
have been entirely solved or done away with (although it is fair to say that these problems 
have been greatly ameliorated since the abolition of chattel slavery and the granting of 
legally equal status to women), in the Western tradition the arguments for “natural 
hierarchy” have been not only discredited but perhaps permanently stained with the 
stench of the most reprehensible and odious of theories and regimes,
34
 and both racial and 
gender discrimination have become almost universally viewed as reprehensible – at least 
de jure, if not always de facto. 
In adopting Aristotelian theories of what is “natural” and what can be observed to 
be naturally good and just, Fukuyama comes dangerously close to suggesting that some 
degree of misery and suffering is essential to the human experience.
35
 He argues that 
human dignity must be derived from human nature, and this argument – although 
Fukuyama does not go so far – can be harnessed to support inequality, slavery, the denial 
of treatment and medicine to people deemed unwanted (whether due to undesirable 
characteristics or simple overpopulation), and so forth.
36
 This seems to be an inherent 
weakness in any argument that advocates for a certain restriction of technology and 
technological solutions. For example, arguments against biotechnology often seem to 
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take it for granted that biotechnology’s inevitable outcome is an artificially-created 
inequality, the creation of a literal übermensch, or techniques sought and practiced purely 
for vanity and conceit. However, biotechnology also encompasses an enormous variety of 
technologies aimed at reducing human suffering and extending both the quality and the 
duration of human life, many of which are inseparable from other, less noble 
applications.  
We may say that Fukuyama’s “defence” of human misery and suffering fits well 
with the Aristotelian account, which justifies much that seems unjust or miserable on the 
grounds that it appears to be natural.
37
 If Aristotle accepts that it is “natural” for certain 
people to be innately irrational and incapable of self-governance, making them natural 
slaves, destined for subjugation under their betters (for their own good, if nothing else), 
then it is not too far a stretch to accept that it is “natural” for certain people to suffer 
disease and deprivation – and why not, if the misery of slavery is natural? Here we bring 
together the meaning of nature in both senses: since the naturally slavish are innately 
incapable of self-governance, it therefore follows that they ought to be governed; if those 
who suffer genetic, incurable diseases and defects have been made so by nature, is it not 
right that they ought to be left to the fate to which nature has condemned them? 
This is the more monstrous side of Classical thought, which I introduce here as 
the beginning of my rationale for rejecting the models and ideas of the ancients in favour 
of those born from the Enlightenment. Contrasted against Classical appeals to virtue and 
character are ideas for governance and human interaction which are highly elitist, 
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denying rights, status, or self-determination to broad swathes of humanity, and inviting 
secrecy and coercion against the weak in character, mind, or soul, or even in the body. 
Such suggestions are profoundly offensive to the Enlightenment project, with its concepts 
of innate, irreducible and inalienable human rights granted to all, and its desire to reject 
the deprivations of our natural condition in search of teleological idealism in politics, 
society, and health which is not derived from nature qua innateness, but from panegyrics 
to the sort of people and society we wish we could be if we were freed from all the innate 
weaknesses and bindings which held us back. 
On this note, it should be stressed that the Aristotelian conception of nature as 
derived from observation acknowledged such human traits as speech and politics to be 
universal, but not autonomy or rationality. Aristotle observes that all humans possess 
speech, and that they all have a political organization of some kind, but some people are 
naturally slavish, and some are seemingly lacking in or wholly devoid of reason; 
therefore, politics must not be an innate, natural human quality, since it is not universal, 
but a teleological one. Aristotelian virtue also encourages this worldview, since the worth 
of a human is measured in their virtue – in how they act and how they think, which are 
variable in quality and quantity – rather than in their innate humanness. It does not take a 
great deal of imagination to extrapolate from that position that there is little natural or 
innate value in any individual human, only the value which they create for themselves; 
since some are hindered from attaining virtue by their ugliness, or poor birth, or poverty, 
it is therefore not unimaginable that there are some humans who are wholly without 
virtue – humans who are “naturally” worthless, ugly and impoverished in body, mind, 
and soul. 
26 
 
Aristotle’s teleological account of nature also includes institutions that might 
seem to be wholly artificial, such as the state, or slavery, since they “naturally” arise from 
human community, although it cannot be supposed that they are innate. They are not 
naturally occurring, but they will naturally come about. In this, Aristotle conflicts with 
Enlightenment thinkers such as Rousseau, for whom such institutions are completely 
unnatural and are not final conditions derived from the innate qualities of humankind, but 
synthetic artifices which “interfere” with the natural order. 
The state and politics are both things which naturally exist inasmuch as they are 
natural developments for humankind, as predestined as death follows birth – no human 
born will fail to die in time, and no community of humans will fail to become a polis in 
time (barring external intervention, of course; the fledgling community may be wiped out 
by invaders or by natural disasters, and eternal life probably requires divine intervention, 
although many religious texts allege that this is not only possible but has already occurred 
for some). This is laid out unequivocally in the Politics, and the stateless are dismissed as 
being either something other than human, whether by deficiency or by excess.
38
  
Aristotle describes the process by which human societies and settlements progress 
from the household, to the village, and finally to the polis by a process of “natural” 
alliance and social bonding, but since the end-form of human society is the polis, it is 
therefore a natural state of existence for humankind. Furthermore, Aristotle continues, 
since animals provide for the sustenance of their offspring by the substance of the egg, or 
the milk, it is also reasonable to infer that animals are provided for at the later stages of 
their development – plants exist for animals, and animals exist for man, whether tame or 
wild. Since nature provides nothing that is purposeless, Aristotle therefore concludes that 
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the fruits of nature have all been made for man.
39
 The entities of the natural world, be 
they animal, mineral or vegetable, exist for the purpose of human exploitation – it is 
natural, in the teleological sense, to produce finished goods from the raw materials of 
nature. Not just the social and political formations of the polis are natural, but also the 
physical and architectural formations. The final form of wood and stone is in the 
buildings and the walls of the polis.  
At first glance, this bears a curious resemblance to the post-enlightenment account 
of nature and technology, in the Baconian conviction that nature is there to be tamed, 
harnessed and exploited in the service of mankind, as George Grant observed, or in the 
vision of nature as standing-reserve to be exploited by industry and commerce, as 
Heidegger lamented.
40
 However, Aristotle does not conclude with this observation, but 
begins from it. Although he often takes the natural to be the correct or just ordering of 
things (again, one can refer to “natural” slavery), there are various possible permutations 
of this, not all of which are desirable. Although mastery over nature may be natural, it is 
possible to exercise one’s mastery over nature in a virtuous or a vicious manner, just as 
over one’s slaves or women. 
Speech, politics, and the perception of good and evil are natural to humankind, for 
any human community seems to naturally develop into a polis, since humans all possess 
language and will deliberate over how to run their collective affairs, and yet, as noted 
above, virtue, value, and autonomy are not innate to human beings in this account.
41
 Nor 
                                                          
39
 Aristotle, The Politics, 1256b7-26. 
40
 George Grant, “In Defense of North America,” in Technology and Empire: Perspectives on North America 
(Toronto: House of Anansi, 1969), 347-350. 
Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” in Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings (London: 
Harper Perennial, 1993), 322-324. 
41
 Aristotle, The Politics, 1253a7-17. 
28 
 
are all men naturally rational, and those that are not are naturally slavish, destined to be 
justly enslaved to men of reason. The use of the male noun is deliberate, for in the same 
breath Aristotle also notes that woman is naturally “inferior and subject” as man is “by 
nature superior and ruler.”42 Reason is the province of the ruler, whether in the household 
or the state, or even in the self.  
Aristotle divides the soul into the appetites and the passions, which ought to be 
ruled by reason. Like Plato, Aristotle believes that some sort of hierarchy of the soul, 
with reason as the apex, is desirable and necessary for happiness and virtuous conduct. 
People who are tempted out of their rational choices by appetites or emotions are dubbed 
akrates, incontinent, for their poor self-control will deny them happiness. Similarly, the 
evil are those who never make rational, virtuous choices in the first place, and their 
happiness will also be continually frustrated. Reason is established as the means by which 
we can obtain happiness, and Aristotle seems convinced that a momentary failure to act 
rationally or virtuously is owed to a momentary lapse of reason; consistently poor choices 
and bad decisions are held to be indicative of chronic irrationality.  
The innateness and the importance of politics to humankind is one of the very first 
points made in the Politics: man is a political animal.
43
 One aspect of the unique nature of 
humankind is politics; the other, speech. For Aristotle, this is also a natural synergy. One 
could not exist without the other. Engagement in politics requires speech, for politics is 
an activity in which we must engage other humans in something other than violence; 
violence is pre-political.
44
 Speech leads to deliberation, for if one can speak, one can 
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make a point and argue for it, and the ability to deliberate over power is a most political 
ability.  
Speech and politics as two elements of a whole can produce concord, and 
according to Aristotle, “the real difference between man and other animals is that humans 
alone have perception of good and evil, just and unjust, etc. It is the sharing of a common 
view in these matters that makes a household and a state.”45 The capacity for speech and 
the capacity for politics are intertwined, and concord leads to the formation of communal 
bodies and, ultimately, to the polis. The sharing of common views requires interaction by 
speech as, even discounting the possibility of persuasion, discourse is a requirement for 
the mere identification of people who share the same views of justice and goodness and 
with whom one can build a community. 
The existence of speech, and not mere voice, distinguishes humans as deliberative 
beings. Many animals have “voices,” and this distinction is still valid today, although the 
terminology may have changed. Animals can and do build societies of their own without 
the capabilities of human language, but Aristotle does not call them political. This is an 
important distinction, and the social and the political ought not to be confused. The link 
between human speech and human politics points to the classification of politics as 
deliberative, since politics requires abstraction and discussion above and beyond the 
simple gatherings of simple, animal societies if it is to discover or create a communal 
consensus on the abstract and philosophical concepts that give rise to political 
community. Aristotle dismisses all simple animal societies based on strength and force, 
such as lion prides or gorilla troops, as apolitical. In order for any creatures to be 
political, they must deliberate, and as only humankind has speech, only humankind can 
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deliberate, and therefore, only humans are political, since only humankind may deliberate 
politically. 
The essentiality of deliberation and speech to politics means that some 
deliberative space is essential for any political regime. Its precise nature or form may 
vary between states and regimes, but it must exist in order that citizens can deliberate and 
arrive at policy.
46
 The better deliberative space would be more inclusive and democratic, 
in Aristotle’s estimation, for the judgement of the many or the public is generally 
superior and better conclusions can be reached when more minds are added to the 
discourse. Aristotle counters the Socratic notion that matters in which expertise exists are 
best left to experts with the response that, taken as a whole, the judgement of the people 
tends to be more correct than that of experts, even in their fields of expertise, but this 
would require as inclusive a deliberative space as possible, so as to include as many 
minds as possible.
47
 In fact, a democracy should open the deliberative space to everyone 
so that all can be a part of the deliberative process that produces policy, and the common 
people will seek this level of equality in any event.
48
 However, given Aristotle’s elitism 
on the subject of the naturally slavish, women, and non-Greeks, and his conviction that 
only the social class of wealth and leisure can lead the contemplative life he holds to be 
ideal, it is not unreasonable to conclude that “the people” is not meant here in the same, 
radically inclusive way that the Marxists might think of the term, but is probably 
restricted to citizens, at least. This is not at odds with Aristotle’s opinions on deliberation 
and democracy, which are also elitist and restrictive in nature. 
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This, then, is the extent of the deliberative space in Aristotelian democracy. Like 
Arendt and Habermas, Aristotle believes that all citizens of democratic communities are 
entitled to participate in the political, deliberative process (although the conditions of 
citizenship greatly restrict the number of potential deliberators compared to 
Enlightenment visions of democracy).
49
 The specific sites of deliberation are not well-
defined in the Aristotelian conception, perhaps because Aristotle feels they are variable 
between regimes, but in a democracy, the simplest definition is that a deliberative space 
comes into existence wherever two or more citizens are gathered and engaged in 
discourse.
50
 This would generally coincide with the Habermasian definition of the public 
sphere, which “comes into existence whenever and wherever all affected by general 
social and political norms of action engage in a practical discourse.”51 The “fine and just 
thing” is for citizens to take turns in order to satisfy the demands of equality and 
similarity, so the deliberative space need not be one in which all citizens participate all of 
the time, but something universally accessible and through which citizens may cycle.
52
  
Rhetoric is the device by which we can persuade others of the truths we have 
arrived at through contemplation, but unlike the discourse found in the ideals of the 
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enlightenment, that persuasion cannot come as a simple delivery of reasoned, rational, 
logical argument and cold evidence. Rhetoric admits of persuasion, and persuasion can be 
used to deceive. The persuasive capacity of rhetoric has three elements: the character of 
the speaker, or the ethos, which ideally means an image of credibility or trustworthiness 
created through the speech rather than that the audience believes to exist before the 
speech has begun; the appeal to emotion, or pathos, allowing emotional content in speech 
to appeal to the mood of an audience and requiring an understanding of human character; 
and the rationality of the speaker’s arguments, or logos, which is what – in the scientific 
or Kantian view – would be the main or the only element, consisting of sound logic and 
credible evidence.
53
  
Aristotle rejects the arguments of some of his contemporaries, who contend that 
the character of a speaker has no bearing on his powers of persuasion. Ceteris paribus, 
the speaker who is either of a more upstanding, truthful, honourable nature – the more 
virtuous speaker, in Aristotelian terms – or the speaker who can create such a persona 
through speech will be the more persuasive, because humans lend support to an argument 
not just because of its merits, but because of the merits of the speaker. Pathos refers to 
what might almost be an act of self-persuasion by the audience via a strong emotional 
identification with the argument of the speaker. Appeals to emotion may often win an 
audience over, and one need not necessarily look to totalitarian demagogues to find 
examples of persuasive arguments based on appeals to (and the exploitation of) anger, 
pride, fear, or hatred. Finally, there is logos, the reason and logic of the speaker’s 
argument itself. In fairness to enlightenment thinkers, logos is the only component of a 
logically sound argument, which forbids appeal to emotion or authority as logical 
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fallacies, but Aristotle reminds us that logic and sound evidence alone do not necessarily 
make an argument convincing. Socrates discovered the truth of this, as his arguments 
were logically sound but often unpersuasive all the same; since all claims made in public 
discourse may be treated as opinions regardless of their internal logic, he was never able 
to satisfactorily demonstrate that it was better to suffer than to do wrong.
54
 
The wise orator would not only ensure that his argument was demonstrative, but 
should also perform a non-rational, emotive display to convince others of the rightness of 
his character, to put his audience in a receptive mood, and to accurately gauge and then 
play to their emotions.
55
 The persuasiveness of emotional display in rhetoric ought to 
seem obvious to an actual observer of politics, as it did to Aristotle, yet many subsequent 
thinkers seem to have forgotten this or at least to have dismissed it in order to advocate 
an idealized form of discourse devoid of emotional content. The superior speaker would 
not just make a logical argument, but aim that argument at the specific audience and bear 
pathos in mind.  
Aristotelian rhetoric is not overly concerned with dialectical deliberation, with 
truth, or with sound argument. Philosophy ought to be based in truth, but Aristotle 
recognizes that truth, logic and evidence alone may not be enough either to win 
arguments with others in the deliberative space or to win over crowds. Emotion and 
character play a significant role, but Aristotle believes that they can be manipulated, and 
a skilled orator could create a persona of credibility and trustworthiness ex nihilo, then 
proceed to ascertain and play to the passions of his audience; having done so, the logical 
soundness of his argument and the strength of his evidence would seem almost irrelevant. 
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Regrettably, rhetoric can therefore be a tool for deceit and manipulation, since the non-
rational components of it can be crafted consciously.  
Not only does rhetoric allow for deception, but the sort of regimes which Plato 
and Aristotle desire must depend at least in part upon deceit. Aristotle is coyer on the 
subject of deception than Plato, and perhaps his relative silence on the subject suggests a 
hope that the elitist regime he favours would be possible without wholesale deception, 
but Plato holds no illusions about this.
56
 In the Poetics, the former remarks that in 
composition “one should prefer what is convincing but impossible over what is 
unconvincing but possible.”57 Plato does not approve of deception in poetry, as Aristotle 
does, but is far more of a realist concerning deception in politics: the City in Speech and 
the Myth of Er both explicitly advocate deception of the underclasses in order to preserve 
the integrity of the state. It seems, with Plato, that it is not deception itself that is to be 
considered wrong, only deception for frivolous, anti-social purposes. This could not be 
further from the openness, publicity, and adherence to truth and fact above all else seen in 
the Enlightenment. 
The possibility of deception is doubtless affected by the fact that, in the Classical 
period, there was really no option for discourse other than personal, face-to-face 
communication. The agora was no mere metaphor, but the actual site of political 
deliberation and discussion, where people would be gathered together for interaction in a 
public yet also in a personal way. Each person would be exposed to others who could 
hear not only what he had to say, but see the manner in which he said it and the sort of 
character he was; in turn, the speaker was able to assess pathos in those he spoke to. Any 
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consideration of what might be lost in deliberation without face-to-face contact was of no 
practical purpose, an academic exercise which would suppose technology that would not 
exist for thousands of years, but in our age, that is no longer moot. Hannah Arendt 
discerned a fourth identifying, revelatory component in speech, an unconscious and 
truthful counterpart to the cultivated, manipulated and manipulative ethos. 
In acting and speaking, men show who they are, reveal actively their 
unique personal identities and thus make their appearance in the human 
world… This disclosure of “who” in contradistinction to “what” 
somebody is… is implicit in everything somebody says and does. It can be 
hidden only in complete silence and perfect passivity, but its disclosure 
can almost never be achieved as a wilful purpose, as though one possessed 
and could dispose of this “who” in the same manner he has and can 
dispose of his qualities. On the contrary, it is more than likely that the 
“who,” which appears so clearly and unmistakably to others, remains 
hidden from the person himself, like the daimon in Greek religion which 
accompanies each man throughout his life, always looking over his 
shoulder from behind and thus visible only to those he encounters. This 
revelatory quality of speech and action comes to the fore where people are 
with others… that is, in sheer human togetherness. Although nobody 
knows whom he reveals when he discloses himself in deed or word, he 
must be willing to risk the disclosure… In these instances [where human 
togetherness is lost]… speech becomes indeed “mere talk,” simply one 
more means toward the end… and [its] achievement, like all other 
achievements, cannot disclose the “who,” the unique and distinct identity 
of the agent.
58
 
 
This is not a mere repetition or reiteration of Aristotelian ethos, considered in the 
Rhetoric to be something that could be cultivated and affected as Mark Antony put on a 
façade of grief and anger to win a crowd. The nature of “who” comes across through 
acting and speaking, and the speaker can neither control it nor, in all likelihood, even 
perceive it. The wary member of the Roman mob should have been able to perceive what 
Antony was displaying without speaking and what he was not able to control: that his 
emotional display was faked, and that he was using rhetorical tricks to whip a crowd into 
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a bloodlust. Those who are willing to heed these messages and cues are able to find the 
truth behind the synthetic ethos. It is a safeguard against deceit, but it requires personal 
communication. 
The crucial aspect of Arendt’s proposal is that there is something involuntarily 
transmitted by the speaker in all speech and action, an undercurrent to the intentional 
manipulation of logos, pathos and ethos. Arendt believes that this is a necessary and an 
indispensable part of public deliberation and discourse because it allows us to see the 
“who” behind the speaker, and since it is not within their control, allows a glimpse into 
their true motives and character. Aristotle was correct to discern that the character of the 
speaker was important, but the audience desires the portrayal of an accurate image of that 
character, whereas the speaker may not. In fact, an accurate portrayal of character may 
even be disastrous for the speaker. It is in their interests to cultivate an ethos likely to 
show them as a trustworthy person of good and forthright character, somebody intelligent 
and educated in the matter under discussion, and somebody who would not deceive his 
audience even if they had reason to. In the political community, especially for a 
functional deliberative democracy, it is in the interest of the audience and the political 
community at large that the speaker’s true character be revealed, so that he can be judged 
by who they truly are, and not by the ethos they cultivate. Arendt argues for immediacy 
and physical presence. She insists on the primacy of open, face-to-face discourse, and 
argues that modern society does not allow a truly public sphere because it has blurred the 
lines between private and public so greatly.
59
 Without this face-to-face communication, 
the ability to perceive the daimones of one’s interlocutors becomes harder as 
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communication becomes more abstracted from the primitive immediacy of personal 
conversation and oratory. 
We have identified the Classical perspectives on the intellectual virtues, on 
science and technology, and on public space and public deliberation. As will be seen, 
these contrast with the perspectives offered in the Enlightenment, but they deserve to be 
examined at such length not only because they form the groundwork upon which later 
philosophical disciplines have built (even if they have substantially remodeled, to 
continue the analogy), but because, even today, they form a keystone in counter-
arguments to technological, Enlightenment thought. 
Before moving on, the role of phronesis as the highest of the intellectual virtues 
should be re-emphasized. Prudence guides and governs the correct application of the 
lesser virtues, including techne and episteme, and the role that habit, character, 
contemplation, and feeling have to play in phronesis deserves repeating. It is something 
that can be attained through good character and inculcation, through contemplation rather 
than (or in addition to) study, experimentation, and observation, and it emphasizes 
personal judgement in decision-making rather than strictly evidence-based and 
methodical calculations. 
On the subject of the intellectual virtues, the relationship between techne and 
episteme should also be restated. Techne works towards practical goals; it is an applied 
skill, like engineering or surgery, aimed at producing a change in the world. Episteme is 
“pure” knowledge which serves to increase human knowledge but without an immediate 
application (or perhaps even without any application at all), such as astronomy or 
physics. Of course, both astronomy and physics can have practical applications, such as 
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navigation or the design of integrated circuits, and I choose these examples deliberately, 
for they illustrate the blurring of techne and episteme well. It is easy to create these 
airtight categories for abstract and practical knowledge, but actually fitting fields of study 
neatly into them is another matter; Plato’s Charmides illustrates that much. Nevertheless, 
both must be governed by and serve phronesis if virtuous conduct, useful study, and wise 
application are to be achieved.  
In the Greek mode of thought, the public space is something which must be a 
physical space into which actors may rise from the private spaces of the home. The 
exercise of good judgement and the revelatory power of phronesis depend upon the 
physical presence of interlocutors. Discourse in the public space contains logos, but also 
ethos and pathos, and while Aristotle admits of their power to deceive, he views them as 
vital components in discourse and advises on their mastery, while his revivalists revisit 
them as essential, moderating influences over the straitjacket of pure logos which they 
feel has drowned out the other characteristics of rhetoric. 
The combination of requirements for phronesis and for participation in Classical 
public spaces lends political discourse an elitist air. Phronesis requires contemplation, 
contemplation requires leisure, and leisure requires wealth; Aristotle admits as much – 
the phronimos must be a man (and this is meant in the sense of “maleness,” not of 
“humanity,” for another aspect of this elitism is its gendered nature) and must possess 
sufficient means that he does not have to labour and can concentrate on developing his 
character, his soul, and his powers of reason. The agora as a physical space requires the 
same degree of leisure, moreover, since working people would not be able to take time 
out of their labour to participate in public discussions. Neither Aristotle nor Plato would 
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view this as a weakness, for they hold democracy in disdain if not contempt, and both 
generally advocate for government of the “superior” men over their less noble, 
intelligent, or learned fellows. This elitist view holds true throughout Classical thought, 
and while there may be much to admire in the ideas of virtue, moderation, and 
magnanimous character, it should be borne in mind by the careful reader that this 
philosophy is and has been fertile ground for despotism, eugenics, slavery, and 
subjugation. It is against this ugly side of the Classical view that the Enlightenment 
philosophers seemingly wish to be compared. 
Part II: Technological Communication 
 
The Enlightenment tradition is one which will doubtless be friendlier to modern 
ears. For all of the appeal that Aristotle’s arguments for virtue and contemplation have, 
the elitism, deceit, and heavy-handed “benevolent” despotism of the ancients is a heavy 
burden for that intellectual school to bear; unlike the Aristotelian revivalists, I find it too 
much so. Instead, I have turned to Immanuel Kant’s work as the “hope” of the Western 
tradition – egalitarian in nature, advocating openness and disclosure in public business, 
and absolutely unbending in its demand for universal human rights and human liberty, 
not just for elites, but for all. In place of Greek national chauvinism, for example, 
unpleasantly tinged with racism against the “Eastern peoples” and the “naturally slavish” 
as it is, Kant introduces universal cosmopolitanism, a political and social regime in which 
other cultures and languages are to be welcomed and included. Exactly how to implement 
this has been fraught with difficulty, and the concept is not without its own internal 
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contradictions;
60
 however, the teleology of this intellectual regime is one of universalism 
and acceptance rather than nationalistic domination, and I find that to be preferable – if 
for no other reason than that it seems to be logically far more defensible. Each nation and 
culture generally conceives itself superior, for example; cultures as diverse as the British, 
the Aztecs, the Mongols, and the Mali built great empires and subjugated other peoples, 
and each culture’s chauvinists had arguments for their own superiority and the predestiny 
of their domination which often seem indistinguishable. Absent a consensus on which is 
culture or nation is superior, equality seems the most mutually agreeable solution, for 
while all may want more, none would settle for less. 
Similarly, Kant’s arguments on human rights, liberty, and equality differ 
markedly from those of the ancients. Aristotle advocates the subjugation of women and 
the naturally slavish, as has been discussed above. How much this was actually intended 
to be practiced, or the reasons for his arguments, may be debatable. At the very least, 
though, it seems clear that Aristotle believes that virtue and eudaimonia are only 
available to the select few blessed with good birth, money, intelligence, and of sound 
body and mind. Meanwhile, Plato builds his City in Speech upon lies, deception, and 
what we would probably label the abuse of power; the lower orders are to be kept 
ignorant and fed myths and legends about the city and its class divisions, deceived as to 
the true nature of affairs for the health of the state and for their own good. The reverence 
afforded to the philosopher-king is strongly reminiscent of the cult of personality as 
practiced under Stalin or Mao, and although Plato believes that this tissue of lies serves 
the greater good of the state, so too did a great many under the aforementioned tyrannies. 
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Again, it is debatable whether the City in Speech is intended as a serious proposal or as a 
warning, or perhaps an illustrative satire of the sophistic arguments of those who might 
seriously propose such a system, but if Plato does not advocate it himself, he does not 
make that easy to see, and neither does he propose a better alternative.  
Kant’s maxims make all such regimes impossible. We must always treat other 
humans as ends in and of themselves, not merely as means.
61
 Consequently, we cannot lie 
to others so as to support a certain regime, and cannot use the “lower orders” to bolster 
the lifestyles of the contemplative class, even if it is so that some of the latter may come 
to phronesis. If that were not enough, the universality maxim forbids lying: if we are only 
to do that which we would wish to be done universally, then we cannot deceive others, 
for societies depend upon trust and concord which universal deceit makes impossible.
62
 
It is for these reasons that I use Kant as the central pillar in Western, liberal 
thought, and why I prefer his rational and egalitarian philosophy to that of the ancients, 
but as noted in the introduction, the “publicity principle” introduces a paradox with 
regard to rebellion against tyranny which I hope can be resolved by new internet 
technologies. Such a reconciliation would be useful, I feel, since there is so much of 
Kant’s political philosophy which is liberal, universal, peaceable, and uplifting, that it 
would be far better to resolve the contradictions in it than to throw it out or even seek to 
modify it with Classical principles offensive to Enlightenment thinking, as the 
Aristotelian revivalists might advocate. However, Kant was not the first in the 
Enlightenment tradition, and before turning to Kant’s work I first wish to frame it. The 
rejection of emotion in favour of logic and reason, the transition to democracy and 
                                                          
61
 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 429. 
62
 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 421. 
42 
 
inclusive public discourse, and the move from secrecy to openness are not concepts 
which Kant introduced but concepts upon which he built, and before moving on to Kant 
himself, we would be well served to examine them, especially when compared to the 
Classical perspectives which they reject. We shall see if the foundations of Kantian 
thought are solid.  
Perhaps the most profound change in Enlightenment thought was to replace the 
Classical conception of the intellectual virtues with one that downplayed or eliminated 
the importance of “feeling” and of contemplation in favour of logic, reason, evidence, 
and science. However, the first major Western thinker to place techne at the forefront of 
intellectual virtue may actually have been Plato himself, as noted previously, who made a 
case for the technician as the ultimate and best ruler of the polis in The Statesman and, 
most famously, in his construction of the City in Speech in The Republic. At the risk of 
repetition, Plato is something of an ambiguous writer and there are times where it does 
not seem clear if he is advocating for or warning against a certain idea, or whether his 
advice is serious or satirical. Thomas Hobbes is much more unequivocal, however, and 
makes a clear case for science over human wisdom as a means for correct governance of 
oneself and of the state in the Leviathan. Human judgement, which presumably includes 
the Aristotelian intellectual virtues of sophia, nous and phronesis, is deemed to be fallible 
and of use only when man does not have science to guide him. Human reason is reduced 
to the status of instinct or “gut feeling”: acceptable for use when time is too short or 
information too scarce for proper, scientific judgement, but to be abandoned 
unquestioningly wherever proper, scientific inquiry is practical.
63
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As Enlightenment science seemed to be answering the mysteries of the physical 
world in fields like physics, astronomy, biology, or anatomy, and disproving the theories 
of the ancients, perhaps it is understandable that Hobbes would reject Aristotelian 
conceptions of politics and intellectual virtue for those with a better claim to have been 
derived from science. Aristotle’s science was upheld throughout the late Middle Ages 
with almost religious fervour (and in some cases, the “almost” is inapplicable), and 
certainly would take a great deal of Classical science as read.
64
 However, so much of it 
was proven erroneous in the Renaissance, and the new science was supplying the correct 
answers. The advent of the scientific method also cast doubt onto the wisdom of the 
ancients, since rigorous adherence to the scientific method produced demonstrably better 
results.  
The scientific method requires four basic steps. Observation is first; the recording 
and description of some phenomenon which demands explanation since it does not seem 
to be explained by existing scientific theory.
65
 Next comes the hypothesis, an “educated 
guess” which would explain the phenomenon and needs to be tested – in fact, a true 
hypothesis must be capable of being tested; as per Karl Popper, a hypothesis must be 
capable of being proven wrong. Thirdly, the hypothesis must be usable to predict the 
outcomes of tests, or the existence or qualities of other phenomena, and fourthly, 
experimental tests must confirm these predictions. Classical science frequently or even 
generally stops at the second stage – Aristotle, for example, observed that mice came 
from piles of damp hay, aphids occurred on dewy leaves, flies from decaying biological 
                                                          
64
 Notwithstanding the “Dark Ages,” when declining understanding of Greek cut medieval Europe off from 
a great deal of its intellectual and scientific inheritance. 
65
 It should be noted that in scientific terminology, “hypothesis” and “theory” do not mean the same 
thing, and that “theory” does not carry the connotations of vagueness, imprecision, or guesswork that it 
does in common parlance. As far as science is concerned, “theory” means “fact.” 
44 
 
material, and so forth; he then hypothesized that it was these phenomena which generated 
the mice, aphids, and flies, and left it at that. Had he continued scientifically, he would 
not have made this error; a pile of damp hay, isolated and in a sealed environment, will 
never generate mice. The hypothesis would have been unable to predict outcomes, and 
would have been unconfirmed by experimentation.
66
 
Because of this, it follows that because the ancients often failed to conduct true 
science in their efforts to explain the universe, even their correct explanations were 
sometimes owed to luck – the broken clock is right twice a day. Their explanations may 
have happened to be true from time to time, but even when it was so, it was not because 
they had followed the scientific method, although this is not to say that when the ancients 
employed the scientific method, or something very close, correct results were not 
ascertained for the right reasons. For example, Eratosthenes’ measurement of the 
circumference of the Earth (probably 40,233 km) may have been accurate to within 1%; 
the correct measurement is 40,075 km. He arrived at this remarkably precise figure 
through scientific methodology, although there may have been some flaws in it. Aristotle 
proposed that it was 400,000 stadia, or 63,000-74,000km, depending on which Greek 
stadion one believes he was referring to (there were five, ranging from 157m to 209m; 
this problem also affects interpretation of Eratosthenes, who may have been up to 16% 
off – still, far better than Aristotle’s guess), and how he arrived at this wildly inaccurate 
figure is unknown.
67
 A true scientist should never have guessed, and Aristotle’s figure 
stands as an example of how poor Classical scholars often were at explaining and 
measuring the world. 
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All this cast ancient wisdom in an increasingly poor light from the Scientific 
Revolution onwards, and those like Hobbes, working in the scientific era, must have 
wondered how else the ancients might have erred – in philosophy or politics, in their 
accounts of the virtues or of the ideal composition of a polity. The difference could not be 
more clearly illustrated than in Hobbes’ recasting of prudence in Leviathan. Aristotle had 
understood prudence, phronesis, the greatest of intellectual virtues, to be practical 
wisdom – right action informed not only by intelligence, but by strong and moral 
character. Prudence is like an instinct, but one honed through a life of contemplation and 
the habituation of the soul to virtue, a “muscle memory” of virtuous conduct. Prudence 
cannot be a science, or an art.
68
 Hobbes rejects this entirely and frames prudence as an act 
of calculation, a judgement of future consequences based on knowledge of the world and 
of past events. Contemplation and character are rejected in favour of sensory experience; 
the prudent person makes educated guesses about the future based upon what happened 
in the past, and the extent of wisdom is the extent to which knowledge and experience 
make our guesses accurate.
69
 
This deeper difference between the ancients and the moderns (who, for 
argument’s sake, are those working during and after the Scientific Revolution) 
concerning the ideas of the intellectual virtues explains many more superficial differences 
concerning science, knowledge, and communication. The Greeks observed a 
phenomenon and arrived at a reasonable explanation; it feels right, because individual 
judgement – wisdom, phronesis, nous – is a virtue, because contemplation and the 
conversation with the other within the self are good and acceptable means to 
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knowledge.
70
 To the sons of the Enlightenment, this is wholly inadequate. One cannot 
simply say that something is true because it feels true, because one has contemplated and 
meditated upon it and because a carefully cultivated intellectual virtue has apprehended it 
as truth. Instead, one’s initial thoughts must be verified with empirical observation and 
testing; moreover, the scientific method demands that one’s work be duplicated by others 
who must reach the same conclusions in order to be valid. Individual judgement and 
internal wisdom are no longer enough to arrive at the truth. 
In this manner, some Enlightenment intellectuals sought to apply scientific 
principles to politics and society. Utilitarianism is probably the most obvious example of 
a school of thought born from these ideas. Kant is not a utilitarian, but utilitarianism 
typifies the rejection of emotion and feeling in favour of rational calculation and 
scientific principles so well that a discussion of this transition would be incomplete 
without it. In Aristotelian thought, with which this, too, may be contrasted, a great deal of 
ethics is left up to the individual who, being (hopefully) pursuant of virtue, will choose 
the best path. For example, Aristotle’s principle of the Golden Mean teaches that the best 
path is to steer a course between excess and deficiency. Too much bravery is 
recklessness; the citizen endangers himself and his polis. For the statesman, this is 
disastrous. History is replete with states and polities humbled or destroyed after starting 
wars they could not hope to win; the citizen-soldier endangers his own life and those of 
his comrades by his foolhardiness, and sagacious foreign policy may be thrown away by 
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reckless conduct on the battlefield. However, the deficiency of bravery is cowardice. The 
cowardly statesman is exploited, subjugated, or invaded when he fears to flex his military 
muscle in foreign policy, and the polis which pays tribute to the barbarians rather than 
fighting them may be only storing up future troubles. The cowardly hoplite endangers 
himself and his comrades as much as his reckless counterpart; to throw down one’s arms 
and run breaks the integrity of the shield-wall and endangers the whole formation. 
As simple as these prescriptions seem, and because of that simplicity, their 
application remains vague. It is left to the individual to judge where the Golden Mean 
lies. Obvious examples are well and good, but often inapplicable to realistic situations. If 
the Athenians have broken an enemy flank on the battlefield, is it brave or foolhardy to 
pursue? The overly cautious general may throw away an opportunity if he holds back and 
allows an enemy army to survive intact after a rout to fight another day, while the 
reckless leader may find his forces surrounded and annihilated after pursuing a feigned 
retreat. The correct course of action must be discerned by a general with sufficient 
wisdom and experience; Aristotle’s approach is to inculcate wisdom and intellectual 
discipline in the hopes of creating men who will be able to apply their knowledge 
according to their own initiative. In the military example, since a rulebook cannot 
anticipate every potential battlefield development, we hope to train and habituate generals 
to possess good martial “instincts” so they may make case-by-case judgements. We may 
apply the same principles, in Aristotelian fashion, to other professions and situations, 
including those concerning ethics. 
Utilitarianism – or, at least, some of the utilitarian philosophers – do not want to 
trust ethics to the judgement of individuals, however. The particular type of utilitarianism 
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under discussion here is act utilitarianism, as posited by Jeremy Bentham or John Stuart 
Mill. In this theory, morality is strictly linked to the consequences of actions rather than 
to principles, according to the maxim that one ought to do that which creates the greatest 
happiness for the most people.
71
 An act is morally good only if it is the act that yields the 
greatest amount of net happiness; all others are at least somewhat less worthy in 
comparison. There are many criticisms of this philosophy, for example, that there is no 
overarching principle of justice (e.g. McCloskey’s example, framing an innocent member 
of an ethnic minority for a crime when failing to do so would provoke riots resulting in 
loss of life).
72
 These critiques are noteworthy and deserve acknowledgement, and, indeed, 
they may be indicative of ways in which Aristotelian virtue can fill some gaps in the age 
of calculation, but they are inconsequential here. 
The noteworthy aspect of act utilitarianism is the calculation involved. It requires 
the actor to take a detached position as a “benevolent spectator” who disregards family 
ties, friendship, proximity, or her own interests in evaluating the merit of her actions, 
much like the scientist, who must disregard and enact strict experimental controls so as to 
eliminate her own feelings and biases from the results.
73
 Again, the contrast with 
Classical perspectives is obvious. In the Ethics, Aristotle spends two books on the subject 
of friendship, concluding that the best form of friendship is that in which each friend 
wishes good upon the other for his friend’s own sake.74 It is an admirable thing to favour 
one’s friends and wish the best for them; far more admirable than to have friends merely 
because one finds their company pleasant or because they are useful to one in some way. 
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To treat one’s friends favourably, then, is not only understandable, but virtuous and 
moral. This idea is reprehensible to act utilitarianism, under which friendship must never 
form the basis for one’s acts. One may wish good things for one’s friends, but one cannot 
act to bring them about (except if such an action also produces the greatest happiness). 
This returns us to the familiar theme of the Enlightenment: the divorce of reason 
and calculation from the realms of feeling and emotion. Philia is borne of feeling, not 
reason; one should not choose one’s friends or lovers by means of rational utility-
calculation (for if one does, then one has only built relationships based upon utility, and 
that sort of relationship is the basest, most fleeting, and ultimately the least rewarding) 
but, when feeling has led us to friendship, the Classical view is that one ought to do good 
for one’s friends as far as is possible. According to the utilitarians, the feelings of 
friendship are obstacles to right thought that must be overcome – one ought to cast aside 
affection and feeling, disregard one’s friendships, and act purely according to what 
reason has laid out as the calculated path to a quantifiable greater good. 
This leads to another remarkable aspect of act utilitarianism, and one which has 
also been subject to criticism: the calculation of happiness. In order to work correctly, the 
prescriptions for the good society require that happiness be calculable and quantifiable, 
like commodities or money. Commerce and science lend themselves easily to cold 
rationality; whichever business model leads to the greatest profit is the best, and the 
greatest profit is easy to measure: a hundred dollars is always worth ten times as much as 
ten dollars, and thus, a hundred dollars is always preferable to ten dollars – or, even more 
precisely, a hundred dollars is better than ten dollars by a factor of ten. The idea that 
happiness or virtue might be reduced to such easily calculable and quantifiable means 
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would probably have been laughable to the ancients, and yet the act utilitarians not only 
proposed precisely that, but actively pursued ways in which to measure and calculate 
happiness. 
This form of utilitarianism, divorced from much of what the ancients defined as 
essential to humanity, can seem quite chilling; as with Classical philosophy, there is a 
sinister side. One of the most troubling projects derived from this coldly calculating view 
of politics and society was the Panopticon, Bentham’s radical new concept for the design 
of a prison. Bentham believed that the principles and the design of the Panopticon could 
be applied on a grand social scale, and that it would achieve the promises made for the 
utopias of Plato or More – “Morals reformed - health preserved - industry invigorated 
instruction diffused - public burthens lightened - Economy seated, as it were, upon a rock 
- the Gordian knot of the Poor-Laws are not cut, but untied - all by a simple idea in 
Architecture!”75 While there is something unsettling, even nightmarish, about the City in 
Speech or Utopia, the ambiguity of Plato and More leaves the reader to wonder if they 
were written as warnings, visions of a totalitarian hell where individual will withers and 
dies. Bentham, however, offers nothing but sincere belief that the Panopticon will fulfill 
the grandiose promises he has made on its behalf, even going so far as to commission an 
architect to draw up plans for it, and persuading the government to embark on its 
construction and purchase land worth £12,000 (worth approximately £13 million in 
2012).
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The concept of the Panopticon was a prison where each prisoner could be 
observed by the warden at any time, but could never know if he was being observed. 
Good behaviour on the part of the prisoners could be ensured with only one warden on 
duty, since if the prisoner was unaware if he was being observed at any given time, his 
safest course of action would be to assume he was always being observed. Bentham 
imagined that this principle could be extended to society at large in order to eliminate 
crime, laziness, the defrauding of the welfare state, and so forth; Foucault, quite 
famously, argued that it already had been.
77
 Foucault understood discipline not 
exclusively as the exercise of power by authorities over the subservient, but a general 
function of power exercised by all, enforced not only by the state but by friends, 
neighbours and colleagues who ceaselessly observe each other and enforce rules and 
norms by censure and ostracism. In the increasingly interconnected and public world, the 
link to Panopticism becomes obvious; as the threshold between the public and the private 
realms becomes increasingly blurred and irrelevant, as Arendt noted, one is truly never 
sure when one is being observed.
78
 
In the age of social media, this is even truer, and the advents of the Tweet and the 
Status Update have introduced an element of self-observation to Panopticism. The 
“prisoner” himself now often generates the observations which are surveilled by the rest 
of society, with the attendant exercise of power over nonconformists, as suffered by those 
people who find themselves dismissed because they were “tagged” in a photographic 
record of drunken revelry, or ostracized by their families after being inadvertently outed 
in a status update. To this must be added the recent revelations (at the time of writing) 
                                                          
77
 Michel Foucault, “Panopticism,” in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Vintage, 2010), 
206-213. 
78
 Arendt, The Human Condition, 24-33. 
52 
 
concerning the PRISM program, under which American intelligence agencies have been 
clandestinely harvesting intelligence from all manner of online communications and 
media, including those expressly designated as private and even those which were 
encrypted. Clearly, the Foucauldian interpretation of omnipresent Panopticism is truer 
than ever in the internet age, but Panopticism is also an example of the tendency of 
scientific thought, when applied to the social sciences and philosophy, to desire control 
and regimentation. Act-utilitarianism and Panopticism are extreme examples against 
which the objections of the Aristotelian revivalists reverberate most clearly, but for all 
that, it is not the case that the Enlightenment approach to communication and the public 
space is always necessarily cold, controlling, or frightening.
79
 As has been noted above, 
Classical perspectives sometimes advocate secrecy and deceit in public discourse, but 
there is a strong current in Enlightenment thought not for spying and the exercise of 
power, but for publicity, openness, and full disclosure. 
In Of Publicity, Bentham argues that publicity must be sought for its beneficial 
effects on the population. He divides the public into three classes. The first contains the 
vast majority of people, who will never inform themselves or produce reasoned 
arguments or opinions (Bentham attributes this torpor to a lack of time and leisure, which 
is a much more charitable analysis than that of many other thinkers) and to whom the 
public disclosure of information would make no difference since they have no real 
interest in public affairs in any case. The second group are those who “borrow” opinions 
and judgements from others because they lack the time to consider and judge information 
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for themselves, while the third are those who can take and process information, who are 
capable of critical thought, and who will actually judge for themselves. The third class 
will be in a better position to make correct judgements if information is free and public, 
and the second, insomuch as they parrot the opinions of the third, will also benefit as the 
decisions of the third group “trickle down.”80 
This argument is entirely consequentialist: publicity produces better outcomes for 
society. The public will be better off when information is made available to them, better 
decisions will be made, and better outcomes arrived at. Science depends on openness, 
upon free access to information and the free flow of ideas. Peer-review and the scientific 
method rely upon as many eyes as possible examining experiments and results; in 
politics, sound judgement depends upon information reaching as many individuals as 
possible. This is why Bentham, the scientific-era consequentialist, supported publicity so 
absolutely. Classical views, which are elitist inasmuch as not all individuals are possessed 
of the training or the virtue to make sound judgements, do not require publicity. In fact, 
full public disclosure in politics may be harmful – the naturally slavish are liable to make 
poor judgements. In both Plato and Aristotle, there is a common theme that one ought to 
be ruled by one’s betters, but such an elitist and undemocratic mode of governance 
depends upon at least a measure of secrecy and upon restricting information from the 
public. As I have remarked before, the engineering of myth is one such deceit; myth 
passed on in genuine belief is one thing, but myth created from whole cloth to serve the 
interests of the state is another. Such myth also makes it harder to think critically about 
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the state; witness the effect that mythology and blind tradition have had on public 
discourses over the rights of women or ethnic minorities, for instance. 
The scientific era, and the philosophers who worked in it, changed our modes of 
thinking about publicity and free information. Rather than observation, and especially 
tradition and myth, we would make our decisions and our policies based upon the 
scientific method, with hypothesis, experimentation, and verification. Rather than being 
governed by elites recruited for their virtues and their strength of character, we would be 
governed by experts in a technocratic manner. These experts depend upon publicity and 
the free flow of information to make their decisions, just as science depends upon them.  
The obvious and clear example of the consequentialists establishes the tone of the 
Enlightenment challenge to Classical perspectives on publicity and communication. 
However, even as it protests the Classical resort to secrecy, deceit, and elitism, as has 
been seen, there are more sinister aspects of act-utilitarianism as well – the strict 
consequentialism which can sometimes lead to the trampling of individual interests, and 
the drive towards social engineering and Panopticism, reminiscent of the ancients albeit 
differing in tone. In answer to these problems, I wish to introduce the thought of 
Immanuel Kant, who inherits much of the Enlightenment tradition as it pertains to 
openness, publicity, and the rejection of elitism, but introduces a strict code of individual 
rights derived from axiomatic principle, rather than either a conception of virtue or from 
the rational calculation of outcomes. Rather than the act-utilitarian’s adherence to 
consequences as the sole measure of morality, Kantian deontology asks how an action 
conforms to a set of rules as a gauge of its morality. Perhaps the Kantian approach is the 
more truly “scientific,” for Kant sets off in search of the first principles, the a priori rules, 
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of ethics. Just as the scientist wishes to discover the irreducible laws of the universe, 
dependent upon nothing further, which can be used to model and describe the world, 
Kant looks for those irreducible rules of morality which depend upon nothing else, and 
which can be used to decide what is moral – to build a model of morality. 
To reiterate Kant’s position on publicity and rebellion, as given in the 
introduction, it is that “all actions affecting the rights of other human beings are wrong if 
their maxim is not compatible with their being made public.” This is argued to forbid 
rebellion against tyranny, for the rebels cannot make their position publicly known. To 
the utilitarians and other consequentialists, Kant’s publicity principle must surely seem 
startling and alarming, for it purports to ascertain the legitimacy of power without any 
deliberation or consideration over how that power is used. It is rather reminiscent of the 
Hobbesian principle that a tyrant can never be justifiably overthrown, although Hobbes 
himself argued from consequentialist grounds – the potential breakdown of society risked 
by rebellion – rather than because rebellion violated any a priori principle. The Kantian 
approach seems rather different from those of the Enlightenment consequentialists, but it 
is actually quite similar. They both leave behind the Aristotelian ideas that ethical and 
moral questions cannot be answered from a rulebook but must be judged by an individual 
whose wisdom and sense of justice have been carefully cultivated. In law, the Classical 
perspective would be equivalent to leaving sentencing entirely in the hands of a judge 
whose expertise is trusted to produce justice; in medicine, to leaving diagnosis entirely in 
the hands of the physician who is well-trained but, nevertheless, whose intuition and 
judgement are ultimately responsible for the outcomes he produces.
81
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Kant’s argument might be situated as giving rise to a consequentialist 
interpretation. The example of the tyrant invokes fears of the punishment which a tyrant 
could inflict upon us. It might be assumed that nobody could conspire publicly against 
the tyrant for fear of the rap at the door in the middle of the night from the agents of some 
Cheka or Stasi, or for fear of appearing on some proscription list, but still, there might be 
the incredibly brave (or incredibly stupid) who would make their opposition known 
regardless.  
Kant’s position is that the public conspiracy, if such a thing could exist, is self-
defeating, internally inconsistent, and logically impossible. It is irrelevant that its 
members depend on secrecy to survive, because the idea of the conspiracy itself depends 
on secrecy. Were it proclaimed and all its members exposed, even if those members did 
not fear death, the tyrant could snuff it out before it had had a chance to recruit anyone or 
gain any traction. A blasé attitude towards the fate of the individual conspirators is not at 
all helpful to the health of the conspiracy, since the conspiracy cannot survive the 
conspirators. Kant sees three primary reasons for undertaking actions in secret: because 
open declaration would conflict with the intentions of the action, because open 
declaration would endanger the success of the action, and because open declaration 
would generate opposition from others.
82
 The safety of the secret actors themselves is 
never listed as a factor. 
Bentham’s tripartite definition of the public also forces us to question the nature 
of “the public” itself. The threefold Benthamite public is a refinement of a dualistic 
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definition, whose two aspects Jodi Dean defines as the “public-supposed-to-know” and 
the “public-supposed-to-believe.” The first reflect Bentham’s conception of an 
incorruptible and powerful “judiciary,” whether they exercise formal, juridical powers or 
not, who require information in order to produce the more-or-less unerring judgement 
which Bentham expects from them. The second are closer to Bentham’s class of the 
“borrowers of opinion” – a naïve, credulous mass that accepts and repeats the loudest and 
most prevalent of ideas offered in public discourse.
83
 In John Stuart Mill’s marketplace of 
ideas, these are the readers of the best-sellers and the airport novels, the viewers of the 
summer blockbuster movies, and the audience for Top 20 singles – popular, uninspired, 
unaesthetic, and devoid of nuance or insight. 
Dean goes on to ask how we could even believe in something like the popular 
conception of the public as a single body, homogenous and monolithic as it is supposed 
to be. We cannot reduce the public simply to the polled, or to the electorate, or to the 
voters, while our increasingly multicultural and multilingual societies preclude unity 
along cultural, linguistic, racial, or religious lines. Even the culturally and ethnically 
homogenous society is fractured by gender, class, wealth, social status, and age. That 
being the case, what sense does it make to discuss some universal “we” to whom virtually 
everybody is some sort of exception or another?
84
 
These objections to the notion of the unified public are post-Kantian; Kant 
himself took publicity as a potential. Because Kant is not a consequentialist, the problems 
of what the public may do with the information are irrelevant; publicity is desirable as an 
axiom. As a consequentialist, Bentham is obliged to consider the results of publicity in 
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his examination of it. In such a manner, the question of to whom information is released, 
and what that audience will make of it, is as important as what that information is, since it 
is of virtually equal weight in assessing the results of such a release. Information made 
available to the indifferent will have no effect. Information made available to those who 
simply do not care is worth nothing.  
Kant has no use for distinctions between different categories of the public. As a 
deontologist, the principle itself is what matters. Publicity is a principle to be followed, 
and so that principle alone becomes the arbiter of the good. Thus, Kant can fully justify 
his position on rebellion against tyranny. The consequentialist would argue that a tyrant 
can justly be overthrown and that rebellion against a tyrant is righteous because of the 
preferable consequences which it brings about; Kant can argue that the rebellion is wrong 
because it does not adhere to a priori principle. Publicity effectively becomes a form of 
control, as Habermas pointed out; it becomes a force for legitimation because it can wear 
a cloak of reason.
85
 The tyrant can claim to adhere to a principle which his opponents 
cannot; the tyranny which drove them underground becomes a vehicle of legitimation 
while the rebels are labelled as rats, cockroaches, or those other pests and vermin which 
scurry away from the light. Sulla could claim to be a legitimate ruler because his 
proscriptions were public and he had to hide nothing; he could also claim his enemies 
(real or imagined) had no legitimate claim against him which could be voiced in the same 
forums where he had displayed their death warrants. Power was his for as long as he 
could cling to it, for Kant also wrote that since rebellion was the highest of wrongs, a 
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deposed tyrant would run afoul of the same problem and could not rightfully engineer his 
own return to power in secret.
86
 
In Kant’s time, publicity was invariably tied to identifiability. These ties were not 
always drawn tight, but they were always there, and the threads of any conspiracy would 
eventually lead back to the conspirator if followed with sufficient cunning and vigour. 
The anti-espionage activities of both the CIA and the KGB, for instance, relied upon this 
theory. Informants can be hired, dead drops can be surveilled, mail opened, phones 
tapped, apartments bugged, and suspects tailed. Had the British colonial government been 
such past masters at counter-espionage as the KGB, even a mere agitator (rather than an 
outright rebel) such as Thomas Paine might very well have found himself under arrest. 
Even if it were possible for him to remain anonymous indefinitely, any group swayed by 
his arguments could not have been nearly so circumspect if they wished to actually apply 
his ideas. Guy Fawkes’s conspiracy came undone when one of the conspirators revealed 
the plot in a letter of warning. That plot had to be made public, in at least a very limited 
way, not just to recruit enough members but to produce the insurgency the conspirators 
hoped for after the destruction of Parliament. The only way to remain truly anonymous 
was to conspire only in one’s own mind; the more an idea is shared with others, the more 
likely it is to become public. 
However, something Kant could not have foreseen was the possibility of publicity 
without attendant identifiability. Many of the dialogues concerning the internet involve 
the issues of increased exposure and the lack of privacy that the proliferation of both 
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social networking sites and “spyware” have raised.87 However, it is also nevertheless 
possible to use the internet without being identified (much less profiled for marketing 
purposes), and without an unauthorized interceptor of one’s communications being able 
to view their contents.
88
 Kant’s hopes at the time of writing were that technology would 
continue to bring humanity closer together on a spherical and finite earth on whose 
surface we cannot escape from one another. He mentioned the ship and the camel as 
bringing humans from diverse and separate places together so that the peoples of distant 
continents could enter into peaceful relations, one day to be governed by public laws, to 
further the advancement of the cosmopolitan constitution.
89
 What would he have thought 
of the railroad, the telegraph, or the telephone, let alone the internet? 
Perhaps Kant even anticipated online communication. It may seem ridiculous to 
propose that an 18
th
 century philosopher foresaw the internet, but Habermas remarks 
upon the incredible prescience and insight in Kant’s anticipation of the global public 
sphere, in which the degree of global interconnectedness is such that injustice anywhere 
in the world will be felt everywhere in the world, which is the only way to make the 
continual advance towards perpetual peace.
90
 This passage seems to refer to the internet 
or something very much like it, a truly global and universal community such as Kant 
might have dreamed of, and one which has become a vehicle for fighting tyranny and 
oppression. The use of the internet and new social media in the quest of so many Arab 
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citizenries for democracy and human rights – a most cosmopolitan quest – cannot be 
ignored. Neither can the importance of the internet in bringing the matter to the attention 
of the entire world, which has made the affair of Arab human rights into an affair of all 
humanity. It is hard to imagine what Kant might have been speaking of, if not this.  
Internet technology has provided the possibility for securely private and 
anonymous communication, even where oppressive state censorship and surveillance is 
found. For example, it is possible to send e-mail anonymously, with the right software. E-
mails contain “headers” detailing the origins of the email and the servers it was 
transmitted through, complete with IP addresses.
91
 An anonymous re-mailer offers a 
service which forwards e-mails (and attached files, if desired) to other addresses on the 
internet, but first strips the headers from the e-mail, meaning that any party who 
intercepts the message has no way of knowing from where it originated or who the 
original sender was (assuming they were not so foolish as to include their identity in the 
body text). The most secure re-mailers will also use public key cryptography, which can 
encrypt information such that it can only be read by a person with the correct key. A good 
re-mailer will never retain any database of addresses. The re-mailers themselves cannot 
tell where the messages originated; the software operates without human supervision and 
locks even its owners and administrators out of the process.
92
  
For the sake of reference, 256-bit keys are commonly used in encryption; the 
possible combinations expressible in 256 bits are approximately equal to the number of 
atoms in the known universe (Google moved to a 1024-bit DomainKeys Identified Mail – 
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DKIM – system in 2012). Moreover, the common RSA encryption protocol allows for a 
secure key exchange even when that exchange is under surveillance or attack by an 
adversary.
93
 This technology obviously offers incredibly powerful tools for anonymity 
that have never existed before. Using these tools, a person could post messages to a 
website, to an online forum or discussion board, or to an e-mail list without anybody at 
any point in the chain of communications being able to identify them – potentially full 
publicity, with messages visible to anyone with internet access (more, if such messages 
are reprinted and distributed via non-digital methods, although non-digital 
communications are obviously not as secure), and full anonymity.
94
 The darknet systems 
– of which I shall offer a few examples below – are typically used as friend-to-friend 
networks, thus violating the Kantian maxim, but there is no reason why the final recipient 
of a message sent over a darknet should not be a public outlet. My point here is that, 
whatever the actual implementations of these technologies, they have the potential to 
upset Kant’s prohibition on rebellion as made on the grounds of secrecy. 
Freenet is a platform which has been designed from the ground up as a means to 
precisely the sort of free speech, broadcast to as wide a public as possible, with as much 
anonymity and security as the internet can possibly provide. The Freenet network was 
designed with four priorities in mind: firstly, privacy for information producers, 
consumers and holders; secondly, resistance to information censorship; thirdly, high 
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availability and reliability through decentralization; and finally, efficient, scalable, and 
adaptive storage and routing. Freenet participants each run a node that provides the 
network with some storage space. To add a new ﬁle, a user sends the network an insert 
message containing the ﬁle and its assigned location-independent globally unique 
identifier (GUID), which causes the ﬁle to be stored on some set of nodes. During a file’s 
lifetime, it might migrate to or be replicated on other nodes. To retrieve a ﬁle, a user 
sends out a request message containing the GUID key. When the request reaches one of 
the nodes where the ﬁle is stored, that node passes the data back to the request’s 
originator.
95
 
To add a ﬁle one first chooses a short text description. A subspace can be created 
by first generating a random public-private key pair to identify it. One then calculates the 
ﬁle’s signed-subspace key (SSK) by hashing the public half of the subspace key and the 
descriptive string independently before concatenating them and hashing again. The SSK 
can be read by anyone, but only their owners may write to them.
96
 To retrieve a ﬁle from 
a subspace, you need only the subspace’s public key and the descriptive string, from 
which you can recreate the SSK. Adding or updating a ﬁle, on the other hand, requires 
the private key in order to generate a valid signature. SSKs thus facilitate trust by 
guaranteeing that the same pseudonymous person created all ﬁles in the subspace, even 
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though the subspace is not tied to a real-world identity. For example, you can use SSKs to 
send out a newsletter, to publish a Web site, or (operated in reverse) to receive e-mail.
97
  
Freenet was designed from the beginning under the assumption of hostile attack 
from both inside and out. Therefore, it intentionally makes it difﬁcult for nodes to direct 
data toward themselves and keeps its routing topology dynamic and concealed. Freenet 
also encouragers publishers to encrypt all data before insertion so that node operators can 
remain entirely ignorant of the contents of their nodes.
98
 The system thus created offers 
broadcasting of information to a limitless audience, but has been purposefully designed 
so that the author is unidentifiable, even by their “publishers,” the node operators.  
Another example is Tor, an onion-routing network that protects users from packet 
analysis. When data packets travel through the internet, their route is embedded with 
them; onion-routing “layers” the routing information like the skin of an onion, and each 
node peels away a layer. Thus, the only nodes that can even potentially read the plaintext 
are the sender, the recipient, and the exit node; with end-to-end encryption, even the exit 
node cannot read the data. Onion routing works like a game of pass-the-parcel: none of 
the intermediaries know what is inside the parcel. Tor builds on this by implementing 
perfect forward secrecy.
99
 If the technical details of this process are thought complex, 
perhaps it will suffice to say that the PRISM program of the NSA has made repeated 
attempts to attack the Tor network and has failed to penetrate it.
100
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The third well-known example is I2P, which is another anonymizing network, but 
one that does not seek to hide the originator or the recipient, but both, including from 
each other. Two parties can communicate using the I2P protocol, but neither can find out 
who the other is, nor can any intermediary or interceptor learn their identities.
101
 Unlike 
Tor, nodes all act as relays. I2P is, at the time of writing, less well-known than Tor and 
Freenet; all three are in constant development.  
These internet technologies, along with similar cousins and new technologies as 
yet undeveloped, allow us to come closer to what Morio and Buchholz term “true 
anonymity.” Morio and Buchholz’ model separates anonymity into three levels: visual 
anonymity, dissociation of real and online identities, and lack of identifiability. Visual 
anonymity is as it sounds: nobody knows what the speaker looks like. An e-mail does not 
generally contain a photograph of the sender, a website need not contain a picture of its 
author, and a photograph is not a requirement for an account with most social networking 
sites.
102
 It would be the equivalent of wearing a mask while meeting in person. The 
second level, the dissociation of real and online identities, derives from the fact that in 
most online venues, the “username” does not have to be of any relation to that user’s 
“real” name.103 One can call oneself any name at all, and use someone else’s photograph 
– or no photograph at all. Both of these forms, however, offer ties back to the original 
individual which will render them identifiable with enough effort and resources. 
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The third kind of anonymity is a lack of identifiability, and this one most 
approaches what we might call “true anonymity” – the total separation and dissociation 
of the public persona from the private and actual identity. It simply means that an 
individual’s behaviours become indistinguishable from the behaviours of others, and that 
they disappear into the crowd. If a specific act is committed by one person in a 
population, then with a total lack of identifiability, there is no way to identify the actor 
from the other non-acting members of the population. For example, if I were to rob you 
while enjoying a lack of identifiability, you would not be able to tell me apart from all the 
others who have not robbed you. If I picked your pocket in a crowded marketplace, you 
might realize the theft has occurred, turn around, and see only a sea of people, any one of 
whom (or none of whom) might be the thief. A website is not naturally occurring, and has 
to be created by somebody, but with the use of anonymizing technology, the creator is 
indistinguishable from any other member of society. For example, this has been most 
useful to pro-democracy activists in China, or in the wave of protest that has been dubbed 
the “Arab Spring.”  
Apart from the hopeful panegyric for the avenues of dissent and revolt thus 
created for oppressed peoples, academic discussion of internet anonymity also, perhaps 
even primarily, tends towards a lament for the new waves of crime and anti-social 
behaviour that it has made possible. The first two measures of anonymity are fairly 
superficial, although they do have an effect on behaviour. Several works of social 
psychology have found that anonymity and group membership tend to increase antisocial 
behaviour and to decrease helping behaviour, even when the individuating event is only 
momentary and the helping task is very simple, and to increase the instance of unethical 
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behaviour in pursuit of material self-interest.
104
 Anyone who has spent any significant 
time online interacting with other “netizens” can usually offer anecdotal evidence of their 
increased exposure to prejudice, hatred, hostility, anti-social or deviant behaviour online 
when compared to their experiences in the real world which confirms these scientifically-
gathered data. David Davenport suggests that social justice depends upon accountability, 
in quite a Kantian manner. Anonymous communication risks the incremental breakdown 
of society. Davenport observes that simpler societies with less anonymity and privacy 
tend to suffer less crime, social unrest, and protest; if true, we would be foolish to believe 
that a society which embraced anonymity and relied solely on goodwill and the 
conscience of the citizenry could deliver justice.
105
 The social psychology studies above 
would seem to put a scientific heft behind his words.  
Kant might say the reason that the two narratives of liberation and deviancy 
dominate the discourse is because they are actually two facets of the same narrative. To 
conspire against a tyrant is wrong in the greatest degree, and certainly no less so than the 
fraud, theft or vandalism that constitute the bulk of cyber-crime. Both fail his maxims. 
Crimes such as theft or fraud, whether committed online or not, cannot be made universal 
since to do so violates Kant’s categorical imperative: “act only on that maxim which you 
can at the same time will to be a universal law.” Society would fall apart if everybody set 
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out to defraud and rob each other, and the online world would fall apart if it were 
inhabited only by hackers and trolls.
106
  
Rebellion fails the maxim of publicity; a rebel cannot make his sentiment public, 
although the tyrant can. In the Kantian interpretation, these two narratives of cyber-
anonymity are conflated to one: breach of duty. Jean Maynard illustrates it thus: 
democracy is incompatible with technocracy, because the technocrat prefers secrecy and 
concealed action to open debate. The technocracy creates a secrecy all of its own, since 
computers are unfathomable to the layperson by their very nature. For example, if shown 
the source code for a computerized voting system, anyone without a strong knowledge of 
programming and of the particular programming language in which it was written could 
not say if that system would accurately record ballots. In a more everyday scenario, if 
Microsoft, Facebook or Google say that they will not gather, sell and abuse our personal 
information, we have only their word for it since we lack the ability to inspect their 
software for ourselves.
107
 2013 revelations concerning the PRISM program offered 
evidence that these companies were illicitly gathering personal information and abusing 
the trust of their customers, but this did not come from an examination of the code, but 
from an insider-turned-whistleblower.  
Jodi Dean echoes this suspicion of the technocrat. The hackers, writes Dean, 
wanted to overthrow the technocratic elite (in reference to the famous history of Apple, 
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Microsoft and IBM), but subsequently became elites themselves. Steve Wozniak and the 
late Steve Jobs, the co-founders of Apple Computer, began their careers building “blue 
boxes” in the 1960s. The blue box would emulate the tones of a telephone operator’s 
console, enabling the user to place free telephone calls.
108
 Jobs rose from these 
beginnings in the illegal or quasi-legal technology counter-culture to become one of the 
best-known and wealthiest CEOs in the world, and until his death in 2011 led a company 
(barring his hiatus between 1985 and 1997) that has been in the Fortune 500 for almost 
thirty years. Bill Gates and Paul Allen’s firm, Microsoft, was initially run out of a motel 
room in Albuquerque, funded by advances on software he had not yet produced. Gates 
and Allen gambled that software was where the money was, which nobody at the time 
believed (established firms like IBM or Hewlett-Packard focused almost exclusively on 
hardware) – and he was right. Microsoft is now one of the most profitable firms in 
existence and Gates has been the wealthiest person in the world for fifteen of the last 
twenty years. The upstarts in Microsoft and Apple usurped the established elites of IBM, 
DEC, or Hewlett-Packard; the former, now established elites themselves, find themselves 
challenged by the upstarts at Google and Facebook.  
This story is a commercial mirroring of the struggle of the secretive subversives 
against the tyrant. The corporate giant – IBM – was judged to be autocratic by the hacker 
culture; it was overthrown by Apple and Microsoft using the tools of technology and 
secrecy.
109
 When the commercial and the political overlap so much, and where money 
frequently (if not invariably) equates to power, this is not that much less of a usurpation 
of power than any conspiracy against Sulla might have been. Apple and Microsoft would 
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fail Kant’s maxim; they did not want to see their goal of overthrowing and replacing the 
giant to be made universal since, after they had replaced IBM as the giants themselves, 
they took every effort to stop the same thing happening to them and to kick the ladder 
away for any upstart firm that might follow. 
I offer these examples of discourses on technology which dominate academia and 
the popular media, but my analysis concerns another discourse, and one that I feel should 
not be ignored. The internet’s collection of technologies offers secrecy, and it offers 
privacy, but most importantly, it offers anonymity. Secrecy and privacy necessarily 
involve a very restrictive audience: secrecy implies actions and information to which only 
a very few are privy, and privacy reduces the audience and the witnesses to none. The 
difference with anonymity is that it allows for a secret identity while offering information 
to a potentially unlimited audience. The bulk of academic concerns over internet 
technologies such as these are either over the potential for criminal or deviant activity, or 
over breaches of privacy by governments, commercial enterprises, or criminals. Recent 
events in the Arab Spring and in the organization of mass protests in Europe should alter 
the discourse towards a closer scrutiny of anonymity. We have seen activists use 
anonymizing software and services to send out public messages and appeals while 
remaining unidentifiable to state security forces. Activists in Libya used public online 
dating services to exchange messages and arrange meetings, for example.
110
 Even during 
a media blackout, Facebook and Twitter have been used to disseminate information.
111
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The ability to do this for a virtually unlimited audience while still remaining anonymous, 
especially when internet media are used as sources for more traditional media, is 
probably unprecedented. The combination of publicity with anonymity offers a serious 
challenge to the traditional Kantian interpretation of the tyrant against the conspirator. 
Kant believed there was a need for the careful inculcation of cosmopolitan values 
by the state, which would, he hoped, grow and become dominant, and so change the laws 
and the very modes of thought of the citizenry.
112
 The cosmopolitan state would have to 
drag its citizens along behind it. The legal framework of cosmopolitanism will have to be 
constructed first, to be fleshed out by popular acceptance in time. For example, the rights 
of African-Americans in the United States were mostly won in the decisions of the 
courts, such as Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, which desegregated public schools. 
The first African-American children to attend formerly white schools were greeted by 
such public outcry and even violence that troops were necessary to enforce their newly-
won rights. Although the civil rights movement has been advanced by the courts and, to 
some extent, the executive branch, the change of public opinion has since been so great 
that it is as unthinkable now for a public official to openly hold profoundly racist views 
as it would have been for them to openly hold racially egalitarian views sixty years 
ago.
113
  
Kant used the principle of publicity to justify the tyrant’s repression of rebellion, 
and to delegitimize rebellions against tyrants. The new technologies of the internet, 
particularly in the opportunities they offer for anonymity, subvert his principle. Rebels 
against a tyrant are wrong to the highest degree because they cannot proclaim their 
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conspiracy publicly, yet anonymizing technology offers the possibility of doing precisely 
that. Identifiability is not the key to Kant’s principle, so the lack of identifiability is not a 
factor, even though Kant may have conflated identifiability and publicity to a certain 
extent. Perhaps Kant was not able to anticipate a manner in which information could be 
made completely public while the informer remained completely anonymous. In his time, 
it was possible to separate identifiability and publicity to a limited extent, but the two 
concepts remained “sticky” inasmuch as there would almost always remain something or 
someone that could tie the informer back to his information when it was made public.  
However, internet anonymizing technology permanently separates the two 
concepts. The Pirate Bay, a search engine for pirated media shared using the peer-to-peer 
BitTorrent protocol, boasts of a server system under which the Pirate Bay staff does not 
know where its servers are, and the owners of those servers do not know that they are 
hosting the Pirate Bay.
114
 This is why, despite lawsuits, criminal prosecutions, jail 
sentences and the combined efforts of multiple governments, the Pirate Bay continues to 
operate with impunity: there is neither a particular individual who can locate it nor an 
individual with the power to shut it down, and those individuals who might collectively 
have the power to do either are unaware that they are part of such a group, and have no 
way of identifying any other members of that group. Attempts to shut the service down 
by revoking domain hosting in 2013 were successful for an hour or two at most. The 
hosts of the very public website of the Pirate Bay, open to anyone with an internet 
connection, are completely unidentifiable. They cannot even identify themselves, as they 
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do not know that they are the hosts. Despite the publicity, there is nothing left of 
identifiability.  
Identifiability and publicity have finally been pulled apart, but Kant, whether 
mistakenly or not, has tied his maxim to publicity. If rebels against a tyrant can make 
their intent public, then they do not fail this maxim, and thus cannot be judged to be in an 
ethically inferior position. The fear of being identified and meeting a grisly end is 
effectively removed when identifiability is destroyed: the dissident is truly a face in the 
crowd and despite his dissidence, cannot be distinguished from any other member of the 
populace.  
The simplest (and the weakest) defence of Kant’s publicity principle that we can 
mount is to re-bundle publicity with identifiability, to simply say that true publicity 
requires identifiability. If one does not reveal one’s identity along with one’s message, 
one is not being truly public, but at least partially secretive. The message is made public, 
but the identity of the messenger is not. Because of this, we can say that messages and 
dissent delivered publicly while the identity of the sender is kept secret are not truly 
public, and so they still fail the Kantian maxim. When granted this indulgence, the 
principle remains intact even at the height of the information age; conspiracies against 
tyrants are still wrong in the highest degree, and conspirators deserve whatever fate the 
tyrant visits upon them. Such an argument is overly simplistic, however, and not only 
reads meaning into the original text that does not seem to be there, but ignores the 
potential of the internet as a truly paradigm-shifting phenomenon, and as something that 
was possibly anticipated by Kant himself. 
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 One such paradigm that might have been dramatically jolted by the advent 
of the internet is the definition of the public sphere itself. In her analysis of the salon, in 
its traditional form and in a new, virtual, cybernetic iteration, Dean opines that the public 
sphere is confined to the nation-state. She invokes the Habermasian idea of the salon and 
the public sphere as securing national identities, and that the nation-state sets its 
boundaries. The state also invariably forms the target of the political public sphere.
115
 
Buchstein feels that the internet is not a new public sphere at all, and does not live up to 
the Habermasian ideal of a democratic public sphere.
116
 The internet, in short, is not 
thought herein to be a radical change from traditional perceptions of the public sphere, 
and is bounded by the traditional rules and borders of the public, such as the state, as 
much as the traditional public sphere has been. 
 Kant’s cosmopolitanism transcends the state, however. His political 
concepts are international. He calls for a federation of democratic republics under the 
umbrella of international law, and his concept of hospitality relies upon international 
travel and exchange. His world is trans-national and international, one in which our 
horizons are no longer to be hemmed in by borders. Should the public sphere in this 
world not reflect that idea? The internet is certainly not a public sphere bounded by 
national borders. Internationalism is inherent to its very nature; information cares for 
borders about as much as do the winds or the birds. In this sense, if the traditional public 
sphere is a national sphere, then the internet is an altogether new kind of public sphere, 
and one supportive of Kantian cosmopolitanism.  
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Since the tyrannical state cannot hope to break the encryption of messages, cannot 
find information in databases that do not exist, and cannot recruit informants when 
nobody has any truly useful information, the only recourse it has is infiltration. The state 
must plant an agent or recruit an informant, and hope that this individual is then given the 
encryption keys that will reveal who the other dissidents are. Let us assume that the 
dissidents know who the other members of their group are (for it is entirely possible for a 
rebellion to be organized by people who have no idea of any other member’s real-life 
identity, and that this group could be plotting in secrecy and anonymity not just from the 
public, but from each other). If the state has to infiltrate such a group, then it has now 
failed Kant’s publicity maxim itself, for the act of infiltration depends on secrecy. The 
state would be defeated if it were publicly known that it was actively attempting to 
infiltrate dissident groups, and doubly so if the identities of the infiltrators were also 
revealed. Since Kant appealed only to this maxim as the final arbiter of the good, this 
would mean that the state was now committing an act that was wrong in the highest 
degree, and moreover, since the dissidents would be proclaiming their intent publicly, 
this would provoke a crisis of legitimacy. In the Kantian interpretation, the rebels would 
have a better claim to power than the state.  
As if that was not clear enough, in Perpetual Peace, Kant lists the employ of spies 
by the state as one of the “diabolical arts” which are “intrinsically despicable” and which 
cannot even be employed in war.
117
 In the Metaphysics of Morals, he continues to argue 
against spying, and forbids a state to use its own subjects as spies – which it would 
certainly have to if it wished to infiltrate dissident groups – and to use spies, even foreign 
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spies, to spread false reports.
118
 This is owed not only to the publicity maxim, but to 
Kant’s other maxims that one ought not to do that which could not be universally applied, 
and with the demand that one treat other rational actors as ends in and of themselves, and 
not as means. Spying generally fails at least one of these two principles in addition to the 
publicity principle, while dissent against tyranny does not – the replacement of tyranny 
with republics could (and should) be universally applied, and to establish a republic or 
advocate the same is to grant freedom to others which only a republic can possibly 
provide, thus respecting the requirement to treat others as ends rather than as means. 
One could argue that the advent of publicity with anonymity allows the 
flourishing of dissent that undermines the development of cosmopolitanism, safe not just 
from the state censor, but from the public, who may have reached a point of development 
where they would largely reject such dissent and perhaps vilify the dissenters. Thanks to 
the anonymity of the internet, there are numerous outlets for racist, misogynist, 
nationalist-chauvinist, or other prejudiced and exclusionary anti-cosmopolitan views, 
even in societies which have largely accepted most or all of these cosmopolitan norms. 
These generally work at the level of dissociation between real and online identities, rather 
than true lack of identifiability, but nevertheless, they have proliferated in a way that 
traditional media espousing such views could never have. It is difficult to imagine that 
the FCC or the CRTC would allow an overtly and unapologetically fascist radio station or 
TV channel, and yet there are dozens – if not hundreds – of fascist websites in the 
English language alone.
119
 The fact that the internet and anonymity permit, allow, and 
perhaps even encourage a counter-cosmopolitan discourse to flourish is a concern to a 
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cosmopolitan agenda, particularly as Kant relied upon the capturing of the public mind 
and the creation of a hegemonic discourse in order for cosmopolitanism to flourish.  
To the idea that the internet might undermine the cosmopolitan discourse, it may 
simply be said that the changes that the internet introduces are only superficial. The 
internet might allow the proliferation of anti-cosmopolitan discourses, but then, they 
might be allowed without the internet. Kant hoped that cosmopolitanism would become a 
matter of public acceptance through the gradual strengthening of its discourse, and the 
internet does not prevent this any more than it enables it. Put simply, in a cosmopolitan 
society, the extent of anti-cosmopolitan sentiment on the internet would probably be quite 
close to the extent of such sentiment in general. Fringe websites alone are not a concern 
because, in a cosmopolitan society, they would only have fringe appeal and little to no 
influence. If they did have substantial influence, it would mean that the society of whose 
popular discourse they were part must be substantially supportive of their views, in which 
case one would expect support in offline modes as well – radio stations, newspapers, or 
even political parties. Online anti-cosmopolitanism is not a concern for the cosmopolitan 
project. 
Perhaps one reason why such anti-cosmopolitan views are aired online is because 
the anonymity of the internet also removes the shaming effect encountered in public 
discourse. To espouse a highly unpopular, risible, or offensive view in public is to invite 
ridicule or anger; anonymity shields the speaker from that effect and frees them from 
shame. For this reason, it might be argued that shame has a “purifying” effect on public 
discourse, for one feels compelled not to air viewpoints which are laughable or hateful, 
but this purification only works when public discourse is overwhelmingly cosmopolitan 
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and liberal to begin with. Exactly the same effect works, for instance, to discourage the 
airing of anti-homophobic views in the multitude of countries where homosexuality is 
held to be contemptible by a majority of the public, to drive religious minorities 
underground in profoundly theistic societies, or even to suppress academic freedom and 
scientific fact in societies where traditional views are held in greater esteem than is 
science or free thought. Public shaming may “purify” for those societies that have already 
ascended to a liberal, cosmopolitan state (and I use the term “ascend” in reference to 
Kantian teleology), but the same mechanism is an active hindrance to those still some 
way off from that state. Shame acts as a brake on the expression of unpopular ideas, but it 
would be a mistake to conflate popularity with rightness, whether moral or factual. 
Moreover, when it comes to unpopular or anti-cosmopolitan views, the existence 
of websites or eBooks does not indicate the existence of an audience, particularly when 
building websites and publishing eBooks is so inexpensive (unless one desires a high 
degree of customization or branding, there is no reason to pay money to run a website, 
and this has been essentially true since the 1990s and the heyday of GeoCities, while the 
advent of the eBook has essentially removed all requirement for financial investment in 
publishing). These are the digital equivalents of the fringe-movement characters found on 
Speakers’ Corner, isolated and broadly unappealing, viewed largely as curiosities or 
amusements if the general public is even aware of their existence, and as such, threaten 
cosmopolitan ideals no more than the existence of Speakers’ Corner threatens 
parliamentary democracy. The spread of anti-cosmopolitan discourses through digital 
media would only be alarming if it attracted a significant audience, and if so large a slice 
of the general public were receptive to such ideas, it is almost certain that such discourses 
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would proliferate without the existence of the internet. Nationalist and anti-immigrant 
sentiments are becoming more popular in Europe still suffering from the effects of the 
2008 economic crash, but the same was true of Europe when suffering from the effects of 
the 1929 economic crash, and the latter had no digital communications of any kind.  
Intellectual freedom, in the Kantian view, is absolutely essential for the 
flourishing of public reason, and perhaps the proliferation of profoundly anti-
cosmopolitan and illiberal websites and digital media are, in fact, indicative of the health 
of public discourse and the flourishing that digital media allows.
120
 We should be more 
worried for the fate of liberalism if there were not a host of illiberal voices in public 
discourse. It is these dissenting voices that pressure us to engage in reason, in questioning 
and in critical thinking, not those of guardians.
121
 The existence of these dissenting 
voices, and the freedom with which they can be aired online, are not challenges to 
Kantian ideals but instead are supportive of it. The internet, through its low access 
barriers of cost and difficulty, and through its resistance to censorship, advances the ideal 
of intellectual and press freedom which Kant held in such absolutely high regard.
122
 
Perhaps it is true that the internet makes it possible to undermine cosmopolitan 
ideals, but Kant reminded us that progress towards the cosmopolitan ideal would be filled 
with setbacks. If the internet is not ideal, that does not mean it is not bringing us 
somewhat closer to cosmopolitanism. Chauvinistic nationalists and racists can flourish on 
the internet, but so too can relationships and friendships between people of many 
different nations and continents. We can become more exposed to other cultures and 
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better disposed towards them without losing our own, and make contact with other 
societies by reaching out virtually (the virtual reach being less immediate and sensual 
than the physical, but almost infinitely easier). Virtual hospitality is easier than physical 
hospitality. Virtual travellers who search online for Japanese cuisine, Indian architecture, 
or Russian literature will be welcomed by a website that offers exactly what they seek.  
Of course, it is relatively easy to build a website since modern software removes 
the need for knowledge of HTML code that was once required. Such tools have been 
growing in sophistication for years. One is not required to invite anyone into one’s home 
or provide anything tangible for them on a website, but the construction of a freely-
accessible website might be the ultimate act of hospitality: the expenditure of energy in 
the act of creating something that is to be offered to all, without question. The website is 
open to everyone by default, more open and infinitely more accessible than the foreign 
city, and the public who may access it is world-wide and unhindered by access barriers 
such as the cost of travel or the difficulty of navigation. 
The internet also preserves the ideal of public reason, which Kant insisted must 
always be free even if the private use of reason might be narrowly restricted.
123
 It 
provides forums, even anonymous ones, in which a person may address a public 
audience, explain their views and be heard, and in which others may debate with them. 
However, despite claims that the internet erases the line between public and private 
spaces, there is still a definite barrier between the public and the private, such as that 
which Kant describes in What is Enlightenment? He remarks that a man of learning may 
address the entire reading public, and that is a public use of reason, but a private use of 
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reason – which may be curtailed – is that which a person may use in a particular civil post 
or office.
124
 Consider social media, for example, which might be considered to blur or 
even unify these two realms. They do not. A person may use an online forum, 
anonymously, to address the entire public, and the anonymity preserves the ability and 
the right to do so without negative consequences. To bring one’s private space online is 
to invite shame and criticism when misconduct is made public, however – consider the 
laments of those photographed in compromising situations, exposed on social media, and 
promptly fired or arrested. The internet did not enable some infringement on their 
freedom, despite what some of them might say, for this was a matter of private reason, 
i.e. their use of reason in a particular civil post or office when their conduct might be 
expected to reflect upon that office.
125
 Internet anonymity preserves the right of public 
reason by divorcing the speaker from their words, removing not only the possibility of 
reward but also that of punishment, while still leaving untouched the necessary 
restrictions upon private reason that a republic must place upon officeholders when they 
choose to address the public identifiably. 
The addition of anonymity to public discourse also makes such discourse conform 
more closely to Enlightenment ideals of what such discourse should look like. A criticism 
that the Enlightenment philosophers might level at the Aristotelian revivalists who 
believe that technology is harmful to the traditional model of public discourse, is that 
Aristotle himself was quite critical of that model. For example, he remarks that the 
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currents of public discourse are not generated by the public themselves, but by the way in 
which rhetoricians manipulate the public mood.
126
 An orator can bring his audience into a 
frame of mind that disposes them to anger, for example, whether or not that is justified; 
Caesar’s murderers were trying to rid the city of a tyrant and restore Republican rule (and 
although Kant might not have approved of the rebellion, he would probably have 
approved of the result
127), yet Mark Antony’s oration at Caesar’s funeral – at least, in 
Shakespeare’s rendition – is a masterful play upon the emotions of the audience, 
whipping them into a fury against his political enemies.
128
  
It is possible to deceive with logos – if that is not to abuse the concept – by 
falsifying the truth. In short, if the cold facts do not support an argument, one fabricates a 
tissue of lies. Obscuring actual facts or making non-facts up and presenting them as fact 
is a very old trick, but the difference is that false and deceptive logos can be combated 
with logos. If one’s interlocutor is inventing lies, then (theoretically) one should only 
need to present the truth in order to expose him as the liar he is. This is the basis of the 
court or of peer-review, amongst other things, which provide venues in which lies may be 
exposed. Logos, when used properly, however, serves the truth. It requires a sound, 
logical argument backed up by fact. Ethos and pathos are inherently manipulative, for 
they do not hinge on objective facts but on feelings and emotions. 
It is for this reason that Enlightenment philosophy holds ethos and pathos in such 
disdain, and the internet can be used as a tool which eliminates or at least mitigates their 
effects. An anonymous speaker cannot rely upon his reputation or credibility, and his 
                                                          
126
 Aristotle, Rhetoric, II:1. 
127
 Elizabeth Ellis, Kant’s Political Theory: Interpretations and Applications, ed. Elizabeth Ellis (University 
Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2012), 12. 
128
 William Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, Act 3, Scene 2. 
83 
 
displays of emotion or pathos must be limited to those forms which are digitally 
transmissible. The solution is not perfect, for the internet does not automatically reduce 
all arguments to the facts and logical structure alone, but it may be that they are greatly 
preferable to media in which such rhetoric is more feasible – such as television – or in 
direct meetings. Kant, like most Enlightenment philosophers, rejects pathos, which would 
seem to make the internet a better mode of communication according to Kantian ideals, 
and especially so when the speaker is anonymous and his appeals to pathos are 
necessarily extremely limited. 
This is secondary to the consequences that anonymous and public communication 
have for the Kantian publicity principle, however. Not only does the possibility of 
anonymous and public dissent free the dissenter from the shackles of the publicity 
principle, but it then turns to place those shackles on the tyrant. The dissenter, armed with 
this technology, may speak publicly and make their goals widely known, while the tyrant 
must result to spying in order to root them out. Spying, however, is separately and 
vehemently condemned. Kant is not a consequentialist, and the way in which Kantian 
principle may be recruited in defence of tyranny is most alarming to the consequentialists 
such as Bentham, who also argue for publicity, but for the consequences alone. If the 
outcome of publicity were to be suffering and misery, then Bentham would argue against 
it, for one must always seek to minimize suffering, but this is not the case with Kant. 
Anonymous, public communications resolve this problem. Now, we may recruit the 
publicity principle for the overthrow of tyranny and the promotion of the republic and of 
cosmopolitanism. 
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The question remains: which is the preferable mode of thought, that of 
Aristotelian phronesis, or the Kantian perspective of rationality and republicanism? This 
is no simple matter to settle, and I would not presume to do so here. More able thinkers 
than I have come down on both sides of the matter. There is much that is admirable in 
Aristotle, with its praise of individual virtue and the seeming authenticity of the human 
experience that is offered by embracing contemplation and feeling. However, Aristotle 
does not simply mean that we should embrace our natural humanity in the innate sense; 
human nature is full of things to be overcome. It is no accident that, in Aristotelian 
philosophy, phronesis is only available to he who cultivates it through a lifetime of 
contemplation, magnanimity, and the habituation of sound judgement. If we are to 
discard so much of our human nature, then, as the Enlightenment philosophers advocate, 
why not also discard the emotionalism and irrationality which have served to hold us 
back for so many millennia in favour of reason and science, which have done more than 
anything else to raise our awareness and answer our questions about the world?  
The Aristotelian Golden Mean entreats us to walk a middle path between 
extremes of feeling and action, but if the extremes of emotion are undesirable, and only 
the moderate and justifiable emotions are judged fit, then this raises the question of 
whether emotion is desirable at all. For instance, Aristotle believes that justifiable anger 
is righteous, but to be justifiable requires that something not be intrinsically just, and 
perhaps it is this external justification which is valid, and not the anger. For instance, if 
our state is invaded and our anger causes us to rise up and defend it, then that which 
justifies the anger – the invasion – is the cause for defence, and not the anger itself; the 
emotion is superfluous. 
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Again, I return to the idea that rhetoric other than logos is, or can easily be, 
deceptive. This is a weakness of discourse that even Aristotle had to concede, and while 
ethos and pathos are inherently relative and without objective benchmarks to measure 
them against, logos has the rules of logic and the facts of the world to be judged by, and 
logos that does not measure up to either can be dismissed. Perhaps we cannot eradicate 
ethos and pathos from our discourse entirely, but perhaps the Enlightenment 
philosophers, including Kant, are right to believe that we should strive to abandon them 
as much as we can and resort to pure logos wherever possible. If there is a technology or 
a medium for discussion that downplays or even eliminates ethos and pathos, then we 
ought to embrace it. 
Finally, I reject the Aristotelian vision of virtue, public space, public discourse, 
and politics because I find that it is too elitist, chauvinist, and exclusionary. Aristotle 
freely admits that virtue and phronesis are not available to all but only to a privileged 
few, possessed of good breeding, money, friends, and leisure, sound of mind and body. 
There is much in the works of the Classical philosophers that rejects the idea of 
individual autonomy – for example, in dealing with slaves or women who must be 
governed for their own good (justly and wisely, to be sure, but the implication is that 
these people are incapable of governing themselves justly and wisely, while the elites are 
capable of governing not just themselves but others), or the “lower” social orders who 
must be deceived or manipulated to preserve the state and social order. This chauvinism 
is arbitrary, and logically indefensible. Good breeding and inherited wealth are the result 
of chance, and nothing more, as are gender, ethnicity, and national origin. If the Greeks 
believe they are the superior culture, and so do the Persians, there is nothing to tell either 
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which viewpoint is correct: one may point to culture and learning, the other to military 
power, yet the measurement of either is subjective and arbitrary, let alone the weighting 
of one against the other. There is nothing to say that I am a better person than you are; if 
you are more compassionate, perhaps I am more acquisitive, and not only can we not say 
whether acquisitiveness or compassion is the greater virtue, we cannot even say whether 
they are virtues at all. 
Kant does not have an alternative system to settle the question of which people 
are better, and which are destined to rule, but instead avoids the problem altogether. His 
code of human rights demands that we treat others as ends in and of themselves, not as 
means, and this is based on an axiomatic principle. If we cannot agree upon who is better, 
then the only acceptable position is that we should be equal. I might not concede that you 
are better than I am, but I would never concede that I am worse and less deserving. 
Further, in the absence of consensus on what constitutes the good life and what 
constitutes virtue, the only defensible position is the compromise wherein the liberty of 
all is equally respected. Kantian liberty allows each person to act as they will until it 
affects others – my rights end where yours begin.  
For these reasons, I prefer the Kantian vision to that of the ancients. As I have 
noted, there is an ugly and unpleasant side to Classical thought, and to act-utilitarianism, 
but I find that Kant largely avoids the problems of both. The Kantian paradigm seems not 
only more logically sound, but more ethical, more human; it seems more right to treat my 
fellow human beings as autonomous equals whose values, goals, and drives deserve no 
less intrinsic respect than my own rather than to rank humanity in a hierarchy or to treat 
other individuals as factors in some calculus of utilitarian ethics. However, the Kantian 
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perspective has itself come under scrutiny and criticism, not least because of its great 
influence as a cornerstone of modern liberalism, and I wish to address some of these 
critiques. 
Part III: Critiques 
 
The critiques offered in this chapter are distinct from the contrary Classical 
paradigm offered in the first chapter. All of them are modern and post-Kantian; some 
may owe an intellectual heritage to the ancients but all are sufficiently varied and 
independently developed to warrant an individual examination. They have been 
influential either academically, popularly, or both, but despite their influence I feel that 
they cannot successfully revoke the Kantian proposals of public space, discourse, or 
liberalism, and they do not negate the potentially transformative qualities of internet 
communication. 
The first post-Kantian objection concerns the relationship between technology 
and agency, and although this has been a concern since the classical period, new 
perspectives have been offered since the scientific revolution. Is technology a tool which 
we can use as we see fit, or is it an entity that changes our worldview and our motivations 
– can we exercise agency over technology? This argument is seen in the work of 
Heidegger and Ellul, but also has gained popularity in non-academic circles, for example, 
the common contention that modern technologies such as social networking sites and 
smartphones are making us antisocial. Heidegger also proposes that the scientific 
worldview is necessarily limited, and criticizes the Enlightenment thinkers – including 
Kant – for their supposed turn to science, reason and logos as their exclusive tools for 
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looking at the world. By committing ourselves to a rational-scientific mindset, we deny 
ourselves a full range of answers about the nature of the universe and of ourselves. 
Heidegger also believes that this mindset encourages us to think of the natural world as 
raw materials, “standing-reserve” as he puts it, to be exploited; in so doing we cut 
ourselves off from natural beauty, for example. Perhaps the internet has also developed in 
such a way. Steve Wozniak, among others, laments the manner in which the discursive 
spaces of the internet were changed from free and open spaces into ones strictly 
controlled and monopolized by gatekeepers. I wish to establish whether this is true or 
inevitable. 
On the subject of the scientific mindset, Jacques Ellul argues that the changes it 
produces in our worldview are all-pervasive and extremely difficult, if not impossible, to 
free ourselves from. Technique, as he terms it, increasingly comes to dominate our 
society and increasingly curtails our choice and agency. If this is the case, then high 
technology such as the internet and technological means of communication would surely 
exacerbate this problem.  
Hannah Arendt, as discussed earlier, may owe more to the Greeks and to Aristotle 
than the other critics discussed here; her contention is that intimacy is required for 
effective public discourse – we must see each other face-to-face in order to conduct 
politics in a meaningful way. The dividing line between public and private space is 
important, yet the internet seems to be blurring it more than it ever has been before, and 
its technologies allow communication without intimacy, geographical proximity, or even 
shared culture and language. From Arendt’s perspective, this would make internet 
communication most undesirable for political discourse. 
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Finally, I will examine an allegation of Mark Kingwell’s which is perhaps the 
most aesthetic of these critiques, namely, that the internet promotes incivility and 
disrespectful, ignorant discourse which is not conducive to good politics or to rational, 
meaningful and productive discussion. Again, this is an argument which seems to have 
captured much of the popular opinion concerning the internet. However, I remain 
unconvinced that this is necessarily true; the internet may not be the game-changer that 
many think it to be in this respect, and in any case, such arguments smack of the Classical 
elitism that Enlightenment philosophy has often sought to do away with. I shall attempt 
to address all of these critiques in turn. 
The Kantian understanding of technology is social-constructivist, seeing 
technology not as something that shapes human action and experience, but instead as 
something that is shaped by human action and experience. In this understanding, 
technology is therefore merely a set of tools or techniques developed to solve a human 
problem or suit a human whim, without agency or influence of its own. However, the 
most common criticism of technology and the technological mindset denies that 
technology is free of agency, and proposes instead that technology is capable of forming 
and altering human whims and desires, shapes the human experience and, at its worst, 
robs us of the power to shape our own destinies, detracts from the authenticity of the 
human experience, and worsens (or even creates) self-destructive tendencies in the 
human species.  
This view is often enunciated in a dim form in popular newspaper and magazine 
articles or on “exposé” television, and, somewhat ironically, on blogs, and is usually 
concerned with modern social problems such as the addictiveness of videogames, internet 
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chat rooms, and social networking sites, or our willingness to hand personal information 
over to technological gatekeepers, or our desire for more gadgetry and better standards of 
living even at the expense of social justice or environmental preservation. Regular 
readers of popular media will be familiar with such debates. Those who espouse this view 
ask rhetorical questions such as what computer-mediated communication (CMC) is doing 
to social interaction, what is to be done about videogame addiction, and how it is that we 
came to be a society blindly absorbed in the vistas of our smartphones, seemingly unable 
to look up at our physical neighbours. 
Such critiques merely scratch at the surface of the philosophical schema upon 
which these often-rickety rhetorical superstructures are built. That of Heidegger is 
particularly influential, and worth examining for its persuasiveness and rigour. There are 
many truths in the world, Heidegger believes, which are revealed in different ways to 
different people. What is true for me is not necessarily true for you, but both of our 
perceptions are true nonetheless. Art, for example, opens a window on to the world of the 
artist’s creation, but the artist herself is inconsequential to the work since art is a way of 
creating and revealing truth, and truth is what is revealed – since our perception reveals 
truth, artistic intent does not, and art can reveal different truth to each person. Truth is 
that which is perceived, not intended, so great art offers new truths and new ways to view 
them – often in ways that the artist never intended.129 Science, however, does not create 
any new truths or open new vistas to understand them, but only explores a realm of truth 
that has already been opened.
130
 Art can create, but science may only explore. 
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This, alone, would not necessarily be so terrible. Heidegger seems to admire the 
ability of artists to create new ways to look at the world, to create new truths, and new 
ways to approach truth. The problem with the scientific mindset, unlike that of the artist 
or the philosopher, is its conviction that the technical-scientific worldview is the only 
worldview, and the only truth. This chauvinism is a limit to science, but the scientific also 
attempt to stunt all other modes of approaching truth in the same way.
131
 The scientific 
mind can only apprehend things about which it already has an understanding, and can 
only ask the questions that it brings with it. Heidegger offers the example of “three 
oranges;” a concept which only makes sense if the concept of “three” is already known 
and understood.
132
 Science does not bother with contemplation of the nature of “three” 
but assumes it, and thus is at least partially limited to preconceived ideas in the way it 
develops our understanding.  
“Three oranges” might seem to be a puerile example, but one can extrapolate 
from it to a general critique of a scientific understanding. The search for evidence of the 
Higgs boson’s existence does not deal, and will never deal, with the question of what 
existence is, what it means to exist, and what it means not to exist. It is not that science is 
incapable of revealing truth (such as the existence of the Higgs boson), but that it can 
only reveal a limited set of truths (again, such as only the existence of the Higgs boson), 
and that science brings with it a fairly rigid metaphysical framework which shapes the 
answers we can receive from it. Science is essentially limited to the numerical because it 
never questions the numerical and assumes the truth of the numerical – not to say that it 
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is not true, but, according to Heidegger, it is not the only truth, even though the scientific 
mindset believes that it is. 
Art, on the other hand, is capable of embracing the numerical, but also of 
abandoning it; science only has the former quality. The Fibonacci sequence is 
mathematically expressed as Fn = Fn-1 + Fn-2, with seed values of F0 = 0, F1 = 1, but thus 
written, it is coldly numerical and mathematical. This formula, however, describes the 
patterns in a fern or the seed head of a sunflower. A logarithmic spiral is written as r = 
ae
bθ
, but it is the shape of a nautilus shell. The Mandelbrot or Julia sets are merely 
mathematical sets of points, but the images they generate can be found, as with the other 
examples given here, quite beautiful. One may say, therefore, that while the scientific 
mindset is numerical, in the Heideggerian sense, the numerical is not necessarily 
scientific and may give rise to art and beauty, with which science does not deal. 
Secondly, the scientific is the fundamental presupposition of the knowledge of 
things, that all things are knowable, that “nothing” as a concept is not worth bothering 
with, and that knowledge must be constrained to quantifiable facts alone – essentially, 
that knowledge of noumena is impossible, as exemplified by science’s lack of concern or 
interest for nonexistence and nonbeing.
133
 As noted above, the search for the existence of 
a particle or a planet does not deal with the nature of existence, or that of nonexistence. 
To Heidegger, again, it must be stressed that this is a sin of omission, inasmuch as some 
truth and knowledge can be arrived at through this manner, but it is a limited range of 
truth and knowledge since some questions are never asked, and the scientific worldview 
discourages one from asking them. 
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The technological mindset, then, is one which is fixed in a particular pattern and 
not only fails to consider other ways of viewing the world, but often cannot even 
acknowledge that they exist. The problem is not the technological, mathematical way of 
viewing the world per se, for it is revealing of a certain truth, but that those who embrace 
it become so very closed to other ways of viewing the world. For example, Heidegger 
offers the example of a forest, or a river; the technician is unable to appreciate the natural 
beauty of this geographical feature but sees it as a resource of harvestable lumber or 
hydroelectric power which can be harnessed and controlled. This is called the standing-
reserve, the tendency to view everything as a resource pool for technological 
exploitation. The world cannot be left alone but must be harnessed and yoked to produce 
more, faster, and better. Animals must be selectively bred so their offspring will yield 
more meat, milk or eggs, crops modified and cross-pollinated to give more bushels per 
acre, industrial production must use less labour, incur fewer operating costs, and obtain 
greater profitability per unit.  
Nobody living in the modern, Western, industrialized world would read this and 
find no truth in it (and nor would most who live on other parts of the planet, surely), for 
the cold drive towards efficiency surrounds us in late-capitalist society. The attitude is 
even perceptible, as Heidegger remarks, towards things which have not yet even come 
into human utilization – witness the treatment of “proven” and “unproven” oil reserves, 
for instance, which are included in economic calculations and whose size and existence is 
the subject of market speculation even though they remain deep underground and their 
precise extent remains unknown, or the burgeoning markets in commodity futures, 
quantifying and marketing goods as yet unproduced. 
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We have identified the three points of this triad: science, technology, and 
capitalism. Technology is almost certainly the most “basic” of these three and the one 
most innate to humanity. The use of tools is a technology, an artifice of some kind used 
in the solution of some problem, as are the techniques of using them, or even the 
techniques of human hands used upon nature without the mediation of tools. Tool use is 
characteristic of our distant ancestors; crafted tools have been found with the remains of 
Homo habilis and Australopithecus. For example, the site OGS-7, excavated in Ethopia 
in 2000, dates back 2.58 million years and contains both pre-human remains and 
deliberately-created tools.
134
 More recently (relatively speaking), we might consider the 
agricultural revolution which began about 11,000 years ago, involving selective breeding 
and crop manipulation as the accidental selection of differing attributes in crops became 
deliberately sought and engineered by prehistoric farmers. Maize, for example, is not 
natural at all, but is a distant descendant from the teosinte plant (to which, it should be 
noted, it bears very little resemblance at all), first domesticated in central Mexico and 
later to become a staple food for the Aztecs, the Maya, the Incas, and other pre-
Columbian civilizations.
135
 
Popularly, crop manipulation is associated with genetic modification of crops, 
scientific horticulture, Monsanto and Roundup-Ready. However, humans have been 
modifying crops for almost four times as long as they have been writing. Technology – 
the skills, techniques and artifacts used to manipulate nature to human advantage – is 
older than humanity itself, having been established long before Homo sapiens arrived on 
the prehistoric scene. Technology, as techne, was a problem the Greeks dealt with; 
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certainly in the Western philosophical tradition, they were the first to address technology 
as a potential problem. It is a mistake, therefore, to think of technology as something 
modern, or something that is not innate to humanity. If technology predates science, and 
even predates humanity, causality demands that science cannot have given rise to 
technology. Further, if technology has been a universal aspect of human existence as long 
as humans have existed, this strongly suggests that technology is as innate (or, if 
anything, even more innate) to the human experience as speech or politics.  
As I have noted before, the sea change in technology comes about as the result of 
the scientific revolution and the introduction of the scientific method to our technological 
development – the change from techne to technology, as we might call it. Some, like 
Fukuyama or possibly Heidegger, view modern technology is uniquely problematic, but 
this is not borne out. We have used technology, in the sense of artifacts and techniques, 
for millions of years; all that science has done is to make their development easier and 
faster, and to raise the limits of what they can achieve. The scientific revolution was the 
accelerator, but not the creator, of technological change, as the horse, the railway, and the 
aircraft made human transport easier and faster, but humans had moved from place to 
place long before any of them were created. The truly revolutionary moment, when the 
technological was first brought into being, was surely that point at which one of our 
hominid ancestors first extended his own arm with a stick or a bone.
136
 If there was a 
fundamental change, why would the ancients have dwelt on the problems of technology 
in much the same way that we do? If the technological mindset and worldly science or 
material goods are newly corrupting, why would Augustine have railed against them? 
There is evidence to suggest that the scientific revolution accelerated the pace of 
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technological development, and that it exacerbated the problems of technology at the 
same time as it heightened our understanding and our craft, but it did not create them. 
Heidegger does not identify technology but science as problematic, which is in its 
infancy next to the prehistoric phenomenon of technology. The first tentative steps of 
science may be very old, such as Eratosthenes’ aforementioned experimentation with 
gnomons so as to establish the circumference of the Earth, but what Heidegger deals with 
is modern science, originating with the scientific revolution, midwifed by the 
Renaissance. The scientific method is the origin of Heidegger’s critique, since the 
beginning of all scientific inquiry is the framing of the research question, which 
necessarily limits the possible answers in Heidegger’s estimation. There can be many 
truths to answer the question of what makes a good life, but only one of water’s boiling 
point. This is even clearer when science is contrasted with contemplative or meditative 
approaches to truth, which perhaps take a more passive approach to Heideggerian 
revelation than science, which pre-defines the nature of the revelation.  
Science accompanies empiricism and the numerical, but also accompanies a 
departure from techne, which is concerned with the practical and with building, making, 
or working, into something more resembling episteme – a search for knowledge itself in 
the abstract. The ancients might have studied the heavens in order to produce a calendar 
which could guide the planting and harvesting of those crops (the ancient Egyptians 
having produced a calendar of 365 days, with 12 months of 30 days, particularly useful 
for predicting the annual submersion of the Nile floodplain). Modern astronomy, 
however, has a sizeable branch devoted to finding exoplanets, for instance, or the Oort 
cloud, the discovery of which would have little to no bearing upon life on this planet. It is 
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in this crossing from techne to episteme that Heidegger feels science has overstepped its 
bounds, for science is necessarily of limited use in the discovery of abstract truth and 
knowledge, and worse, tends to eclipse other useful epistemological tools.  
The superstructure of capitalism is then built atop the scientific revolution. It is 
hard to read Heidegger’s critique of science and not be reminded of capitalism, in the 
discussion of standing-reserve and the tendency to view the natural world as raw 
material, or to view human beings as a labour resource, a market, or both. The drive for 
efficiency can be seen in the same way, inasmuch as science concerns itself with 
efficiency and the discovery of the “rules” of the universe which can be exploited to 
maximum gain, as an unethical lawyer might exploit the “rules” of law. So, too, can the 
tendency of capitalism to induce human beings to see the world in highly marketized 
ways, as science induces us to see only the scientific and to dismiss the philosophical, the 
artistic, or the religious; the questions we bring with us define the answers we will 
receive. 
 This attitude can certainly be felt on the internet. The computer pioneer Steve 
Wozniak remarks that the internet was, at its inception,  
“a breath of fresh air – it was so free, nobody owned the internet space… 
It was world-wide, [yet] it was people-to-people… the ‘little people’ all of 
a sudden had this incredible resource, and we didn’t have to go through 
other people selling it to us and delivering it to us… [but] a lot of social 
interaction will be curbed – let me take that back, I fear it. I fear it will be. 
The gatekeepers, those who turn on-and-off switches, will allow certain 
things, disallow other things… I fear that very strongly.”137  
The internet began as a free and open space for discourse and sharing, as a 
technology that allows dialogue and even closeness between people separated by huge 
geographical gulfs – something that Kant himself likely would have embraced, since he 
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praised the capacity of the ship and the camel to bring diverse people together for 
peaceful exchange and discourse, to be governed by public law and further the 
advancement of cosmopolitan constitution. Surely he would have been even more 
enamoured of a technology far better than either for these purposes.
138
 Sadly, in this free 
and open space there seem to be edifices of control and curtailment under construction, 
dominated by corporations and conglomerates determined to monetize whatever aspects 
of the internet they can. The internet, in short, was seen as standing-reserve – a great 
potential that could be harvested for economic gain. It could not be left as a simple space 
for open, interpersonal, yet global and cosmopolitan discourse that nobody owned or 
controlled, like the forest or the river, but had to be exploited, its discursive spaces 
analyzed for their market potential and exploited for financial gain – and, as with the 
logging of the forest or the damming of the river, the continued existence of those spaces 
ranks a distant second priority behind the economic gain. 
The internet is a purely synthetic realm. The natural world, such as Heidgger’s 
rivers and forests, would exist even if humans did not. The natural world, existing 
independently of humanity, can be regarded in other ways. To see nature as standing-
reserve is, as Heidegger remarks, just one particular way of looking at it. However, one 
must ask if this is also true of an artificial construction such as the internet, especially one 
conceived and developed when its parent society was deep in the technological age and 
had begun to view almost everything as standing-reserve. Arriving during this particular 
epoch, could the internet ever have been something other than standing-reserve, or was it 
always conceived thus, and perhaps it merely took humanity some time to realize it? 
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For comparison, let us take another of Heidegger’s subjects: art. Art, too, is a 
purely artificial creation. While a strict materialist might argue that a painting is simply a 
rearrangement of pigment on canvas, both of which are the products of nature (or at least, 
of natural materials), it is possible to respond that what makes the painting “art” is 
intangible. Heidegger’s contention is that the physical components of art are not used up, 
but incorporated; art brings the components into their own. While art may have a 
character of physical existence, works of art have to be taken as they are experienced.
139
 
Still more problematic for the materialist are the intangible forms of art, such as the 
symphony, or the poem; while both may be written down, the writings are not the art; 
their destruction or copying does not affect the art, and performances or readings of either 
may vary relatively widely, yet still be recognized as the original art – in short, these 
intangible works of art are not rearrangements of nature, but purely synthetic constructs 
in the human mind.  For example, Gregorio Allegri’s masterpiece Miserere mei, Deus 
was composed in the early 17
th
 century and originally performed quite differently from 
how it is sung today.
140
 Despite the great differences in writing and performance of the 
piece – the original was forbidden to be performed outside the Vatican and, it is 
rumoured, is only known to a wider audience because Mozart recreated it from memory – 
there is no doubt that all versions of the Miserere are still the Miserere. What, then, is the 
“essence” of the Miserere? Surely it is something other than even the music itself? 
Art, to Heidegger, is something that runs counter to science. While science sets 
out to find facts, in a most positivist manner, art contains both world, meaning 
intelligibility, meaning, and the revealing from concealment, yet also earth, which resists 
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meaning and conceals; art does not resolve the strife between them, and as art reveals, it 
simultaneously conceals. Science, unlike art, cannot create or open truth, but only explore 
a realm of truth that has already been opened.
141
 
However, art – or, at least, some art – has come to be regarded as standing-reserve 
also. The commercialization of popular music or movies is obvious and much-lamented 
by critics and the aesthetically-minded public alike; film and song are frequently regarded 
in terms of their marketability and commercial potential virtually divorced from any 
aesthetic considerations.
142
 The obsession of Hollywood with established franchises and 
bankable lead actors needs no introduction, and surely neither does the music industry’s 
efforts to manufacture stars who may often not be the creators – or even the performers – 
of “their” music. Even Banksy, the pseudonymous hit-and-run street artist, has sold 
works at auction for six-figure sums, and bears a large part of the credit for the 
subsequent commercial success of street artists. Art of a distinctly “renegade” bent, it 
seems, can still be commercialized.  
Of course, not all art is seen as standing-reserve in this cynical and 
commercialized manner, nor has all art been successfully “conquered” by the scientific 
mindset and the capitalistic system it gives rise to. Heidegger would probably contend 
that art for commercial purposes, art that was standing-reserve, or art that had been 
“conquered” by science, was no longer art at all, for it has lost its ability to reveal and 
conceal. It has ceased to become art, and instead become equipment, something 
manufactured in order to be consumed. However, in the purely artificial creation of art, 
perhaps there is a comparison to be made with the purely artificial creation of the 
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internet. Even though some art may be corrupted so as to become standing-reserve, losing 
its artistic qualities, it cannot be inherently standing-reserve since there was a time when 
it was not considered so, and not all of it has become standing-reserve. Poetry, for 
example, seems to have largely resisted commercialization, and while classical music 
may have been adopted for movie and videogame soundtracks, a great deal of it is 
(relatively) non-commercial. At least some art-forms, or some parts of each art-form, 
seem able to resist. 
Heidegger seems to consider the painting as quintessentially artistic, and yet in his 
own time just as long before, paintings had a distinctly commercial streak to them. The 
Old Masters generally worked on commission from wealthy patrons who “consumed” art, 
for example, and while some patrons might have been willing to pay for anything by 
Rembrandt or Leonardo, for others, the artist’s work was to be dictated (portraiture, for 
instance). Yet this commercialized element, this hint of standing-reserve, does not seem 
to have swayed Heidegger from his conviction that art runs as a counter-force to science. 
Perhaps there is something unique to art that makes it thus, but one cannot conclude that 
entirely artificial creations only derived from nature in the most abstract way (the 
rearrangement of pigment to form a painting, the molding of wood, glue, and catgut into 
the violin which will play the solo, or the bunching of silica into bundled strands that will 
carry the information of the internet) must necessarily become standing-reserve. 
In the frenetic computer age, the internet before the world-wide-web (WWW) 
seems like ancient history. For an example of the internet whose passing Wozniak 
laments, let us take Usenet. This is an “old” internet technology, preceding the WWW by 
over a decade. It was started in 1979 by two Duke University graduate students, and 
102 
 
functions like a hybrid between a forum and an e-mail system; users post messages 
(individually known as posts or articles; collectively referred to as news) on various 
discussion boards known as newsgroups named for their subject and content, e.g. 
talk.politics.theory. The posts are not held on a single server, but are distributed over a 
large, ever-changing, and widely geographically dispersed collection of servers which 
forward posts between themselves as they are made. These servers are widely distributed 
amongst universities, public institutions, and private companies, but due to the 
decentralized nature of the network, no single server owner has any power over the 
network as a whole. The sudden refusal of any particular provider to participate would 
not impact the network – no posts would be deleted, no groups would be closed, no 
archived material would be lost, and discussion would continue to flow. Usenet itself is 
now in decline and almost all the traffic is in pirated intellectual property rather than 
discussion, while most internet service providers have dropped support for it, citing low 
subscriber interest (having lost its readership to its more graphic offspring, blogs and 
online forums, much as radio lost to television). Those who wish to access the service 
must now find an independent news provider and pay an additional fee to that firm.  
Usenet is symbolic of what the early internet was about. Access was restricted 
only by access to the internet itself. It was a space for discussion of an unlimited number 
of topics by an unlimited number of people separated by unlimited geographical distance 
and time, since one could read and respond to a message at any point – thanks to the 
efforts of archivists, it is theoretically possible to reply to a post made decades ago.
143
 
Wozniak described it as “a breath of fresh air,” and, indeed, nothing like it had existed 
before. It was a mode of communication that could take the format of a letter, but it could 
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be received with the immediacy of a telephone call; it could be read by a readership 
rivalling that of a major daily newspaper, and yet be responded to by potentially anyone 
capable of reading it in the first place. This was an agora that could potentially 
encompass the entire world and be accessed by it at its leisure. 
Until the early 1990s, the internet was strictly for enthusiasts only, and the 
telecommunications technology of the time was only realistically capable of text 
communication since the “plain old telephone service” (POTS – the voice-grade, pre-
digital telephone network) modems then in use would take hours to transmit even 
photographs considered fairly low-resolution by 2013 standards. With the advent of the 
World Wide Web in 1993 and with better telecommunication technologies, internet usage 
exploded in the mid-1990s. In 1993, the CBC reported that the internet was growing at a 
rate of ten per cent every month.
144
 The burgeoning internet was increasingly colonized 
by financial interests, and the word “colonized” is used deliberately for reasons that will 
become apparent later. To put it in Heidegger’s terms, the rapid expansion of the internet 
turned the attentions of the technologically-minded to it, and what they saw was the 
standing-reserve of untapped markets for services and commercialization. 
The distributed server network has now been replaced by centralized servers 
operated by companies such as Facebook, Google, eBay, Apple, Microsoft, and so forth. 
Recent years have also seen a large number of buy-outs and mergers, further 
concentrating online media into a smaller and smaller number of hands, mirroring the 
experiences of more conventional media in the 1980s and 1990s.
145
 At the time of 
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writing, for example, Amazon has acquired 22 companies since its founding, while 
Facebook has acquired 42, eBay 45, Apple 53, and Google 127.
146
 The list of formerly 
independent major technology firms includes Netscape, Hotmail, Geocities, PayPal, 
Craigslist, YouTube, Lycos, Instagram, MySpace, Ask.com, Tumblr, NeXT, FeedBurner, 
Android, Skype, and WebTV, and does not include substantial holdings purchased in yet 
more companies, including those that the major internet and media firms hold in each 
other (such as Microsoft’s $240 million stake in Facebook, its $605 million share of 
Barnes & Noble, or its $5 billion investment in AT&T).
147
  
Instead of a distributed network where no single server owner/operator can impact 
the service as a whole, these organizations now have tremendous control over internet 
usage and content. Imagine the impact to social networking if Facebook disappeared, 
how web searches would change if Google was no more, how much independent internet 
video would be lost if YouTube closed their servers, or how digital music distribution 
would be affected by the disappearance of iTunes. These are the “gatekeepers” whom 
Wozniak referred to, so-called because their existence as content providers of such 
enormous reach and power gives them incredible capacity to shape and change the 
information that flows through their servers. It is certainly not necessary to document the 
concerns that this raises, for a simple search of news sources reveals a seemingly endless 
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number of stories which fret about the possible abuses of power by the gatekeepers, 
including violations of privacy and information-gathering, censorship, bait-and-switch 
tactics to squeeze profits out of consumers, and so forth. 
In his Defense of North America, George Grant elaborates upon the “primal” of 
North America created by the combination of a Protestant/Calvinist strain of theology 
and Baconian science which formed the dominant character of those Europeans who 
happened upon the “untamed wilderness” of the Americas. Rejecting Greek ideas of 
nature and humanity’s place in the natural order, Baconian science led us to conquer 
nature as much as Calvinist theology urged us to conquer ourselves. This primal gave an 
expectation of a certain kind of freedom which was perhaps never realized, Grant 
contends, as the conquest of the land yielded not an age of material abundance but only 
numberless metropoloi where literal squalor vied with the metaphorical poverty of 
mindless consumerism. Even though the pioneers are all gone and the pioneering spirit is 
certainly irrelevant to modern, urban, mass-consumption society, the primal remains with 
us and shapes our attitudes.
148
  
It is for this reason that I describe the internet as having been “colonized,” for 
Grant’s description of the scientific-Calvinist mindset and its effect upon the Europeans 
who colonized North America can also be read as a metaphor for what happened in the 
online world around twenty years after he wrote it. The internet was akin to an 
undiscovered continent (albeit without inconvenient natives to be displaced or disposed 
of – and Usenet makes for a spurious analogue), arising in virtual space, but appearing in 
our consciousness from nothing in much the same way as the Americas appeared in the 
consciousness of Europe in 1492. Millions of internet users, growing in number every 
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day, were seen as an opportunity both by established firms and by entrepreneurs. A few 
of the latter managed to found successful companies, such as Amazon, but most failed in 
the 1997-2000 dot-com bubble – the first wave of internet “colonization.” This mass of 
potential consumers seemed to be viewed with the same mindset as the discovery of new 
lands potentially rich in natural resources, resulting in something like the Klondike Gold 
Rush – the rapid spread of rumoured fortunes to be made, without doubt vastly 
exaggerated, followed by a haphazard and ill-planned scramble to capitalize on the 
phenomenon before it became too late, with the result that most left with nothing. 
Grant’s apprehension is similar to that of Heidegger, for to the technologically-
minded, any untamed wilderness will be approached as an opportunity to colonize, 
capitalize, and exploit, for it is all seen as standing-reserve, ripe for exploitation. Perhaps 
it was not a coincidence that colonialism appeared with the Renaissance and reached its 
peak in the 19
th
 century, in the rational-scientific Victorian era, famous not just for an 
obsession with colonialism and empire in the foreign policies of the major Victorian 
powers, but for the great number of engineering, scientific and technical geniuses that it 
produced. It is apparently impossible to see an untamed wilderness and leave it 
unspoiled, as Heidegger remarked; the wilderness must be colonized, conquered and 
transformed, and the race is on, for if we do not do it then someone else will, and then we 
shall lose out. The “Scramble for Africa” was one such example. The “Scramble for the 
Internet” might be another. 
The application of the scientific enframing to the social sphere, to human labour 
and to economics, returns us both to the agora and to the internet. Instead of a medium 
for discussion and discovery, the internet is regarded by the gatekeepers in terms of 
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economic potential. The discussions of Usenet cannot be quantified in terms of their 
value, but e-commerce can, and so begins the conquest of the gatekeepers. It is difficult 
to see what Facebook messages or wall posts offer that Usenet does not, and yet the latter 
is in decline while the former is waxing. Heidegger would undoubtedly remark that the 
technological minds at Facebook (and the companies which preceded them, and those 
which they bought out, lest it be said that I give Facebook credit for originality that they 
do not deserve) had perceived the phenomenon of online communication and regarded it 
as a standing-reserve, and not purely by conscious choice – if at all. The potential to 
exploit it lies in channeling it through a service where it can be monetized. If 
communications can be made to flow through centralized Facebook servers rather than 
through the decentralized and nebulous cloud of Usenet, then content can be analyzed 
and scrutinized for marketing potential, so that the tailored advertisements can appear on 
one’s Facebook page, crafted out of a cloud of keywords which Facebook’s analytical 
software has plucked from wall posts and messages. Just as the technological mind looks 
upon the forest and sees lumber, so, too, it looks upon “netizens” and sees consumers. 
The essence of Heidegger’s critique of Kant, as augmented by Grant, might be 
summarized as this: technology cannot liberate or assist in liberation by itself, will not be 
of any great help in human emancipation, and is probably an active hindrance. Firstly, the 
mindset of the technological all but guarantees something like colonization and empire-
building since new virtual spaces will be used not for discourse or for any cosmopolitan 
project of liberation, but will be harnessed for productivity and profit. Secondly – and this 
is drawn much more from Heidegger than from Grant – even if technology could liberate 
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us politically, what then will liberate us from the technological, and from the narrowing 
of our collective vision? 
There is something quite teleological in Heidegger’s assessment, however, and 
even something hopeful. Technology has the potential to be that which saves, if only we 
can manage to raise our gaze to the unfolding of technology rather than its marvels alone. 
“So long as we represent technology as an instrument, we remain transfixed in the will to 
master it.”149 Not so for Jacques Ellul, however, who is much more pessimistic about 
technology, and whose only promise of salvation even seems confounded by his own 
criteria.  
According to Ellul, the problem of technology is not the use of technology, for 
this confuses technology and the machine. The machine can be used for many purposes, 
but only one is technical, and technique has no end other than itself. Moreover, technique 
does not make moral judgements but creates a technical “morality:” how replaces 
should.
150
 The technologies of the internet in particular are advanced technologies whose 
development and use is possible only in a society that has already made great advances in 
electronics and miniaturization, which require a good understanding of quantum 
mechanics, the ability to cost-effectively engineer at the nanometre level, an 
understanding of the role of software, and so forth. Even thirty or forty years ago, these 
were insufficiently understood to allow anything like the modern computer hardware or 
software that makes the internet possible, and this is not to mention more elementary 
technologies such as the reliable delivery of alternating current, the manufacture of 
plastics, etc. It was only with the creation of computers for the Apollo program that the 
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separation of software from hardware became understood, for example; this was on then 
state-of-the-art hardware that was many orders of magnitude less powerful than a modern 
cellphone. 
The point is that a society capable of producing such technology sits at the apex 
of a pyramid of supporting technologies which had to be mastered at earlier points in 
time – a society steeped in technique. Eratosthenes’ measurement of the earth’s 
circumference depended only upon sticks in the ground and Galileo’s observations 
required only hand-crafted instruments, but the internet is a superstructure built upon a 
technological and industrial edifice of dizzying size and sophistication. If Ellul is correct, 
to progress this far would have meant that the technical morality would have replaced 
philosophically-derived moral judgements long ago. Technical progress is geometric, he 
argues, and the technical progress of any given civilization is irreversible.
151
 There is no 
going back, and there is no standing still, only a galloping forward at a geometrically 
increasing rate – a reiteration of Moore’s Law if ever there was one.152 
So the stage is set for our present conundrum, and like both Grant and Heidegger, 
Ellul would probably say that it was inevitable that a development such as the internet, as 
dependent upon technique as it was, would be degraded in some way and would lose the 
social and even spiritual aspects it may once have had in favour of the technical. He 
might have been surprised that it took so long. Ellul’s work has a more specific bearing 
upon this particular problem, however. He originally discussed “technical automatism” in 
reference to Marxism, but it seems that the lessons can be applied to this situation as well. 
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In this phenomenon, humans are stripped of choice in methods, organization, and so 
forth, yet are satisfied.
153
 If one is deprived of opportunities to participate in the 
“authentic” human social experience, Ellul argues, it is not, strangely, grounds for 
unhappiness. The removal of choice is accepted and even welcomed, and very few are 
sad to see their options being curtailed and their horizons limited.  
So might be described the transformation of the internet. What began as 
something quite human, despite its dependence on the technological, is reduced to the 
technical. If we take as read Wozniak’s likening of the early internet to a “breath of fresh 
air,” revitalizing and revolutionizing discussion and human interaction, then the advent of 
the gatekeepers removes choice from it, yet everyone is happy with this state of affairs, 
blissfully participating in Facebook discussions or watching YouTube videos without 
seeming to wonder why their options for participating in and enjoying these media are 
increasingly constrained and limited. Moreover, as Karim remarks, the information 
society is in the midst of a great conjuring act wherein data and information are conflated 
with knowledge and wisdom, and individual happiness is promised just by tapping into 
the vast wealth of online information.
154
 The information revolution has been heralded as 
a saviour, and this is to suppose that the solution to our problems is to widen and deepen 
technique. 
Ellul also claimed that as technique progressed, the individual with a preference 
for solitude would find it increasingly difficult to disengage materially or spiritually from 
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society; technique would invade that individual’s entire life.155 As the development of the 
internet has progressed, again, this seems increasingly applicable to the online world. The 
universality of technology is not applied equally to all people in society but seems to be 
somewhat generational: while many members of older generations refuse to have an e-
mail, Facebook, Twitter or LinkedIn account, a Western citizen under the age of thirty 
who did not possess at least some of the four and use them regularly, if not compulsively, 
would be rare. Moreover, and here we return to Ellul’s prediction, such a person would 
find themselves cut off from a great deal of human interaction, socialization, news and 
current events, and so forth, were they to renounce smartphones, e-mail, new social 
media and the internet. 
It might be said that this is reading something into Ellul’s work that is not there. 
The Technological Society was written in 1963, when transistors had only recently 
replaced vacuum tubes, integrated circuits had not yet been invented, and ARPAnet – the 
first packet-switching network – was still a blue-sky hypothesis. However, the internet 
surely remains one of the ultimate expressions of technique, and as it becomes 
increasingly true that, for some, offline and online worlds and identities become blended, 
Ellul’s arguments become more and more applicable. This merging of the offline and 
online, on either side of a boundary once defined quite sharply, seems to be proceeding 
rapidly in a certain segment of the technologically-aware population. Apart from the 
meteoric rise of social networking and micro-blogging sites as a standard mode of 
socialization and information-gathering, there is the increasing merger of online and 
offline shopping and banking, for example – activities that once took place entirely in the 
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physical world. With the advent of e-readers, online content services, and e-stores, the 
shopping “experience” for many goods and services can now be entirely digital. One 
visits the online store, browses for the content one is looking for, completes the purchase 
online with an encrypted credit-card checkout, and receives the content either streamed or 
downloaded to disk over a broadband connection. The purchase, once the exchange of 
money for tangible goods, can now be entirely virtual – digital currency for digital 
property, with neither having any corporeal form. 
Ellul gives three ways out of the technological society: apocalypse, 
enlightenment, or divine intervention.
156
 He identifies problems with the technological 
society, but with these answers, it is safe to say he has no realistic solutions to offer. The 
main flaw in his thinking, however, is something that can be found in any profoundly 
structuralist argument: if the technological mindset is so powerful and drowns out other 
voices both in ourselves and in society at large, then why is it that we would be able to 
identify it, and why are there so many dissenting voices? The very fact that Ellul has 
apprehended the technological mindset, that so many others have read and agreed with it, 
and so many more seem to have reached similar conclusions on their own, seems to 
indicate that its hold is not so strong that it cannot be opposed, and not so pervasive that it 
cannot be detected or that alternatives cannot be imagined. If it is not so pervasive and 
subversive as supposed, then perhaps it is not as dangerous; if we can apprehend the 
problem, it would seem that we may be able to produce a solution – if the problem is 
really so grave at all. 
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For example, in the last few decades alone there has arisen a veritable rash of 
movements and ideals opposed to technique. The environmentalists, for example, have 
become politically influential and exert considerable power over policy (particularly in 
Europe), and at its heart, environmentalism is fundamentally opposed both to a 
conception of the world as Heidegger’s standing-reserve, and to Ellul’s technological 
drive to ever-greater efficiency and production. There are many sub-groups within the 
environmentalist pantheon, and not all of its members subscribe to all or even most of 
them, but among those most commonly adhered to are the sanctity of non-human life and 
the need to preserve habitats and environments, the desire to preserve the natural beauty 
of the world, and the search for a calmer existence absent the treadmill of production.  
The link between technique and capitalism is obvious. Heidegger’s standing-
reserve is undoubtedly the way that the capitalist views the world, with everything as yet 
outside the sphere of capitalism seen as untapped resources or untapped markets. 
Consumerism is the same mindset at a personal level, where happiness is linked to 
material acquisition – the world exists to be acquired, and to acquire it is fulfillment. If 
capitalism is linked to and symptomatic of the technological worldview, then, as it seems 
clear that Heidegger and Ellul both intend it to be, then anti-capitalist movements must be 
opposed to that worldview. 
There are many such movements. In the 1980s and 1990s, with capitalism 
revelling in its supposed victory over both Soviet Marxism-Leninism and the mixed-
economy doldrums of the 1970s, it appeared that the environmental movement was the 
cutting edge of anti-capitalist agitation and, perhaps, the only such movement with much 
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life left in it.
157
 While there might have been cause for despondency among socialists 
when technological capitalism of the 1980s and 1990s seemed all-conquering, this 
resurgence of technological-capitalism has produced increasing wealth inequalities, 
environmental catastrophes (the worst of which are yet to come), and several economic 
crises, the latest iteration of a magnitude not seen since the Great Depression. In the wake 
of these insults to the supposed impregnability and infallibility of technological 
capitalism, more such movements have proliferated, and old ones have acquired new life. 
Some resistance to capitalist domination seems to remain within the technological 
camp, such as Marxism and the labour movement in general (Marxism being devoted to 
rationality, science, industrial production and distribution, albeit in the interests of a 
different social class, while the labour movement largely seeks more equitable 
distribution and fairer treatment in the existing socioeconomic structure), but there are 
others which seem diametrically opposed, such as the hippie and punk countercultures of 
the 1970s and 1980s, New Age spiritualism, fundamentalist Islam and Christianity (and 
while the latter makes a strange bedfellow with capitalism, perhaps it is not too 
controversial to suggest that it sits at odds with science and rationality), or, recently, the 
Occupy movement.  
The latter is particularly interesting, for Occupy made considerable use of internet 
technologies, including CMC, to organize the movement and their protests. This use of 
technology to subvert the technological mindset is significant, for it implies that 
technology can be removed from the “technological.” As Ellul remarked, the machine 
can indeed be theoretically used at cross-purposes with technique, but these practical 
uses imply that technique is not as all-powerful as he supposed. These new technologies 
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are evidently a threat to technological regimes, since within the last few years there were 
a number of instances wherein states contemplated or actually undertook a ban on social 
media or internet usage. The British government considered a bill to shut down British 
CMC during periods of “social unrest” (due to the utility they had offered to dissenters 
during the recent European wave of anti-austerity protests and riots), while the Egyptian 
government took the still more radical step of shutting down the internet entirely for 
several days as the local phalanx of the Arab Spring reached critical mass. The “Great 
Firewall” of China has grown notorious, and surely the Chinese state is one of the most 
technological (in Ellul’s sense) in the modern world, dedicated as it is to science, 
engineering, and economics, and highly disdainful of philosophy or the arts, frequently 
condemning the latter as subversive and dangerous (however, the Great Firewall is 
routinely bypassed not only by Chinese dissidents but also by ordinary citizens 
uninterested in politics who wish to participate in Facebook and other banned sites, and 
these bypasses themselves are accomplished using internet technologies). 
If such anti-technological movements can exist and flourish, and, moreover, are 
using technological means to flourish (rather than an outright rejection of technology as 
per, for example, the Luddites), then perhaps the technological society is not as 
entrancing as Ellul supposes, and technology can be divorced from technique. Heidegger 
allows for the potential of technology to also become “that which saves,” if only we can 
manage to raise our gaze to the unfolding of technology rather than its marvels alone. He 
wrote that as technology threatens to sweep mankind aside, we may become aware of the 
power of technology to do this, cease to be transfixed by our desire to master it, and 
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resolve to save ourselves.
158
 Perhaps the existence of these movements reflects this 
prophecy coming to pass, and perhaps we are witnessing the end of a Heideggerian 
epoch, when human nature and human desires and understanding will be changed – 
again. 
Yet if it is possible for technology to be used in freeing ourselves from the 
shackles of a technological enframing, then Kant was right after all, and technology is 
merely an instrument shaped by human desire rather than an entity that shapes it. 
Technology serves two masters, both the established forces of technique, capitalism, and 
state power, and the dissidents and protesters who oppose them. That lends weight to the 
idea that technology itself is value-neutral, and is merely exploited by people of differing 
mindsets and motivations, rather than actively shaping those mindsets and motivations. If 
society has become entranced by the technological, then that is by coincidence and of our 
own doing rather than by the power of technology to do so – and, therefore, to free 
society of it does not require us to cast aside technology. The Kantian message (and 
perhaps even the Heideggerian one in the final analysis) is that technology is a tool which 
we can use to lift ourselves upwards as a society, and not one that will hold us down. 
There are many people who develop and embrace technology yet also pursue Kantian 
ideals of liberalism and freedom, not in spite of technology but using it: Steve Wozniak, 
who is not only the co-founder of Apple, Inc. but also of the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation; Richard Stallman, a world-class software developer but also a fierce 
advocate of free software (not only “free as in beer” but also “free as in speech,” as he 
likes to say); Linus Torvalds, who wrote the Linux operating system and then not only 
gave it away for free but allowed open access to the source code as well; Julian Assange, 
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whose Wikileaks project relies upon internet technology to promote transparency and 
liberalism for citizens otherwise dominated by states, corporations, and NGOs. Evidently, 
to be an engineer deeply invested in technology and technique by no means prevents one 
from also becoming an advocate of liberalism, freedom, and social justice, or from 
employing technical skills in those pursuits. 
Ellul and Heidegger both believe that the technological society and the cultural 
obsession with technique, and the attendant, blinkered, rational-scientific mindset, are 
rather new phenomena from no earlier than the 20
th
 century and quite possibly not even 
until some decades into it, beginning with the Second Industrial Revolution, oil power, 
and internal combustion, or even later, with the digital age. Richard Sennett counters that 
the phenomena which they observe are actually much older than that, and simple 
causality therefore dictates that the blame for them cannot be laid at the door of new 
technologies alone, which would exonerate digital technology as an agent of such change. 
Sennett argues that the impulse to withdraw from public life began long before the advent 
of electronics, which are not “infernal devices” but tools invented to fulfill pre-existing 
human needs and desires. The cultural impulse to withdraw from social interaction in 
order to know and feel more as a person does not date from the advent of CMC, or even 
from that of television or the radio, but from the great, wrenching changes in public life 
that started in the 18
th
 century. What we are witnessing today, therefore, is a continuation 
of trends now over two hundred years old.
159
   
The advent of electronics did not substantially alter the patterns of society, but in 
the 18
th
 century, industrialization and urbanization did. Agrarian economies were quickly 
revolutionized into industrial ones; farming fell from the most common to one of the least 
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common professions, and the feudal customs of serfdom, quitrent, and so forth which had 
composed the social landscape of Europe for over a thousand years were suddenly 
abolished. Largely rural populations were suddenly flung into large cities to feed the 
industrial demand for cheap labour. Feudal landowners and nobles living in their country 
seats were no longer the most powerful or the wealthiest social group, and had to make 
way for the nouveau riche urban bourgeoisie, who quickly demanded political changes to 
match the social ones. Canals, railroads and telegraphs suddenly and massively 
revolutionized communications, trade, and travel, which had all been bound to muscle 
and wind power for thousands of years. 
This shift from agrarian to industrial, rural to urban, and feudal to bourgeois-
liberal was the historical site for the beginning of modern public life, for the blurring of 
public and private, and for the desire to participate in public life more selectively and on 
one’s own terms rather than to be suddenly thrust into the public sphere. Timothy Leary 
may have popularized the now shop-worn phrase, “turn on, tune in, drop out”, but the 
desire to “drop out” of mainstream public life in search of a more meaningful, personal 
experience was already a century-and-a-half old when he first said it. Sennett cites 
Maxime du Camp, who wrote that the nature of public opinion and interest “is as if 
people's heads are turned by a wind of madness… enthusiasms are sudden, and they are 
sometimes tremendous, but they don't last long.” Du Camp is not describing the 
whimsical modern fascinations with internet memes (and the sudden elevation of all 
things feline to the status of a cultural touchstone), but the fickle and extremely transient 
nature of popular attention in Paris of the mid-19
th
 century.
160
 Here, Sennett’s thesis is 
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that the Victorians were not very different from ourselves in their social attitudes and 
behaviours, and certainly they have far more in common with us than either of us does 
with the medievals, or the ancients.
161
 
If these social patterns and impulses predate electronics, then electronics cannot 
be responsible for them. This sequence of events would prove Sennett and Kant correct: 
since the great shifts in public life occurred in the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries, modern 
technologies such as CMC have merely been developed to further those impulses. For 
example, Sennett remarks that one of the oldest Western conceptions of human society is 
theatrum mundi – life as theater. In the Christian era, the audience for the world theater 
was God, but by the 18
th
 century, those who adhered to this theory now held the 
performers to be performing for one another.
162
 It is difficult to read this and not to be 
reminded of the social posturing on Facebook, Twitter, internet forums, and so forth, 
where the performance of social theater is aided by the internet’s promise of relative 
anonymity – to make the dramatic mask so impenetrable that the identity of the actor 
cannot be revealed. These technologies have not created the phenomenon of social 
theater, but have merely enhanced it, and if the impulse towards social theater performed 
for one another (or, at least, the tendency to see society in such a fashion) is centuries-
old, then it is logical to conclude that these technologies were probably developed to 
satisfy the human need to make the performance of social theater more convincing and 
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more accessible. Moreover, nothing could be more wrong than to blame internet 
technologies for the performance of social theater. 
There is also a counter-argument derived from Hannah Arendt, whose arguments 
support the contention that CMC cannot be a substitute for traditional political forums or 
for face-to-face contact. The incorporeal nature of the internet “space” also seems to 
condemn it as a meaningful forum, and in addition, the appearance of the internet may 
further compound the blurring of the line between public and private space that Arendt 
finds troublesome. The Greeks believed that public space and political life were different 
from, and stood in opposition to, the home and the family – the threshold was a barrier 
which the ancients had to cross in order to transcend the household and “rise” to the 
realm of politics. Since the Classical period, we have seen the rise of the social realm 
which is neither strictly public nor strictly private; consequently, this vague middle 
ground has served to blur our understanding of what constitutes public and private.
163
 
Society excludes the possibility of action, since it expects a certain kind of behaviour and 
imposes norms and rules. For the Greeks, the public space presented an opportunity to 
show who they really were. Moreover, it gave the opportunity for others to see who they 
really were, for in acting and speaking, a person shows who they truly are – the revelation 
of “who” a person is rather than “what” she is; her gifts, qualities, talents, shortcomings, 
and so forth. Hiding the agent robs action of specific character. It is important to be able 
to perceive people in order to judge not only what they say but who they are, and this is 
perhaps an insurmountable challenge for the internet, especially considering its power to 
anonymize.
164
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Firstly, in response, it is possible that all of this may be true and yet the 
anonymous deliberative spaces of the internet may still be useful for political discourse. 
The inter-personal, immediate, and intimate deliberation which Arendt prizes may be 
held up as an ideal to be practiced in societies and under political regimes in which the 
right to participate in such discussions is protected and upheld. However, not all regimes 
live up to this standard. In such regimes, while anonymous internet forums with the 
protection of encryption may not be optimal, they are better than the stilted, censored, 
and self-censored discussions which are the only kind that tend to be held in a corporeal 
forum – in short, not the best, but the best available. Online discussion may be a poor 
substitute for the agora, in Arendt’s estimation, but it is better than nothing at all. 
Furthermore, by fostering public politics and enabling the voicing of dissent for regimes 
that forbid the involvement of citizens in politics, it may serve to move those regimes 
closer to a state of tolerance for political dissent and discussion – and, therefore, the 
technologies that allow this to happen are actually moving us closer to the Kantian ideal 
of universal liberalism, republicanism, and hospitality.  
Secondly, Arendt’s assessment of corporeal intimacy’s desirability in discourse, 
the need to see the daimon of one’s interlocutors, is drawn from Greek thought, 
particularly from Aristotle. Both Aristotle and Plato deplore the ability of rhetoric to 
deceive and delude the credulous, however, and the Enlightenment tradition builds these 
reservations about the potential abuse of rhetoric into a total disavowal for anything but 
logos.
165
 This tradition, which includes the work of Kant, holds that reason alone should 
win discussion, and that arguments, political or otherwise, ought to be considered on their 
logical merits alone, rather than the character of the speaker or his ability as a rhetorician.  
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The appeal to pure reason might be thought to fall into the camp of the 
technological as described by Heidegger, inasmuch as it rejects feeling or emotion as 
irrational distractions, but this is probably fallacious. Science does not have a monopoly 
on reason or logic, and the embrace of reason does no disservice to philosophy, at least 
some of which has embraced logic from Aristotle onwards. The only other comparison to 
be made regards the advocates of reason dismissing emotion and feeling in the same way 
as the scientific mind dismisses philosophy or art, but perhaps all theories are dismissive 
of their competition, and this does not necessarily make them partners. Strict plurality 
contains a self-contradiction, for it is itself an opinion that must either supersede others or 
concede its own worthlessness – the contradiction of tolerance, for example, which 
cannot extend to the intolerant, and which cannot concede that intolerance is as valid as 
tolerance. 
Habermas in particular is one such proponent of Enlightenment, Kantian reason, 
and his deliberations on the public sphere are particularly relevant here. Contra Arendt 
and Aristotle, he argues that speech ought to focus on reason alone and that ideas ought 
to be defended through logos – “a politics radically situated in this world should be 
justifiable on the basis of reason.”166 However, the Habermasian model holds that the 
public sphere exists wherever and whenever people affected by the social and political 
norms of action are engaged in practical discourse.
167
 This definition is radically 
inclusive enough that the virtual spaces of the internet could easily be included in it. The 
Habermasian public sphere does not contain actors, as only the administrative system can 
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act politically, although the public opinion as expressed, defined, and created in the 
public sphere may program the ruling body.
168
  
The deliberative spaces of the internet are virtual rather than physical, do not have 
the power to decide policy, and while there is some room for pathos even if there is little 
for ethos, the anonymity of the internet and its restriction to the written word or the pre-
recorded podcast or video places a strong emphasis on logos. All of this may disqualify it 
from becoming a proper deliberative, political space in some traditions, but a strong and 
influential tradition – perhaps even the dominant tradition in modern, Western political 
philosophy – would have to accept it. Even according to Arendt, the internet “spaces” 
may not be ideal discursive spaces, but they may remain spaces nonetheless and, while a 
poor substitute for a physical agora, we should be willing to embrace them where the 
optimal forms are impractical or dangerous, or perhaps even when they are so unpopular 
as to border on the irrelevant, as surely the physical town-hall meeting has become when 
contrasted with the volume of online discourse. It is also arguable that the internet is 
merely symptomatic of social change and the transformation of the public sphere rather 
than a causal agent, and this would confirm the Kantian conception of technology as a 
tool developed to serve human needs and desires, rather than an enslaving influence over 
human existence. 
Another objection to the deliberative potential of the internet, particularly when 
anonymity is allowed, is the great potential for incivility. Casual users of internet 
discussion boards or those who endure a quick perusal of the comments on YouTube or 
unmoderated news sites will be familiar with the profanity, the racial and sexual slurs, the 
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petty jingoism and xenophobia, and so forth that plagues them. Mark Kingwell finds the 
internet most objectionable precisely because it is so uncivil so much of the time, and 
because rational dialogue is so hard to find and so easily spoiled. Kingwell borrows from 
Charles Taylor in observing that individual freedom without any other values quickly 
gives way to vanity and relativism, and as the ultimate expression of this, “the internet is 
a reality that is sad, aimless and anti-democratic.”169 Incivility is profoundly damaging to 
political discussion, and therefore, online discussion boards are “surely… not genuine 
forms of democratic debate.”170 
There are several objections to this, however. Firstly, the internet is a medium for 
popular debate, and is not restricted to elected officials, functionaries, academics, 
professionals, or other social elites. Neither wealth nor education is an access barrier. It 
cannot be fairly compared to the Roman senate, nor may internet users be fairly 
compared with Cicero, any more than it would be fair to compare a bottle rocket with the 
Saturn V. Public political discourse, it must be noted, has been uncivil for a long time, 
and attempts to state otherwise are a whitewashing of history, intentional or otherwise. 
The letters of Cicero are more widely read and studied than the graffiti of Pompeii, but it 
would be an error to suppose that two ordinary Roman plebeians discussing politics in a 
bath-house would be closer to the former than the latter. The writings and monologues of 
the men of letters are recorded and studied, not the public-house arguments of 
commoners.
171
 Internet forums are the proper heirs of the latter, not the former. 
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For example, Sennett discusses the intensity and vitriol of 1750s political 
pamphlets, offering as examples an English pamphlet which describes its opponents as 
“whoremasters to the Devil, bastards without an ounce of charity for their fathers,” and a 
French pamphlet on the fairly tame subject of the floating of a foreign loan whose author 
calls his enemies “scaly monkeys, slaves of the dung hill on which they gibber.”172 The 
pamphlet format in particular is an interesting precursor of uncivil internet forums. From 
the late sixteenth century, the pamphlet was “small, insignificant, ephemeral, disposable, 
untrustworthy, unruly, noisy, deceitful, poorly printed, addictive, a waste of time,” and 
the stereotypical pamphleteer “an idle exploiter of the credulous vulgar” who, by the mid-
seventeenth century, had progressed from frivolity to greed and malice.
173
 The pamphlet, 
like the internet, was pseudonymous, and, like the internet forums which Kingwell 
despises, rapidly became a veritable cesspool of scurrilous accusations, petty insults, 
propaganda and fear-mongering. 
The point is not that incivility is virtuous or desirable in public speech, but merely 
that it is age-old and cannot be blamed upon the internet. As with the tendency to 
withdraw from the theater of public life in search of a more meaningful, private existence 
that Sennett documents, the internet has merely become the latest vehicle for general 
trends and tendencies which are centuries or even millennia old. In truth, a condemnation 
of the incivility of the internet is not a condemnation of the internet but of the general 
public, which is a profoundly undemocratic and illiberal notion. The reason for the 
civility of the Roman senate was precisely because it excluded all but those of learning 
and gentle birth, and concerns over the vulgarity and incivility of the general public are 
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but a stone’s throw from concerns over their right to vote or to be involved in politics at 
all. 
The same can be said for the mechanical skills of writing. Apart from the frequent 
weakness of their logos and the incivility of their composition, a common criticism of 
internet forums is that their posts are often written by people who seem to verge on 
functional illiteracy. Once again, it is not the internet that has created this phenomenon. 
The literacy rate is higher in the modern age than ever before, and as a corollary, the 
proportion of semi-literate or illiterate members of the general public in earlier eras was 
much higher. Again, online discursive spaces are radically inclusive, requiring only 
internet access (such as may be obtained from a cellphone, a public library, or an internet 
café), and as such contain the discourses of the general public – discourses which, 
centuries ago, would have been even more poorly written (if the general public could 
even write at all). While poor command of written language is by no means laudable, it is 
erroneous to blame the internet for this, and again, to argue that the general public ought 
to be excluded from political debate because of their lack of writing skills is deeply 
elitist. 
Kingwell also remarks that civility might be cast as a public good, and perhaps 
the internet fails because the economic rationale behind the distribution of such a public 
good is broken in some way – the benefits of civil discourse cannot be gated and are free 
of charge, but if some people in the forum are not interested in civil discourse, then a 
problem is set up.
174
 Gating the forum – however trivially – may offer a solution. For 
example, despite the name, the web forums on Something Awful: The Internet Makes You 
Stupid are actually a model of civility and productive discussion, and with good reason: 
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an access barrier has been created. Reading the forums is free, but posting requires an 
account and a nominal fee of a few dollars. The terms of the account are such that 
repeated incivility is sufficient reason for an account-holder to be banned, without 
refund.
175
 The modus operandi of the internet “troll” is to create a free account, use it to 
cause disruption, and when banned, simply create another. To do so on the Something 
Awful forums would require a significant cash outlay, and is probably why the forums 
are pleasantly civil and troll-free. Unfortunately, this does tie accounts to credit cards and 
other payment methods, but there are solutions to this problem as well – firstly, servers 
can be programmed not to retain any information linking subscribers to real-world 
accounts (and, again, computers cannot be interrogated or hacked for information they do 
not contain), and secondly, cryptocurrencies such as BitCoin may offer a way to conduct 
transactions online with the anonymity of cash.  
The concerns over the incivility and illiteracy exhibited on internet forums are not 
something that the internet has created or enabled, except inasmuch as it has provided a 
“voice” for an increasing number of people who would have been unable to express 
themselves publicly in previous eras. The internet merely allows a broadening of the 
public sphere and makes it radically inclusive, and although the general public might be 
frighteningly uncivil and semi-literate to those used to dealing with the educated elite, the 
fact is that the general public has always been thus – and, if anything, these problems 
might even be significantly less today than they have been historically. To try and deny 
the public voice based on the subjective criteria of civility, literacy, and education is 
profoundly illiberal and undemocratic. Students of American history and civil rights will 
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recall that literacy tests were part-and-parcel of the Jim Crow laws that disenfranchised 
ethnic minorities, especially the poor, and to deny or disdain a means of expression for 
the general public for similar reasons is unpleasantly reminiscent of them. 
I remain convinced of the Kantian assertion that technology is something over 
which we can assert agency; that we can make technology serve us, and not become 
servants of it. Perhaps those who feel otherwise are convinced that changes in human 
nature and human culture are occurring, or have occurred, far faster than they actually 
have. Sennett’s convincing argument is that the changes in human society, in terms of the 
pace at which we live and the nature of our social interactions, happened a long time 
before the advent of digital technology, and thus we cannot blame the internet for social 
changes that may have largely occurred two centuries or more before it existed. If new 
technology is accelerating the pace of this change, then that also implies that we exert 
agency over it; we are using technology to move ourselves further in the direction we 
desire and in the direction we were already moving in, and complaints over this must be 
seen not as complaints about technology, but complaints about the direction we choose to 
move in – which, again, seem to be rather elitist. If the majority are not moving in the 
direction one wishes them to, especially in a subjective matter like culture, is the majority 
incorrect, or is the dissenting opinion simply of a different personal preference which the 
dissenter is attempting to impose on an unwilling public? 
Furthermore, and in contradiction to the arguments of Ellul and Heidegger who 
believe that technology and science create a pervasive mindset which it is difficult or 
impossible to think outside of, the fact that some or many are able to perceive that 
technological society is not proceeding as they would wish is evidence that it is possible 
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to think in a non-technological way. Again, this permits agency, and demands the 
concession that the technological mindset is not so stultifying that we cannot think 
without it. If it is possible to identify the problems of technology and to think about their 
solution, then one such problem cannot be that technology makes it impossible to think 
about its problems and their possible solutions. Technological communication remains an 
expression of human communication; the tendencies it exhibits are those we would wish 
for our modes of communication and those we would seek out anyway, and which we 
have been seeking for some time, if not forever.  
If this is the case, then technological communication, including online 
communication, is a viable or even an exemplary format for discourse. Radically 
inclusive and open, cosmopolitan and democratic, its weaknesses are not the weaknesses 
of the technology itself, but the weaknesses of those who participate in communication. 
The medium is not responsible for the quality of the content; we cannot blame the 
internet for incivility, ignorance, closed-mindedness, prejudice, or any of the other 
problems we may think it responsible for. A truly open and inclusive public discourse 
requires that communication be unrestricted, as Kant demanded; the fact that those who 
might normally be excluded from communication are able to do so online is symptomatic 
of its radical inclusiveness. The internet offers enormous potential, but it is a tool and a 
conduit; we gain nothing by condemning it, and those who criticize it should assess 
whether their criticisms are of the technology or of those who use it – and whether those 
criticisms are justified. 
Conclusion 
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From Classical Greek thought in general, and (mostly) from Aristotle in 
particular, I have outlined the basis of Western pre-modern, pre-scientific-revolution 
thought on technology, deliberative speech, and the public realm. The Greeks struggled, 
as we still struggle, with their relationship with technology and the technological mindset. 
Aristotle argued, much as Ellul did over two millennia later, that the technological 
mindset and techne pursued to the exclusion of other virtues was not a beneficial thing 
for the overall health of the polity or for the virtue of its citizens. I mention these 
problems as they occurred to the Greeks because they illustrate a point I wish to 
emphasize, namely, that technology itself, as a collective term for the artifacts and 
techniques that we develop to shape and understand the world, is as old as humanity 
itself. The great change that occurred with the advent of the scientific revolution was not 
a change in the fundamental nature of technology, but a relatively sudden growth in the 
pace of technological change due to the discovery that we could develop our technology 
much better, faster, and easier with rational, methodical, and scientific methods.  
We might say, from the Greek perspective, that we had given techne, which was 
understood to mean something like art or craft, an enormous boost by governing it with 
episteme (knowledge, or more specifically, scientific knowledge) to a much greater 
degree. Engineering and architecture could do much better when performed in 
accordance with the understanding of physics, for example, and medicine was much more 
effective when done in the light of the sciences of anatomy and biology, rather than when 
it was performed haphazardly according to rules discovered through trial and error and 
through hypotheses untested by the scientific method.  
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The significant difference in the approach of the Greeks was not that they did not 
understand or practice techne and episteme, but that they desired both to be placed under 
the governance of phronesis – prudence, or practical wisdom, to be found not just as the 
result of science and knowledge (for both knowledge and craft are considered 
Aristotelian intellectual virtues), but in the cultivation of good character and 
contemplative wisdom, leading to the ability to make sound judgements and act in the 
true, eudaimonic interests of oneself and of others. It should be emphasized that philia, 
friendship, is necessary for phronesis and for the human experience, and phronesis 
therefore requires not just logic and science, but feeling, character, and emotion. Aristotle 
requires reason to be the governing part of the soul, but does not dismiss emotion, and 
believes that such feelings as righteous anger are not only justifiable but are essential to 
the ideal character. The phronimos should feel anger, love, sadness, and so forth. 
From these convictions emerge a picture of deliberative speech that is necessarily 
intimate and possessed not only of logos, but of ethos and pathos as well. Intimacy is 
required so that we can judge the character of others, and we must judge not only the 
evidence and the logical arguments of a speaker, but also his character. The corollary of 
this is that the speaker who wishes to be influential should learn not only how to present 
strong evidence and logical arguments, but must learn how to appear trustworthy and 
how to play to or even manipulate the feelings of his audience. It is incorrect to infer that 
Aristotle necessarily desires or advocates such manipulations, but they are characteristic 
of public discourse, and this is unavoidable given the nature of the intellectual virtues we 
are presented with. 
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A further development from these ideas is the idea of the public realm as 
something exclusive, rather than as an inclusive space. The intimate and separate nature 
of the public space requires leisure for participation; the working man does not have time 
to participate fully in the political life of the agora. Furthermore, phronesis requires 
leisure and wealth in order to conduct the life of contemplation that is required; Aristotle 
admits as much, and even lists gentle birth, a sound body, and even a relatively pleasing 
physical appearance as probable requirements for eudaimonia. It is worth re-emphasizing 
this inherent elitism in the thought of Aristotle and Plato, and I feel that this problem has 
never been satisfactorily resolved. Their works are elitist and undemocratic; they despise 
the “mob” and, although Aristotle opines that the opinion of the many would generally be 
preferable to that of a few experts, given his elitist tone it is not unreasonable to infer that 
the “many” refers here to citizens, probably not freedmen, and almost certainly not 
slaves, women, or the “naturally slavish,” for if some people are incapable of governing 
themselves, how could their opinions on deeper matters be valid? 
Against these ideas come the Enlightenment and the scientific revolution, as 
exemplified by the thought of Immanuel Kant. The advent of the scientific method 
offered a new methodology for gathering and applying knowledge, yielding far better 
results in our inquiries to understand and shape the natural world. Humans have always 
altered their environment and the use of tools predates the appearance of homo sapiens 
themselves, but the advent of modern science was a gigantic leap in the possibilities for 
technology. Observing the superiority of the results of the scientific method, which in the 
space of a few short centuries has answered a great many questions that had remained 
unanswered (or at least, lacking correct answers) for millennia, it is unsurprising that the 
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Enlightenment turned to logos, rationality, and reason as the highest intellectual virtues 
and discarded instinct, feeling, and emotion. The latter tended to mislead, it was argued; 
they could be manipulated in the service of deception and frequently led to factual errors 
in assessing the physical universe in which there was much, we discovered, that was 
counter-intuitive. Feeling something to be true or evaluating it through contemplation 
were now judged to be inferior ways of understanding when compared to gathering and 
verifying empirical evidence and testing hypotheses in a rational and methodical manner. 
The Enlightenment and the scientific revolution produced the industrial 
revolution, as the huge leaps in scientific knowledge gave us the technology to make 
huge leaps in our economic productivity and our standard of living. This also produced 
great changes in human society as urbanization changed our heretofore agrarian, rural 
lifestyle. Cities had always been centres of civilization, but cities grew to unprecedented 
size and came to encompass the vast majority of the population. Urbanization greatly 
changed the nature of our public spaces, Sennett argues; from the socially dull and 
familial rural life we were thrust into the urban medley of increasingly cosmopolitan 
strangers, and this was the time of the great sea-change in the composition of the public 
space and the nature of public discourse; it was not a century or more later when 
electrical and electronic communications first appeared.  
When these technologies were developed, they had a deepening and broadening 
effect: communication was possible with more people and at a faster rate. Kant remarked 
on the potential of the ship and the camel to allow communication, trade, and exchange 
over vast differences, and again, the truly revolutionary technologies and developments 
were those which suddenly thrust us into contact with people we had never previously 
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communicated with, whether they were in the big cities we were now gathering in, or on 
other continents whose inhabitants were suddenly becoming accessible to us. The modern 
public sphere is one which is now radically inclusive and which transcends national, 
cultural and even linguistic boundaries; it is virtually instantaneous in the speed of its 
communication, and can mix-and-match between historical formats and media. The 
internet, more than any other technology before it, exemplifies all of these aspects and is 
– thus far – the paragon of all the attributes of the modern public space. 
Modernity has positive and negative aspects, and the internet reflects both. It 
enables rapid and instant communication and broadens our social scope enormously, but 
that change can also feel overwhelming and alienating; much the same feelings could be 
observed in response to industrialization, urbanization, and globalization. It offers a 
potentially global reach to anyone with internet access, but it does not act to “purify” the 
messages conveyed therein: racism and hatred may flourish as much as cosmopolitanism 
and tolerance. However, the internet does not exacerbate these problems either, and if it 
enables and eases offensive discourses, it enables and eases their opposites just as much. I 
contend that to blame these issues on the technology is erroneous when they have existed 
and festered long before that technology was conceived; incivility and prejudice did not 
first appear in human interaction with the invention of the modem, and the evidence 
suggests that, far from living in a particularly uncivil or prejudiced age, we are probably 
living in the most enlightened, respectful, and tolerant. Those who contend otherwise 
ought to consider previous eras from the perspective of ethnic and religious minorities, 
women, homosexuals, the mentally ill, and so forth. 
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Online anonymity is an aspect of internet technology which can be used for good 
or ill, just as the rest of its technologies. Anonymity is not Boolean, and those who 
engineer the best private and anonymous networks acknowledge that the internet cannot 
offer absolute anonymity in combination with a global reach (or any reach at all), but the 
internet, again, is a great accelerator in this regard. It may not make anonymity absolute, 
but it can make anonymity stronger and easier than ever before, and it places tools for 
anonymity in the hands of the individual of such strength that even large and powerful 
governments cannot defeat them. It is this change that I am concerned with, for while 
there have always been attempts to remain anonymous yet speak publicly, there have 
always been human beings and physical spaces or objects involved, weak points which 
the enemies of free discourse can target. As with much of the internet or post-scientific-
revolution technology in general, these internet technologies did not invent anonymity 
with publicity, nor are they the last word on the subject, but they present a radical change 
in the power and ease-of-use of anonymizing tools.  
Although, as I have said, the internet has not ushered in a particularly uncivil or 
intolerant era, it would not matter overmuch if it had. One can use anonymity as a shield 
from which to say things which are unpopular or dangerous, perhaps because they 
threaten tyrants, or perhaps because they are offensive and vile. I am more interested in 
how these technologies may be used, or could be used; all the forum trolls in the world 
detract little from the potential of a tool that can be used to work against tyranny. The 
prize, I think, is worth the cost, particularly if internet trolls are a symptom rather than a 
problem in and of themselves, and if they would exist anyway, when anti-social, 
scurrilous, insulting, denigrating and irreverent speech has existed as long as speech itself 
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(for example, the 18
th
-century pamphlet). Even if the internet had produced a great 
increase in incivility and intolerance, that would not mean that this could not be reversed. 
Over time, human civilization seems to be trending towards cosmopolitanism, reason, 
and republicanism, not away from it. 
In this, I am hopeful for the future of politics; like Kant, I believe that we are 
developing better politics, and becoming more inclusive, republican, humane, tolerant, 
and accepting, and I believe that technology is helping us along that road. I think Kant 
was correct in this, and I think that his philosophy is more important to these goals and, 
dare I opine, more serving of them than that of the ancients, no matter how much they 
may be recruited to moderate the “problems” of modern technology. If Kant’s assessment 
that technology is the servant and not the master of human destiny is true, the degree of 
moderation required would be little, at most.  
A stumbling-block in Kant’s philosophy is the problem of rebellion and publicity, 
but I believe that internet technologies have largely untied that knot. Kant’s maxim that 
other-regarding actions are wrong if they are incompatible with wide public knowledge 
forbids much of what we would probably define as immoral, unlawful, or anti-social 
(theft, fraud, murder, etc.), but unfortunately, Kant acknowledges that it also forbids 
dissent against tyrants. Arguably, it may be worth forbidding violent revolution so as to 
avoid the uncertainty and anarchy that it might usher in, as Kant argues (violent 
revolutions famously led to an intensifying of tyranny in France and Russia), but without 
dissent, how can tyranny be undone even by a gradual and peaceful process that will be 
better suited to producing a stable republic? If dissent cannot be public then it is wrong 
and forbidden, but if secret dissent is forbidden and public dissent is self-destructive, we 
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essentially forgo the right to determine our own political destiny without tyranny and we 
throw ourselves on the mercy of teleology alone. 
Without violating or modifying the maxim and throwing out its benefits, the 
solution is to find a way to dissent in public while remaining anonymous. If one can 
speak publicly, then one is not in violation of the maxim, but anonymity serves as a 
shield to protect the vulnerable from the attention of tyrants. A dissenter could always 
speak publicly, of course, but to be positively identifiable as a dissenter in a tyranny is to 
invite one’s own destruction and the destruction of the dissenting movement. The 
possibility of internet technologies to reach an unprecedentedly broad public while 
maintaining an unprecedentedly high degree of anonymity represents the greatest 
potential to upset this dynamic yet seen. Not only can dissenters now enjoy publicity 
from behind the shield of anonymity, but those who would silence them are now forced 
to violate the Kantian publicity maxim themselves, for they must now resort to 
infiltration and spying, which Kant explicitly condemns.  
Technology has provided a solution to this paradox. We do not need to throw 
Kant out, as it were, to proceed with his quest for universal republicanism, and we can 
now actively work to remove tyrannies and replace them with republics using the 
technology we have provided ourselves with, rather than having to wait passively for 
them to end. We can take a more active role in shaping our political destiny rather than 
trusting to teleology alone. Technology has resolved this paradox in Kantian thought, and 
whether or not it presents us with problems to be overcome, in this instance it has 
presented us with a solution to a heretofore most troublesome problem.  
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Appendix I: Internet firm mergers and acquisitions 
 
Since many corporate mergers and acquisitions are conducted in secrecy (apropos of this thesis), detailed information 
concerning many such transactions is unknown, such as the price or the purpose (tech firms are often bought to acquire licenses and 
patents, technology, or talented workers, but which – if any – of these has motivated the purchase is not often made clear to the 
public). As such, most of the sources for this appendix are news websites, and many carry the caveat that the reports are based on 
rumours, insider information, and leaks. These reports may not be reliable. They are presented here for interest pertaining to a point 
made in Part III. 
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List of Acquisitions by Amazon.com 
 
Date Company Value 
(USD) 
References 
Mar, 
2013 
Goodreads — "Amazon Acquires Social Reading Site Goodreads, Which Gives The Company A Social Advantage Over Apple". SF 
Gate. Retrieved 2012-10-22. 
May, 
2012 
Kiva Systems $775m "Amazon.Com Inc, SEC Form 8-K.". U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Retrieved 2013-12-21. 
Feb, 
2012 
TeachStreet — "Exclusive: Amazon.com buys TeachStreet". GeekWire. Retrieved 2013-12-21. 
Jul, 2011 The Book Depository — "Booksellers fear 'stranglehold' as Amazon snaps up British rival The Book Depository". The Guardian. Retrieved 
2013-12-21. 
Jul, 2011 Pushbutton — "Amazon Acquires Pushbutton". Amazon. Retrieved 2013-12-21. 
Jan, 2011 LoveFilm £200m "Amazon To Buy UK Rental Firm Lovefilm". News.sky.com. Retrieved 2013-12-21. 
Nov, 
2010 
Diapers.com $550m "Amazon.com to Acquire Diapers.com and Soap.com". Business Wire. Retrieved 2013-12-21. 
Jun, 2010 Woot — "BREAKING: Woot To Be Acquired By Amazon, Then Left To Amuse Ourselves". Woot.com. Retrieved 2011-12-05. 
Jul, 2009 Zappos $1.2b "Amazon Closes Zappos Deal, Ends Up Paying $1.2 Billion". TechCrunch. Retrieved 2010-01-28. 
Apr, 
2009 
Lexcycle — "Amazon Acquires Lexcycle". BusinessWeek. Retrieved 2009-04-27. 
Oct, 2008 Reflexive 
Entertainment 
— "Amazon Buys Reflexive Entertainment, Looks to Distribute Casual Games". Xconomy. Retrieved 2013-12-21.  
Aug, 
2008 
AbeBooks — "Book Sites Unite". Internet News. Retrieved 2007-10-30. 
Aug, 
2008 
Shelfari — "Amazon Acquires Shelfari: Moves To Corner Book-Centric Social Networks". TechCrunch. Retrieved 2008-08-25. 
Jul, 2008 Box Office Mojo — "Amazon's IMDb movie trivia site acquires rival Box Office Mojo". TechFlash. Retrieved 2008-12-17. 
Jan, 2008 Audible $300m "Amazon to buy Audible for $300 million". Reuters. Retrieved 2013-12-21 
Jan, 2008 Withoutabox — "IMDB acquiring Without A Box". Bizjournals.com. Retrieved 2013-12-21. 
May, 
2007 
Digital Photography 
Review 
— "Amazon.com acquires dpreview.com". Digital Photography Review. Retrieved 2013-12-21. 
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Date Company Value 
(USD) 
References 
Aug, 
2004 
Joyo.com $75m "Amazon Acquires Chinese Joyo". Internet News. Retrieved 2013-12-21. 
2001 CDNow — "Bertelsmann to Let Amazon.com Run CDNow". The New York Times. Retrieved 2013-12-21. 
1999 Alexa $250m "E-commerce loves Street: Critical Path plans encore". San Francisco Business Times. Retrieved 2013-11-05 
Aug, 
1998 
PlanetAll — "Amazon.com buys Junglee, PlanetAll". Silicon Valley Business Journal. Retrieved 2013-12-21. 
1998 Internet Movie 
Database (IMDb) 
— "INTERNET BOOKSELLER AMAZON.COM ANNOUNCES ACQUISITION OF UNITED KINGDOM COMPANY THE INTERNET 
MOVIE DATABASE LTD.". IMDb via PR Newswire Europe. Retrieved 2007-01-15. 
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List of Acquisitions by Apple, Inc. 
 
Date Company Value 
(USD) 
References 
Dec, 
2013 
BroadMap — "Apple Did Indeed Acquire BroadMap and Catch Earlier This Year". All Things Digital. Retrieved 2013-12-23. 
Dec, 
2013 
Catch.com — "Apple Did Indeed Acquire BroadMap and Catch Earlier This Year". All Things Digital. Retrieved 2013-12-23. 
Dec, 
2013 
Topsy $200m "Apple Acquires Social Analytics Firm Topsy for $200 Million". MacRumors. Retrieved 2013-12-03. 
Nov, 
2013 
PrimeSense $345m "Apple Confirms Acquisition of 3-D Sensor Startup PrimeSense". All Things Digital. Retrieved 2013-11-24. 
Oct, 2013 Cue $50m "Apple acquires personal assistant app Cue for at least $35M [u]". AppleInsider. Retrieved 2013-10-03. 
Aug, 
2013 
AlgoTrim — "Apple Reportedly Acquires Swedish Firm AlgoTrim, A Company That Does Mobile Media And Data Compression". 
TechCrunch. Retrieved 2013-08-28. 
Aug, 
2013 
Embark — "Exclusive: Apple Buys (Another) Map App, Embark". Jessica Lessin. Retrieved 2013-08-22. 
Aug, 
2013 
Matcha — "Apple acquires Matcha.tv". VentureBeat. Retrieved 2013-08-13. 
Aug, 
2013 
Passif 
Semiconductor 
— "Apple acquires wireless chip maker Passif Semiconductor". Engadget. Retrieved 2013-08-01. 
Jul, 2013 Locationary — "Apple Acquires Local Data Outfit Locationary". All Things Digital. Retrieved 2013-07-19. 
Jul, 2013 HopStop.com — "Apple Said to Buy HopStop, Pushing Deeper Into Maps". Bloomberg. Retrieved 2013-07-19. 
Mar, 
2013 
WiFiSlam $20m "Apple Acquires Indoor Location Company WifiSLAM". Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 2013-03-23. 
Sep, 
2012 
Particle — "Apple snaps up celebrity-backed Web app firm Particle". CNet. Retrieved 2012-10-16. 
Jul, 2012 AuthenTec $356m "Apple buys patent-rich security firm Authentec for $356 million". The Verge. Retrieved 2012-07-27. 
Jun, 2012 Redmatica — "Apple-acquired music editing software firm Redmatica closes; product support will end on 12 June". The Next Web. 
Retrieved 2012-06-08. 
Feb, 
2012 
Chomp $50m "Apple Is Said to Pay About $50 Million for Search Startup Chomp". Bloomberg Businessweek. Retrieved 2011-02-23. 
Dec, 
2011 
Anobit $390m "Apple picks up Anobit for Flash Memory". Slashgear. Retrieved December 20, 2011. 
Aug, 
2011 
C3 
Technologies 
$267m "Apple acquired mind-blowing 3D mapping company C3 Technologies, looking to take iOS Maps to the next level". 9to5Mac. 
Retrieved October 31, 2011. 
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Date Company Value 
(USD) 
References 
Sep, 2010 Polar Rose $29m "Apple acquires face-recognition firm Polar Rose". Venture Beat. Retrieved October 18, 2011. 
Sep, 2010 IMSense — "Apple Buys Imsense Ltd.". Silicon Tap. Retrieved October 18, 2011. 
Jul, 2010 Poly9 — "Apple acquires online mapping company Poly9 - report". Apple Insider. Retrieved August 1, 2010. 
Apr, 2010 Intrinsity $121m "Apple Buys Intrinsity". New York Times. Retrieved April 27, 2010. 
Apr, 2010 Siri — "Apple Moves Deeper Into Voice-Activated Search With Siri Buy". Wall Street Journal. Retrieved April 28, 2010. 
Jan, 2010 Quattro Wireless $275m "Apple acquires Quattro Wireless". Reuters. Retrieved February 19, 2010. 
Dec, 2009 Lala.com $17m "Apple Inc acquires LaLa.com". TechCrunch. Retrieved 2009-12-43. 
Jul, 2009 Placebase — "Apple purchased Placebase in July to replace Google Maps?". ComputerWorld. Retrieved 2009-09-30. 
Apr, 2008 P.A. Semi $278m "Apple acquires low-power chip designer PA Semi". CNet. Retrieved 2010-04-09. 
Dec, 2006 Proximity — "Apple Acquires Proximity". Mac Observer. Retrieved 2008-10-21. 
Oct, 2006 Silicon Color — "Apple Computer Inc acquires Silicon Color Inc.". Thomson Financial. Retrieved 2008-10-21. 
Apr, 2005 FingerWorks — "Inside the multitouch FingerWorks tech in Apple's tablet". AppleInsider. Retrieved 2013-05-04. 
Mar, 2005 Schemasoft — "Apple swallows SchemaSoft". CNET. Retrieved 2010-01-23. 
Jul, 2002 Emagic $30m "Apple Computer Inc acquires Emagic Soft-und Hardware GmbH". Thomson Financial. Retrieved 2008-10-21. 
Jun, 2002 Prismo Graphics — "Apple acquires technologies from Prismo Graphics". PCWorld. Retrieved 2013-12-21. 
Jun, 2002 Propel Software — "Apple Computer Inc acquires Propel Software Corp". Thomson Financial. Retrieved 2008-10-21. 
Jun, 2002 Silicon Grail Corp-
Chalice 
— "Apple Computer Inc acquires Silicon Grail Corp-Chalice from Silicon Grail Corp". Thomson Financial. Retrieved 
2008-10-21. 
Apr, 2002 Zayante $13m "Apple Computer Inc acquires Zayante Inc.". Thomson Financial. Retrieved 2008-10-21. 
Feb, 2002 Nothing Real $15m "Apple Computer Inc acquires Nothing Real LLC". Thomson Financial. Retrieved 2008-10-21. 
Dec, 2001 PowerSchool $62m "Apple Computer Inc acquires PowerSchool Inc.". Thomson Financial. Retrieved 2008-10-21. 
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Date Company Value 
(USD) 
References 
Jul, 2001 Spruce 
Technologies 
— "Apple Computer Inc acquires Spruce Technologies Inc from JBIS Holdings Inc.". Thomson Financial. Retrieved 2008-
10-21. 
May, 2001 bluebuzz — "Network Innovations Corp acquires bluebuzz.com Inc.". Thomson Financial. Retrieved 2008-10-21 (Apple Inc. is the 
ultimate parent of Network Innovations Corp). 
2001 Bluefish Labs — Bluefish Labs. Retrieved from http://archive.is/IfOQx on 2013-12-21. 
Q4, 2000 SoundJam MP — "Apple Acquires SoundJam, Programmer for iMusic". AppleInsider. Retrieved 2012-04-23. 
Apr, 2000 Astarte-DVD 
Authoring Software 
— "Apple Computer Inc acquires Astarte-DVD Authoring Software from Astarte GmbH". Thomson Financial. Retrieved 
2008-10-21. 
Jan, 2000 NetSelector — "Apple Computer Inc acquires NetSelector". Thomson Financial. Retrieved 2008-10-21. 
Nov, 1999 Raycer Graphics $15m "Apple Computer Inc acquires Raycer Graphics". Thomson Financial. Retrieved 2008-10-21. 
Jan, 1999 Xemplar Education $5m "Apple Computer Inc acquires remaining interest in Xemplar Education Ltd from Morgan Stanley". Thomson Financial. 
Retrieved 2008-10-21. 
Sep, 1997 Power Computing-
Clone-Making 
$100m "Apple Computer Inc acquires Power Computing-Clone-Making from Power Computing Corp". Thomson Financial. 
Retrieved 2008-10-21. 
Feb, 1997 NeXT $404m "Apple Computer Inc acquires NeXT Computer Inc.". Thomson Financial. Retrieved 2008-10-21. 
Jan, 1989 Coral Software — "Apple Computer Inc acquires Coral Software Corp". Thomson Financial. Retrieved 2008-10-21. 
Jul, 1988 Nashoba Systems — "Claris Corp(Apple Computer) acquires Nashoba Systems Inc.". Thomson Financial. Retrieved 2008-10-21. 
Jun, 1988 Styleware — "Claris Corp(Apple Computer) acquires Styleware Inc.". Thomson Financial. Retrieved 2008-10-21. 
Jun, 1988 Orion Network 
Systems 
— "Apple Computer Inc acquires Orion Network Systems Inc.". Thomson Financial. Retrieved 2008-10-21. 
Mar, 1988 Network 
Innovations 
— "Apple Computer Inc acquires Network Innovations Corp". Thomson Financial. Retrieved 2008-10-21. 
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List of Acquisitions by eBay 
 
Date Company Value 
(USD) 
References 
Oct, 2013 Shutl — "eBay Acquires UK Startup Shutl To Change The Ecommerce Game With One Hour Delivery". TechCrunch. Retrieved 
October 22, 2013. 
Sep, 2013 Braintree $800m "EBay Buys Braintree, a Payments Start-Up". The New York Times. Retrieved September 26, 2013. 
Sep, 2013 Decide.com — "Online Shopping Research And Price Comparison Site Decide.com Acquired By eBay". CEOWORLD Magazine. Retrieved 
2013-12-21. 
Sep, 2012 Svpply — "eBay Acquires Style-Focused, Social, Curated Shopping Site Svpply". TechCrunch. Retrieved 2013-12-21. 
Dec, 2011 Zvents — "Ebay-owned Stubhub acquires Zvents for event listings.". VentureBeat. Retrieved 2013-12-21. 
Sep, 2011 The Gifts 
Project 
— "eBay buys Israeli start up The Gifts Project: The price is estimated to be in the tens of millions of dollars.". Globes. 
Retrieved 2013-12-21. 
Sep, 2011 Hunch $80m "eBay Buys Recommendation Service Hunch To Improve Buying, Selling.". TechCrunch. Retrieved 2013-12-21. 
Jul, 2011 Zong $240m "eBay Stacking Up the Acquisitions". Forbes. Retrieved 2013-12-21. 
Mar, 2011 GSI Commerce $2.4b "EBay to Buy GSI Commerce for $2.4B".PCWorld. Retrieved October 22, 2013. 
Mar, 2011 Where, Inc. $135m "EBay to buy Boston software firm". The Boston Globe. Retrieved October 22, 2013. 
Dec, 2010 Milo.com $75m "Confirmed: Ebay Acquires Milo For $75 Million. Investors Make A Killing." TechCrunch. Retrieved 2013-12-21. 
Jun, 2010 RedLaser $10m "eBay Acquires RedLaser: The Leading Barcode-Scanning iPhone Application". eBay. Retrieved 2010-11-09. 
Mar, 2010 Magento $225m "A Year Later, Welcome eBay to the Magento Family!". Magento Commerce. Retrieved 2011-02-15. 
Jan, 2009 Positronic Inc. — "eBay Acquires Positronic, Inc.". eBay. Retrieved 2010-11-09. 
Oct, 2008 Bill Me Later $1.2b "eBay Buys Bill Be Later". TechCrunch. Retrieved 2008-10-06. 
Oct, 2008 dba.dk & 
bilbasen.dk 
$390m "eBay Buys Classifieds Businesses".eBay. Retrieved 2008-10-06. 
Jan, 2008 Fraud Sciences $169m  "eBay’s Paypal acquires Israel’s Fraud Sciences for $169 million, 12 times the return for investors". VC Cafe. Retrieved 
2013-12-21. 
May, 2007 StumbleUpon $75m "eBay Investor Message". eBay. Retrieved 2007-09-10. 
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Date Company Value (USD) References 
May, 2007 GittiGidiyor $217.5m "eBay Acquires Stake in Turkey's GittiGidiyor.com". eBay. Retrieved 2008-04-18. 
Jan, 2007 StubHub $310m "eBay To Acquire Online Tickets Marketplace StubHub". eBay. Retrieved 2008-04-18. 
Apr, 2006 Tradera $48m "eBay Acquires Sweden's Tradera.com".eBay. Retrieved 2008-04-18. 
Mar, 2006 Meetup.com $10m "eBay's Affinity for Meetup.com".BusinessWeek. Retrieved 2008-04-18. 
Sep, 2005 Skype Limited $2.6b "EBay to Acquire Internet Phone Leader". The Washington Post. Retrieved 2008-04-18. 
Jun, 2005 OpusForum.org — "eBay’s Kijiji Acquires German Classifieds Web Site opusforum". Internet Retailer. Retrieved 2008-04-18. 
Jun, 2005 Shopping.com $620m "EBay buys Shopping.com for $620 million". The Industry Standard. Retrieved 2008-04-18. 
May, 2005 Gumtree — "Ebay buys Gumtree.com". Manchester Evening News. Retrieved 2008-04-18. 
May, 2005 Loquo — "eBay's Kijiji Acquires Classifieds Web Sites". Business Wire. 2005-05-18. Retrieved 2008-04-18. 
Dec, 2004 Rent.com $415m "eBay to Acquire Rent.com". eBay. 2004-12-16. Retrieved 2008-04-18. 
Nov, 2004 Marktplaats.nl $290m "eBay Acquires Dutch Company Marktplaats.nl". eBay. 2004-11-10. Retrieved 2008-04-18. 
Aug, 2004 Craigslist $13.5m  "EBay buys 25% stake in Craigslist". San Francisco Chronicle. Retrieved 2008-04-18. 
Jun, 2004 Baazee.com $50m "eBay to Acquire India's Baazee.com". eBay. Retrieved 2007-07-08. 
Jan, 2004 mobile.de $152m "eBay to Acquire Germany's mobile.de". eBay. Retrieved 2012-07-18. 
Jul, 2003 EachNet $150m  "eBay Acquires Chinese Shopping Site EachNet". InterNetNews. Retrieved 2008-04-18. 
Jan, 2003 CARad.com — "eBay Motors Announces Acquisition Agreement and New Strategic Relationship". eBay. Retrieved 2007-07-08. 
Jul, 2002 PayPal $1.5b "eBay picks up PayPal for $1.5 billion". CNET News. Retrieved 2008-04-18. 
Mar, 2001 iBazar $66m "eBay To Acquire Ibazar S.A.". eBay. Retrieved 2008-04-18. 
Jan, 2001 Internet Auction Co. $120m "eBay to Acquire Majority Stake in Korea's Internet Auction Co.". eBay. Retrieved 2008-04-18. 
Dec, 2000 Precision Buying Service — "eBay Acquires Deja.com's Technology". Internet News. Retrieved 2007-01-05. 
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Date Company Value (USD) References 
Jun, 2000 Half.com $318m "eBay buying Half.com in stock deal". CNET News. Retrieved 2008-04-18. 
Oct, 1999 Blackthorne — "eBay Blackthorne: Frequently Asked Questions". eBay. Retrieved 2013-12-21. 
Jun, 1999 Alando $43m "eBay wins German bid". CNN. Retrieved 2008-04-18. 
May, 1999 Billpoint — "eBay acquires two firms". CNET News. Retrieved 2008-04-18. 
May, 1999 Kruse International — "eBay acquires two firms". CNET News. Retrieved 2008-04-18. 
Apr, 1999 Butterfield & 
Butterfield 
$260m "eBay buys Butterfield & Butterfield". CNET News. Retrieved 2008-04-18. 
Jul, 1998 Up4Sale.com — "Business Wire July 16, 1998". Business Wire. Retrieved 2007-07-08. 
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List of Acquisitions by Facebook 
 
Date Compan
y 
Value 
(USD) 
References 
Dec, 2013 SportStre
am 
— "Sporty Facebook acquires a San Francisco-based startup". Woolor. Retrieved 2013-12-21. 
Oct, 2013 Onavo — "Facebook Buys Mobile Data Analytics Company Onavo, Reportedly For Up To $200M… And (Finally?) Gets Its Office In Israel". 
TechCrunch. Retrieved 2013-12-21. 
Aug, 2013 Jibbigo — "Facebook Acquires “Mobile Technologies”, Developer Of Speech Translation App Jibbigo". TechCrunch. Retrieved 2013-12-21. 
Jul, 2013 Monoidic
s 
— "Facebook to Aquire Monoidics' Assets!". Monoidics. Retrieved 2013-12-21. 
Apr, 2013 Parse — "Welcoming Parse to Facebook". Facebook. Retrieved 2013-12-21. 
Apr, 2013 Spacepor
t 
— "Facebook Acqhires Team From HTML5 Game Platform Spaceport.io, Which Will Keep Running". TechCrunch. Retrieved 2013-
12-21. 
Mar, 2013 Hot 
Studio 
— "Welcoming the Talented Team Behind Hot Studio". Facebook. Retrieved 2013-12-21. 
Feb, 2013 Atlas <$100m "Facebook Confirms It Will Acquire Atlas Advertiser Suite From Microsoft To Close The Ad Spend Loop". Techcrunch. Retrieved 
2013-12-21. 
Aug, 2012 Threadsy — "Facebook Acquires Threadsy, Maker of Social Marketing Tool Swaylo". Techcrunch. Retrieved 2013-12-21. 
Jul, 2012 Acrylic 
Software 
— "Facebook acquires Mac, iOS developer Acrylic Software". CNET. Retrieved 2013-12-21. 
Jul, 2012 Spool — "Facebook acquires mobile-bookmarking service Spool". CNET. Retrieved 2013-12-21. 
Jun, 2012 Face.com $100m "Facebook acquires Face.com - stock up 4.7 percent".San Francisco Gate. Retrieved 2012-06-19. 
May, 2012 Karma — "Facebook stumbles, buys startup Karma." The Australian. Retrieved 2013-12-21. 
May, 2012 Lightbox.
com 
— "Facebook Hires Team From Android Photosharing App Dev Lightbox To Quiet Mobile Fears." TechCrunch. Retrieved 2013-12-
21. 
Apr, 2012 Tagtile  — "Facebook Acquires Team Behind Customer-Loyalty App Tagtile". Bloomberg News. Retrieved 2012-05-05. 
Apr, 2012 Instagra
m 
$1b "Facebook Buys Instagram for $1 Billion, Turns Budding Rival Into Its Standalone Photo App". TechCrunch. Retrieved 2013-12-
21. 
Dec, 2011 Gowalla — "Facebook Has Acquired Gowalla." TechCrunch. Retrieved on 2013-12-21. 
Nov, 2011 Strobe — "Facebook Acquires Team Behind HTML5 App Platform Strobe; SproutCore Lives On".TechCrunch. Retrieved 2012-05-05. 
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Date Company Value 
(USD) 
References 
Oct, 2011 Friend.ly — "Facebook acquires Q&A service Friend.ly". ZDNet. Retrieved 2012-05-05. 
Aug, 2011 Push Pop Press —  "Push Pop Press acquired by Facebook". Push Pop Pres. Retrieved 2012-05-05. 
Jun, 2011 Sofa — "Facebook Buys Sofa, A Software Design Team That Will Help Make Facebook More Beautiful". TechCrunch. Retrieved 
2011-06-09. 
Jun, 2011 MailRank — "Facebook buys e-mail prioritiser MailRank". FirstPost. Retrieved 2011-11-16. 
Apr, 2011 DayTum — "Facebook Acq-hires Data Organization Startup Daytum". TechCrunch. Retrieved 2013-12-21. 
Mar, 2011 RecRec — "Facebook Picks Up Much of Dogpatch Labs Startup Recrec's Team". Inside Facebook. Retrieved 2013-12-21. 
Mar, 2011 Snaptu $60–70m "Confirmed: Facebook Acquires Snaptu (For An Estimated $60 – $70 Million)". TechCrunch. Retrieved 2011-03-20. 
Mar, 2011 Beluga — "Facebook Acquires Group Messaging Service Beluga In A Talent AND Technology Deal". TechCrunch. Retrieved 2011-
03-01. 
Jan, 2011 Rel8tion — "Facebook Acquires Mobile Advertising Company Out of Stealth Mode". AllThingsD. Retrieved 2011-01-25. 
Nov, 2010 FB.com domain 
name 
$8.5m "FB.com acquired by Facebook".NameMon News. Retrieved 2013-12-21. 
Oct, 2010 Drop.io ~$10m "Facebook Acquires Drop.io, Nabs Sam Lessin". TechCrunch. Retrieved 2010-10-30. 
Aug, 2010 Hot Potato ~$10m "Facebook acquires Hot Potato". Mashable. Retrieved 2010-10-30. 
Aug, 2010 Chai Labs $10m "Facebook Acquires Chai Labs, Gains 'Godfather of Google Adsense'". PCMag. Retrieved 2010-10-30. 
Jul, 2010 Nextstop $2.5m "Facebook acquires social travel-recommendation site Nextstop". TechCrunch. Retrieved 2010-10-30. 
May, 2010 ShareGrove — "Facebook Acquires ShareGrove". Mashable. Retrieved 2010-10-30. 
May, 2010 Friendster 
(patents) 
$40m "Facebook buys friendster patents for 40m". GigaOm. Retrieved 2010-10-30. 
Mar, 2010 Divvyshot — "Facebook Buys Up Divvyshot To Make Facebook Photos Even Better". TechCrunch. Retrieved 2010-10-30. 
Feb, 2010 Octazen — "Octazen: What The Heck Did Facebook Just Buy Exactly, And Why?". TechCrunch. Retrieved 2010-10-30. 
Aug, 2009 FriendFeed $47.5m "Facebook Acquires FriendFeed". TechCrunch. Retrieved 2010-10-30. 
Jun, 2008 ConnectU $31m "Judge Blocks Rival's Effort to Learn Value of Facebook's Stock". New York Law Journal. Retrieved 2010-10-30. 
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Date Company Value (USD) References 
Jul, 2007 Parakey — "Facebook buys Parakey". Gigaom. 2007-07-19. Retrieved 2010-10-30. 
Aug, 2005 facebook.com domain name $0.2m "Facebook wins Manx battle for face-book.com". The Register (London). Retrieved 2008-06-13. 
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List of Acquisitions by Google 
 
Date Company Value 
(USD) 
References 
Dec, 2013 Boston 
Dynamics 
— "Google Adds to Its Menagerie of Robots". The New York Times. Retrieved 2013-12-14. 
Dec, 2013 Autofuss  — "Google Puts Money on Robots, Using the Man Behind Android". The New York Times. Retrieved 2013-12-13. 
Dec, 2013 Bot & Dolly  — Ibid. 
Dec, 2013 Holomni  — Ibid. 
Dec, 2013 Meka 
Robotics 
— Ibid. 
Dec, 2013 Redwood 
Robotics 
— Ibid. 
Dec, 2013 Industrial 
Perception 
— Ibid. 
Dec, 2013 Schaft.inc  — Ibid. 
Oct, 2013 FlexyCore  $24m "Google buys the company behind DroidBooster to speed up Android, cross fingers for KitKat". PhoneArena. Retrieved 
2013-10-22. 
Oct, 2013 Flutter $40m "Google Acquires YC-Backed Flutter, A Gesture Recognition Technology Startup, For Around $40M". TechCrunch. Retrieved 
2013-10-2. 
Sep, 2013 Bump  — "Google Buys Bump App for Easy Sharing". PC Mag. Retrieved 2013-09-16. 
Jun, 2013 Waze $966m "Yahoo And Google Are Both Spending Big Money On Acquisition Sprees And What That Says About Their 
Futures". TechCrunch. Retrieved 2013-07-29. 
May, 2013 Makani Power — "Google X Acquires Makani Power And Its Airborne Wind Turbines". TechCrunch. Retrieved 2013-05-23. 
Apr, 2013 Wavii $30m "Google Buys Wavii For North Of $30 Million". TechCrunch. Retrieved 2013-04-25. 
Apr, 2013 Behavio — "Google acquires Android mobile-data firm Behavio". CNet. Retrieved 2013-04-16. 
Mar, 2013 Talaria 
Technologies 
— "Google Acquires Web Application Server Talaria To Enhance Its Cloud Platform". TechCrunch. Retrieved 2013-05-06. 
Mar, 2013 DNNresearch 
Inc. 
— "U of T neural networks start-up acquired by Google". University of Toronto. Retrieved 2013-03-13. 
Feb, 2013 Channel 
Intelligence 
$125m "Google Acquires Channel Intelligence For $125M To Boost Product Referrals And E-Commerce With Users". TechCrunch. 
Retrieved 2013-12-21. 
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Date Company Value 
(USD) 
References 
Nov, 2012 BufferBox $17m "Google snaps up Waterloo startup BufferBox". The National Post. Retrieved 2012-11-30. 
Nov, 2012 Incentive Targeting 
Inc. 
— "Google nabs coupon-marketing startup Incentive Targeting". ZDNet. Retrieved 2012-11-28. 
Oct, 2012 Viewdle $45m "Confirmed: Google’s Motorola Mobility Acquires Image And Gesture Recognition Company Viewdle". TechCrunch. 
Retrieved 2013-05-06. 
Sep, 2012 Nik Software, Inc. — "Google Acquires Nik Software". Nik Software. Archived from the original on 2013-02-07. Retrieved 2012-09-17. 
Sep, 2012 VirusTotal.com  — "An update from VirusTotal". VirusTotal.com. Retrieved 2012-09-07. 
Aug, 2012 Wildfire Interactive $450m "Google Slaps $100M Golden Handcuffs On Wildfire To Retain Employees After $350M Acquisition". TechCrunch. 
Retrieved 2012-09-09. 
Jul, 2012 Sparrow $25m "Google acquires Sparrow, integrates it into the Gmail team". Ars Technica. Retrieved 2012-07-20. 
Jun, 2012 Quickoffice — "Google + Quickoffice = get more done anytime, anywhere". Google. Retrieved 2013-05-06. 
Jun, 2012 Meebo $100m "Google is acquiring messaging and advertising service Meebo for its Google+ team". The Next Web. Retrieved 2013-05-
06. 
Apr, 2012 TxVia — "Google Buys TxVia, Banks On Better Payment Technology (And 100M Customers) For Google Wallet". TechCrunch. 
Retrieved 2013-05-06. 
Mar, 2012 Milk, Inc — "Google nabs Digg founder to boost Google+". CNN. Retrieved 2013-05-06. 
Jul, 1905 WIMM Labs — "Google Confirms It Has Acquired Android Smartwatch Maker WIMM Labs". TechCrunch. AOL Inc. Retrieved 2013-09-
08. 
Dec, 2011 Clever Sense — "Google Acquires Clever Sense, Creator Of Local Recommendations App Alfred". TechCrunch. Retrieved 2013-05-06. 
Dec, 2011 RightsFlow  — "YouTube Buys Company That Processes Music Royalties". The New York Times. Retrieved 2013-05-06. 
Nov, 2011 Katango — "Google Acquires Katango, The Automatic Friend Sorter". TechCrunch. Retrieved 2013-05-06. 
Nov, 2011 Apture  — "Google Buys Contextual Rich News Browsing Startup Apture To Beef Up Chrome". TechCrunch. Retrieved 2013-05-06. 
Oct, 2011 SocialGrapple — "Google Acquires Twitter Analytics Startup SocialGrapple". Search Engine Watch. Retrieved 2013-05-06. 
Sep, 2011 DailyDeal $114m "Google buys German deals site DailyDeal to take Offers global". Reuters. September 19, 2011. Retrieved 2013-05-06. 
Sep, 2011 Zagat $151m  "Google Discloses $151 Million Price Tag for Zagat Service". Bloomberg Television. Retrieved 2013-05-06. 
Sep, 2011 Zave Networks — "Google Buys Frommer's to Expand Local Search Content". eWeek. Retrieved 2012-09-09. 
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Date Company Value 
(USD) 
References 
Aug, 
2011 
Motorola Mobility  $12.5b "Gadget wars heat up as new Apple iPhone looms". Financial Post. Retrieved 2012-09-09. 
Aug, 
2011 
Dealmap — "Google Scoops Up Daily Deal Aggregator 'The Dealmap'". TechCrunch. Retrieved 2013-05-06. 
Jul, 2011 PittPatt — "Google Acquires Facial Recognition Software Company PittPatt". TechCrunch. Retrieved 2013-05-06. 
Jul, 2011 Fridge — "Google+ Makes Its First Acquisition And Buys Social Group Startup Fridge". Business Insider. Retrieved 2013-05-06. 
Jul, 2011 Punchd — "Google To Buy Mobile Loyalty Card Startup Punchd". Techcrunch. Retrieved 2013-05-06. 
Jun, 2011 SageTV — "Google buys up SageTV to bolster Google TV with useful features". Ars Technica. Retrieved 2013-12-21. 
Jun, 2011 Admeld $400m "Helping publishers get the most from display advertising with Admeld". DoubleClick Publisher Blog. Retrieved 2013-
05-06. 
Jun, 2011 PostRank — "Google Acquires PostRank, An Analytics Service For The Social Web". Techcrunch. Retrieved 2013-05-06. 
May, 
2011 
Sparkbuy — "Google Acquires 'Kayak For Consumer Electronics' Sparkbuy". Techcrunch. Retrieved 2013-05-06. 
Apr, 
2011 
TalkBin — "Google Acquires TalkBin, A Feedback Platform For Businesses That’s Only Five Months Old". Techcrunch. Retrieved 
2013-05-06. 
Apr, 
2011 
PushLife $25m "Google Buys Mobile Entertainment Platform Pushlife". Techcrunch. Retrieved 2013-05-06. 
Mar, 
2011 
Green Parrot Pictures — "YouTube Continues To Amp Up Its Content Quality, Buys Green Parrot Pictures". Techcrunch. Retrieved 2013-05-06. 
Mar, 
2011 
BeatThatQuote.com  £37.7m "Beat that! Google acquires the UK’s BeatThatQuote.com for £37.7m". Techcrunch Europe. Retrieved 2013-05-06. 
Mar, 
2011 
Next New Networks — "It's Official: YouTube Buys Next New Networks". GigaOm. Retrieved 2013-05-06. 
Mar, 
2011 
Zynamics — "zynamics acquired by Google !". Zynamics. Retrieved 2013-05-06. 
Jan, 2011 fflick $10m "Google To Acquire fflick For $10 Million". TechCrunch. Retrieved 2013-05-06. 
  
Jan, 2011 SayNow — "Google acquires SayNow". SayNow. Retrieved 2013-12-21. 
Jan, 2011 eBook Technologies — "Google acquires eBook Technologies". InfoWorld. Retrieved 2013-05-06. 
Dec, 
2010 
Phonetic Arts — "Can we talk? Better speech technology with Phonetic Arts". Official Google Blog. Retrieved 2010-12-04. 
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Date Company Value 
(USD) 
References 
Dec, 
2010 
Widevine 
Technologies 
— "On demand is in demand: we’ve agreed to acquire Widevine". Official Google Blog. Retrieved 2010-12-04 
Oct, 2010 BlindType — "Google Acquires Impressive Touchscreen Keyboard Startup BlindType". TechCrunch. Retrieved 2010-12-04. 
Sep, 
2010 
Plannr — "Google Buys Schedule Management Startup Plannr".TechCrunch. Retrieved 2013-05-06. 
Sep, 
2010 
Quiksee $10m "Google purchases Israeli startup Quiksee". Quiksee. Retrieved 2010-09-13. 
Aug, 
2010 
Angstro — "Google buys Angstro". Angstro. Retrieved 2010-08-30. 
Aug, 
2010 
SocialDeck, Inc. — "Google buys Canadian gaming company SocialDeck".The Globe and Mail (Toronto). Retrieved 2010-08-30. 
Aug, 
2010 
Like.com  $100m "Google to Acquire Like.com". TechCrunch. Retrieved 2010-08-15. 
Aug, 
2010 
Jambool $70m "Google to Acquire jambool". TechCrunch. Retrieved 2010-08-10. 
Aug, 
2010 
Slide.com $228m "SAD MAX: Google Just Bought Slide For A Measly $228 Million". Business Insider. Retrieved 2011-08-17. 
Aug, 
2010 
Instantiations — "Google buys Java tools from Instantiations". SD Times. Retrieved 2010-08-05. 
Aug, 
2010 
Zetawire — "Google Confirms Zetawire Buy for NFC vs. Apple, RIM". eWeek. Retrieved 2013-05-06. 
Jul, 2010 Metaweb — "Metaweb joins Google – The Freebase Blog". Semantic Web. Retrieved 2013-05-06. 
Jul, 2010 ITA Software $676m "Google and ITA Software Sign Acquisition Agreement". Google Investor Relations. Retrieved 2010-07-01. 
Jun, 2010 Invite Media $81m "Google's Final Price Tag for Invite Media: $81 Million". Media Memo – All Things Digital. Retrieved 2013-05-06. 
May, 
2010 
Ruba.com — "Serial entrepreneur Mike Cassidy sells Ruba to Google". Venturebeat. Retrieved 2010-09-22. 
May, 
2010 
Simplify Media — "Google Buys Simplify Media To Power Music Syncing For New iTunes Competitor". TechCrunch. Retrieved 2010-02-25. 
May, 
2010 
Global IP Solutions  $68.2m "Google Buys GIPS to Challenge Skype in VOIP". eWeek. Retrieved 2012-05-20. 
Apr, 
2010 
BumpTop  $30m "Google Buys Bump Technologies, Maker of 3-D Desktop Software". Bloomberg, L.P. Retrieved 2010-04-30. 
Apr, 
2010 
LabPixies — "Google buys Labpixies". InformationWeek. Retrieved 2010-04-27. 
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Date Company Value 
(USD) 
References 
Apr, 2010 Agnilux — "Google buys Agnilux, eyeing processors". CNN. Retrieved 2013-07-09. 
Apr, 2010 PlinkArt — "Google Acquires Its First Ever UK Startup. Visual Search Engine Plink". The Next Web. Retrieved 2010-04-12. 
Apr, 2010 Episodic — "Episodic Joins Google". Episodic. Retrieved 2010-04-02. 
Mar, 2010 DocVerse $25m "Google Acquires Docverse To Further Office Arms Race". TechCrunch. Retrieved 2013-05-06. 
Mar, 2010 Picnik — "Deals may rise as tech firms overflow with cash". TD Ameritrade. Retrieved 2010-05-13. 
Feb, 2010 reMail — "Google Continues Shopping Spree; Acquires reMail And Former Gmail Employee". TechCrunch. Retrieved 2010-02-17. 
Feb, 2010 Aardvark $50m "Google acquires social search engine Aardvark". CNET. Retrieved2010-02-12. 
Dec, 2009 AppJet — Google Acquires AppJet". December 4, 2009. AppJet. Retrieved 2009-12-04. 
Nov, 2009 Teracent — "Google Has Acquired Teracent". Official Google Blog. Retrieved 2009-11-28. 
Nov, 2009 AdMob $750m "Facts about Google's acquisition of AdMob". Official Google Blog. Retrieved 2009-09-16. 
Nov, 2009 Gizmo5  $30m "Exclusive: Google Has Acquired Gizmo5". TechCrunch. Retrieved 2009-11-09. 
Sep, 2009 reCAPTCHA  — "Teaching computers to read: Google acquires reCAPTCHA". Official Google Blog. Retrieved 2009-09-16. 
Aug, 2009 On2 $133m "Google Bullied Out Of Another $26.5 Million In Cash By On2 Shareholders". Business Insider. Retrieved 2011-08-17. 
Sep, 2008 TNC — "Google buys Korean blogging software company". Reuters. Retrieved 2009-03-24. 
Jul, 2008 Omnisio $15m "YouTube and Omnisio Join Forces". YouTube Blog. Retrieved 2008-07-30. 
Oct, 2007 Jaiku — "Google acquires Jaiku". Jaiku. Retrieved 2008-01-08. 
Sep, 2007 Zingku  — "Google Buys Mobile Social Network Zingku". PC World. Retrieved 2008-01-08. 
Jul, 2007 ImageAmerica — "We have acquired ImageAmerica, a company that builds high resolution cameras for the collection of aerial 
imagery". Google LatLong Blog. Retrieved 2007-07-21. 
Jul, 2007 Postini  $625m "Google buys Postini for $625m". vnunet. Retrieved 2008-01-08. 
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(USD) 
References 
Jul, 2007 GrandCentral $45m "We're pleased to announce that we have acquired GrandCentral Communications". Official Google Blog. Retrieved July 
2, 2007-07-02. 
Jun, 2007 Zenter — "We're pleased to announce that we've acquired the assets of Zenter". Official Google Blog. Retrieved 2008-01-08. 
Jun, 2007 PeakStream — "Google shivs server crowd with PeakStream buy". The Register. Retrieved 2007-06-05. 
Jun, 2007 FeedBurner $100m "Google buys Internet news delivery firm FeedBurner". Melbourne: The Age. Retrieved 2008-03-22. 
Jun, 2007 Panoramio — "Google has announced plans to acquire Spain's Panoramio photo sharing service". Digital Trends. Retrieved 2007-06-
01. 
May, 
2007 
GreenBorder — "Google acquires GreenBorder Technologies". CNET. Retrieved 2008-01-08. 
Apr, 
2007 
Marratech $15m "Collaborating with Marratech". Official Google Blog. Retrieved 2007-04-19. 
Apr, 
2007 
Tonic Systems — "We want to welcome the team from Tonic Systems to Google". Official Google Blog. Retrieved 2007-04-17. 
Apr, 
2007 
DoubleClick  $3.1b "The next step in Google advertising". Official Google Blog. Retrieved 2008-01-08. 
Mar, 
2007 
Trendalyzer — "Google Buys Data Visualization Software". Forbes. Retrieved 2007-04-02. 
Feb, 
2007 
Adscape $23m "Google buys video game ad firm Adscape". USA Today. Retrieved 2013-05-06. 
Dec, 
2006 
Endoxon $28m "Google buys Endoxon". InfoWorld. Retrieved 2007-04-02. 
Oct, 2006 JotSpot — "Google Buys JotSpot, Offers Free Wiki Pages". PC World. Retrieved 2006-10-09. 
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